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I. INTRODUCTION 
Land, and controlling what happens on it and the revenues from it, 
has always been the focal point of relations between Indigenous peoples 
and non-Natives in North America.1  Today, as many Indian tribes re-
build their land bases after centuries of dispossession, with the result that 
state and local governments generally lose jurisdiction over the land, the 
politics around tribal land (re)acquisitions2 are among the most conten-
tious in Indian-white relations and federal Indian policy.  Conflicts over 
tribal land reacquisitions exist throughout the United States, from New 
England across the Great Lakes and Great Plains regions to California, 
and in the suburbs of some of America’s largest cities and the capital cit-
ies of several states.3  And though the overwhelming majority of tribal 
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 1.   This article uses the terms “Indigenous,” “Indian,” and “Native,” and “peoples,” “nations,” 
and “tribes,” interchangeably, with acknowledgment that none of these words is from a language 
indigenous to what is now called North America that people indigenous to this continent use to de-
scribe themselves.  See also infra note 25. 
 2.   The word “reacquisition” is used hereafter to reflect that, in almost all instances, tribes are 
purchasing or otherwise obtaining title to their ancestral lands. 
 3.   E.g., Frank Pommersheim, Land into Trust: An Inquiry into Law, Policy, and History, 49 
IDAHO L. REV. 519, 535–38 (2013) (discussing South Dakota’s opposition to and lawsuits over tribal 
land reacquisitions); Arkansas Lawmakers Oppose Tribe’s Request to Put Land into Federal Trust, 
ARK. NEWS (July 8, 2015), http://www.arkansasnews.com/news/arkansas/arkansas-lawmakers-
oppose-tribe-s-request-put-land-federal-trust (Little Rock, Arkansas); Perry Backus, County Dis-
cusses Medicine Tree Plan, RAVALLI REPUBLIC (Nov. 21, 2013), http://ravallirepublic.com/ 
news/local/article_cd7120f4-5323-11e3-8288-0019bb2963f4.html (Confederated Salish and Koote-
nai Tribes in Montana); Dean Baker, Cowlitz Tribe Continues Push for Casino near La Center, THE 
OREGONIAN (July 17, 2013), http://www.oregonlive.com/clark-county/index.ssf/2013/07/ 
cowlitz_tribe_continues_push_f.html (suburban Portland); Susannah Bryan, Davie Fighting Semi-
nole Tribe’s Bid to Absorb 10 Acres, SUN SENTINEL (Feb. 21, 2014), http://articles.sun-
sentinel.com/2014-02-21/news/fl-seminole-land-davie-20140221_1_seminole-tribe-sovereign-land-
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land reacquisitions are for agriculture, government infrastructure, hous-
ing, and cultural purposes,4 passions can be especially heated where a ca-
sino is potentially in the mix (or is perceived to be, as is often the case), 
particularly in a place like the Hamptons or California wine country.5 
                                                          
councilman-bryan-caletka (suburban Miami); Steve Carmody, Long Planned Lansing Casino Pro-
ject Remains in Limbo, MICH. RADIO (Oct. 31, 2016), http://michiganradio.org/post/long-planned-
lansing-casino-project-remains-limbo (Lansing, Michigan); Charles McConnell, Court Sides with 
Tohono O’odham—Again—in Fight over Glendale Casino, CRONKITE NEWS (Nov. 6, 2015), 
https://cronkitenews.azpbs.org/2015/11/06/court-sides-with-tohono-oodham-again-in-fight-over-
glendale-casino/ (suburban Phoenix); Sean P. Murphy, Taunton Property Owners Sue to Block Trib-
al Casino, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/02/04/taunton-
property-owners-file-lawsuit-block-tribal-casino-taunton/ysNpoe7y7mFUsGrdAmEyMP/story.html 
(challenge to new reservation lands for the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe in Massachusetts); Emma 
Nelson, Prior Lake City Council Opposes Shakopee Tribe’s Land Plans, STAR TRIBUNE (Dec. 21, 
2015), http://www.startribune.com/prior-lake-city-council-opposes-shakopee-tribe-s-land-
plans/363092071 (Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community in Minnesota); Adam Rodewald, Ho-
bart to Green Bay: Fight for Tribal Land, GREEN BAY PRESS-GAZETTE (Jan. 20, 2016), 
http://www.greenbaypressgazette.com/story/news/local/ 
2016/01/20/hobart-green-bay-fight-tribal-land/79061984 (Oneida Tribe in Wisconsin); Hudson San-
gree & Richard Chang, Casino Proposed for Southern Sacramento County Prompts Hopes, Con-
cerns, SACRAMENTO BEE (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.sacbee.com/entertainment/casino/ 
article60266761.html (outside Sacramento, California); Edward Sifuentes, Valley Center: Tribe’s 
Land Transfer Plan Opposed, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Apr. 15, 2011), 
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2011/apr/15/valley-center-tribes-land-transfer-plan-
opposed/ (suburban San Diego).  
 4.   Inadequate Standards for Trust Land Acquisition in the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934: Oversight Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Indian, Insular and Ala. Native Affairs of the 
H. Comm. on Nat. Res., 113th Cong. 4:08–4:30 (2015) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing Recording] 
(statement of Kevin Washburn, Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs), https://soundcloud.com/ 
indianz/testimony-17?in=indianz/sets/house-subcommittee-on-indian-insular-and-alaska-native-
affairs-may-14-2015 (“You may have been told that land into trust is only about gaming.  But in six-
plus years, out of 1,900 applications for land into trust approved [under the Obama Administration], 
fewer than twenty . . . were for gaming.  Most were for agriculture, followed by infrastructure such 
as schools and detention centers, then for non-gaming economic development, and then housing.”).  
 5.   E.g., Scott Gold, Tension Rises over Chumash Indian Plan for Santa Ynez Valley Casino, 
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/apr/05/local/la-me-casino-expansion-
20140406 (noting “persistent allegations” that the Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians “is secretly 
planning to build a second casino” on land slated for a tribal housing development in the Santa Ynez 
Valley); Danny Hakim, U.S. Recognizes an Indian Tribe on Long Island, Clearing the Way for a 
Casino, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/16/nyregion/ 
16shinnecock.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing speculation about the Shinnecock Indian Na-
tion building a casino in Southampton or New York City’s suburbs); Mark Harrington, Shinnecocks 
to Consider Revisiting Casino Proposals, NEWSDAY (July 14, 2016), 
http://www.newsday.com/long-island/suffolk/shinnecocks-weigh-revisiting-proposals-for-gaming-
casino-1.12044417 (same); Clark Mason, Lytton Pomo Tribe on Buying Spree in Sonoma County, 
PRESS DEMOCRAT (Dec. 1, 2013), http://www.pressdemocrat.com/csp/mediapool/sites/ 
PressDemocrat/News/story.csp?cid=2226315&sid=555&fid=181 (speculation about the Lytton 
Band of Pomo Indians building a casino on land the Tribe purchased in the Sonoma County); see 
also Quapaw Tribe Says No Casino on Pulaski County Property, WASH. TIMES (July 11, 2015), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/11/quapaw-tribe-says-no-casino-on-pulaski-
county-prop/ (discussing the Quapaw Tribe’s offer, in response to opposition from Arkansas’s gov-
ernor and U.S. Congressional delegation, to sign an agreement that it will not build a casino on a 
160-acre tract outside of Little Rock that encompasses an old Quapaw village, including cemeteries).  
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Most tribes are rebuilding their land bases using the Indian Reorgan-
ization Act (the “IRA”), a 1934 law that authorizes the U.S. Secretary of 
the Interior to acquire land for Indians.6  Through the “fee-to-trust” ad-
ministrative process, a tribe requests the Secretary to acquire and hold 
(fee) title to the land in trust for the tribe, and the Secretary, after giving 
state and local governments and members of the public the opportunity 
to comment, decides whether to take the land into trust.7  As the Interior 
Department has exercised this authority more frequently in recent years,8 
the backlash against tribal land reacquisitions has grown.  It is evidenced 
by the numerous lawsuits and administrative challenges regarding fee-to-
trust decisions happening across the country.9  Two of these challenges 
reached the Supreme Court in the past decade.10 
                                                          
For a general discussion of the modern stereotype of the “rich casino Indian” and how the politics 
around Indian casinos have reshaped tribal-state-local government relations, see JEFF CORNTASSEL 
& RICHARD C. WITMER, FORCED FEDERALISM: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO INDIGENOUS NA-
TIONHOOD 4–6 (2008).  
 6.   Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984.  The Secretary’s land acquisition 
authority is codified at 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2012) (editorially reclassified as § 5108 in Aug. 2016).  
 7.   The regulations governing the fee-to-trust process are codified at 25 C.F.R. Part 151 
(2016).  
 8.   In a May 2015 Congressional hearing, Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs Kevin Wash-
burn, the highest-ranking official in the U.S. Indian affairs bureaucracy, referred to legislators’ 
“question[ing] . . . the legitimacy of the Administration’s power to take land into trust for tribes” and 
explained that  
[the] Interior [Department] has exercised this power for over eighty years . . . without any 
problems. . . . Now admittedly, Interior’s power to take land into trust was used only rare-
ly during the previous Presidential Administration.  But when President Obama came into 
office . . . Interior dusted off the power and began taking land into trust [for tribes] again.  
Since 2009, we’ve taken nearly 300,000 acres of land into trust for well more than one 
hundred tribes. 
Oversight Hearing Recording, supra note 4, at 0:45–1:43, 3:00–3:04; see also Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of the Interior, Obama Administration Exceeds Ambitious Goal to Restore 500,000 Acres of 
Tribal Homelands (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/obama-administration-
exceeds-ambitious-goal-restore-500000-acres-tribal-homelands (noting the Interior Department has 
placed more than 500,000 acres into trust since 2009). 
 9.   E.g., Stand Up for California! v. Dep’t of Interior, No. 12-2039, 2016 WL 4621065 
(D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2016) (North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians in California); Littlefield v. Dep’t of 
Interior, No. 16-10184, 2016 WL 4098749 (D. Mass. July 28, 2016) (Mashpee Wampanoag Indian 
Tribe in Massachusetts); Cty. of Amador v. Dep’t of Interior, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1193 (E.D. Cal. 2015), 
appeal filed, No. 15-17253 (9th Cir.) (Ione Band of Miwok Indians in California); Citizens for a Bet-
ter Way v. Dep’t of Interior, No. 2:12-cv-3021, 2015 WL 5648925 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2015) (Es-
tom Yumeka Maidu Tribe of the Enterprise Rancheria in California)); Patchak v. Jewell, 109 F. 
Supp. 3d 152 (D.D.C. 2015), aff’d, 828 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish 
Band of Pottawatomi Indians in Michigan); Upstate Citizens for Equal., Inc. v. Jewell, No. 5:08-cv-
0633, 2015 WL 1399366 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Upstate Citizens for Equal., Inc. 
v. United States, No. 15-1688, 2016 WL 6608942 (2d Cir. Nov. 9, 2016) (Oneida Indian Nation in 
New York); Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. v. Jewell, 75 F. Supp. 3d 387 (D.D.C. 
2014), aff’d, 830 F.3d 552 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Citizens Against Reservation 
Shopping v. Jewell (U.S. Oct. 27, 2016) (No. 16-572) (Cowlitz Indian Tribe in Washington); Grand 
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In 2009, the Court in Carcieri v. Salazar interpreted the Indian Reor-
ganization Act to authorize land acquisitions only for Indian tribes that 
were “under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934, when Congress passed the 
IRA.11  Although the Court did not say what it means for a tribe to have 
been under federal jurisdiction in 1934, its decision gave fee-to-trust op-
ponents a new argument: that the federal government cannot take the 
land into trust because the tribe in question was not under federal juris-
diction in 1934.  The first cases where local governments and others (in-
cluding other tribes in some instances) make this argument are percolat-
ing through the courts.12  The Carcieri issue—whether a tribe was under 
federal jurisdiction in 1934—has also come up in lawsuits over property 
taxes,13 casino licenses,14 and tribal-state gaming compact negotiations.15 
Carcieri, like the broader fee-to-trust politics it is part of, is a lens for 
watching the centuries-old struggle over control of land and resources 
that underlies federal Indian law play out in the new millennium.  It is 
thus unsurprising that “Carcieri,” the last name of the former Rhode Is-
land governor who filed the lawsuit, has in the last several years assumed 
both a descriptive (e.g., a “Carcieri question” or something “Carcieri-
related”) and doctrinal status (the “Carcieri issue”) in the federal Indian 
                                                          
Traverse Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs. v. Acting Midwest Reg’l Dir., 61 IBIA 273 (2015), 2015 WL 
10939236 (rejecting challenge to acquisition for the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa 
Indians in Michigan, and upholding Interior Department finding that the Band was under federal 
jurisdiction in 1934); Miami-Dade Cty. v. Acting E. Reg’l Dir., 57 IBIA 192 (2013), 2013 WL 
4405996 (Seminole Indian Tribe in Florida); Vill. of Hobart v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 57 IBIA 4 
(2013), 2013 WL 3054077 (Oneida Tribe of Indians in Wisconsin); Nelson, supra note 3 (discussing 
Prior Lake City Council challenge to acquisition for the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Communi-
ty).  In addition to these challenges to fee-to-trust acquisitions for particular tribes, the State of Alas-
ka sued to block implementation of a rule authorizing the Interior Secretary to acquire lands in trust 
for Alaska Native villages.  Akiachak Native Cmty. v. Salazar, 935 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. 2013) 
(upholding Secretary’s authority to acquire land into trust for Native villages and tribes in Alaska), 
vacated sub nom. Akiachak Native Cmty. v. Dep’t of Interior, 827 F.3d 100 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see 
also Raenne Holmes, No Appeal from State of Alaska in Land-into-Trust Case, ALASKA NATIVE 
NEWS (Aug. 16, 2016), http://alaska-native-news.com/no-appeal-from-state-of-alaska-in-land-into-
trust-case-23724 (discussing Alaska’s announcement that it would no longer pursue the litigation). 
 10.   Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199 
(2012) (challenge to acquisition for Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians); 
Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (challenge to acquisition for Narragansett Indian Tribe). 
 11.   Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 391.  
 12.   See cases listed supra note 9.  
 13.   Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Hildreth, No. 1:15-0277, 2015 WL 4469479 (S.D. Ala. 
July 22, 2015), aff’d, No. 15-13400, 2016 WL 3668021 (11th Cir. July 11, 2016) (county property 
taxes in Alabama).  
 14.   KG Urban Enters. v. Patrick, 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (commercial gaming licenses in 
Massachusetts).  
 15.   Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 789 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2015) (gaming compact nego-
tiations in California).  
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law lexicon.  The Carcieri case is significant not simply because of the 
litigation it has spurred, which can determine whether or not a casino or 
some other tribal project gets built.16  The case and its fallout—including 
various Congressional hearings and attempts at a “Carcieri-fix” amend-
ment to the Indian Reorganization Act17—encapsulate some of the most 
dynamic aspects of modern federal Indian law and policy: judicial dis-
comfort with tribal sovereignty, and particularly with tribes’ exercising 
                                                          
 16.   The fee-to-trust regulations require the Secretary to consider the purpose for which the 
land will be used, 25 C.F.R. §§ 151.10(c), 151.11(a) (2016), but whether land is eligible for gaming 
is ultimately determined by criteria in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 § 4, 25 U.S.C. § 
2703(4) (defining “Indian lands”); § 11, 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (regulation of gaming on Indian lands); § 
20, 25 U.S.C. § 2719 (gaming on lands acquired in trust after October 17, 1988).  That the land is 
held in trust may be, and often is, a precondition for operating a casino there.  
 17.   See, e.g., The Carcieri Crisis: The Ripple Effect on Jobs, Economic Development, and 
Public Safety in Indian Country: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011); 
Supreme Court Decision, Carcieri v. Salazar, Ramifications to Indian Tribes: Oversight Hearing Be-
fore H. Comm. on Nat’l Res., 111th Cong. (2009).  So-called “Carcieri-fix” legislation, which would 
affirm the Interior Secretary’s authority to acquire land for all federally recognized tribes, has been 
introduced in every Congress since Carcieri was decided.  S. 1879, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 732, 
114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 407, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 249, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 2188, 113th 
Cong. (2014); S. 676, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R. 1291, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1234, 112th Cong. 
(2011); S. 1703, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R. 3742, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3697, 111th Cong. 
(2009); Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier & Ruth K. Khalsa, A Post-Carcieri Vocabulary Exercise: What 
If “Now” Really Means “Then”?, 1 UNLV GAMING L.J. 39, 67–69 (2010) (discussing amendments 
proposed  following Carcieri); see also H.R. 3137, 114th Cong. (2015) (proposed legislation that 
would affirm the trust status of all lands acquired in trust before the Carcieri decision); Rep. Tom 
Cole Suffers Defeat as Land-into-Trust Fix Goes Down in House, INDIANZ.COM (July 13, 2016) 
http://www.indianz.com/News/2016/07/13/rep-tom-cole-suffers-defeat-as-landintot.asp (discussing 
unsuccessful effort to include the relevant language from H.R. 3137 in the fiscal year 2017 Interior 
appropriations bill).  Some of these legislative proposals have been tied to broader changes to the 
fee-to-trust process.  Press Release, Senate Comm. On Indian Affairs, Barrasso Introduces the Inte-
rior Improvement Act (July 29, 2015), http://www.indian.senate.gov/news/press-release/barrasso-
introduces-interior-improvement-act (discussing the Interior Improvement Act, S. 1879, 114th Cong. 
(2015), which would remove the “now under Federal jurisdiction” language from the IRA and, ac-
cording to the sponsoring senator’s press release, “restore[] the Secretary of the Interior’s authority 
to take land into trust for all federally recognized tribes” while “incentivizing the use of cooperative 
agreements” with local governments); Julie Bykowicz and Derek Wallbank, Feinstein Battles with 
Obama over Casinos Using 1934 Law, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2013-09-19/feinstein-battles-with-obama-over-casinos-using-1934-law.html (discussing sena-
tors’ use of the Carcieri ruling “as leverage” in their efforts “to curb tribal gaming expansion”); see 
also Sen. Feinstein Pushing for Anti-Gaming Language in Carcieri Fix, INDIANZ.COM (July 14, 
2016), http://www.indianz.com/IndianGaming/2016/07/14/sen-feinstein-pushing-for-anti.asp (dis-
cussing Senator Diane Feinstein’s statement regarding a potential amendment to the Interior Im-
provement Act, mentioned supra, that would restrict tribal casinos on certain acquired lands).  In 
addition, the Carcieri decision and interpretation of the Indian Reorganization Act’s “under Federal 
jurisdiction” language are the subject of one of the eight Interior Department Solicitor’s opinions 
issued during the Obama Administration. See Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, Solicitor of 
the Dep’t of the Interior, to Sally Jewell, Sec’y of the Dep’t. of Interior, M-37029 (Mar. 12, 2014),  
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.opengov.ibmcloud.com/files/uploads/M-37029.pdf; see also Solici-
tor’s Opinions, DEP’T OF INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/solicitor-dev/opinions (last visited Sept. 28, 
2016) (listing opinions).   
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sovereignty over land removed from state and local government jurisdic-
tion;18 perceptions about so-called “reservation shopping” by tribes try-
ing to take land into trust for casinos19 (and that tribes always plan to 
build casinos no matter the stated purpose for the acquisition);20 and the 
political power and relative influence of tribes, states, and local govern-
ments in Congress. 
But the Carcieri case has received relatively little attention in federal 
Indian law scholarship.21  That is unfortunate, given not just its obvious 
practical importance for Indian tribes trying to rebuild their land bases 
                                                          
 18.   During the Carcieri oral argument, Justice Kennedy twice queried whether the Court 
should be “cautious” about removing land from Rhode Island’s jurisdiction, and Chief Justice Rob-
erts called the IRA’s land acquisition authority “an extraordinary assertion of [federal] power.”  
Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (No. 07-526) (statement 
of Roberts, C.J.) (“[W]e are talking about an extraordinary assertion of power.  The Secretary gets to 
take land and give it a whole different jurisdictional status apart from State law and all . . . .”); id. at 
38–39 (statement of Kennedy, J.) (referencing Roberts’s question and asking “Is there any overrid-
ing principle[] about which we must be most cautious before we interpret the statute as depriving the 
State of the ownership and jurisdiction of this land?”).  
 19.  As described by Senator Diane Feinstein in a 2010 newspaper op-ed, “reservation shop-
ping” happens when “tribes from rural areas seek federal approval to acquire lands in trust in densely 
populated urban areas.”  Diane Feinstein, Opinion, It’s Time to Say “Enough is Enough” to Reserva-
tion Shopping, EAST BAY TIMES (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.eastbaytimes.com/2010/11/29/ 
readers-forum-must-stop-reservation-shopping-once-and-for-all/.  
 20.   After the Assistant U.S. Solicitor General explained to the Carcieri Court that the Narra-
gansett Tribe was building housing on the land at issue, Chief Justice Roberts asked if “[t]hey could 
engage in other activities that Indian tribes can engage in[,]” which the Assistant Solicitor General 
understood to be Roberts’s “concern[] with . . . the specter of gaming” on the land.  Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 37, Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379 (No. 07-526). 
 21.   A search on Westlaw (for “Carcieri” in the Law Reviews & Journals Database) yielded 
just three articles and a few student comments that discuss the Carcieri case with anything more than 
a passing reference, and they mostly focus on legislative, judicial, and administrative remedies.  See 
G. William Rice, The Indian Reorganization Act, The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples, and a Proposed Carcieri “Fix”: Updating the Trust Land Acquisition Process, 45 IDAHO L. 
REV. 575, 592–94 (2009) (discussing the Carcieri holding and its impacts in the context of a broader 
argument for revising the IRA and Indian trust land acquisition process); Staudenmaier & Khalsa, 
supra note 17, at 67–69 (focusing on proposed amendments to the IRA following Carcieri); Scott A. 
Taylor, Taxation in Indian Country After Carcieri v. Salazar, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 590, 601–
20 (2010) (examining the case’s potential consequences for tribal, state, and federal taxes); Noah 
Nehemiah Gillespie, Essay, Preserving Trust: Overruling Carcieri and Patchak While Respecting the 
Takings Clause, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1707 (2013); Amanda D. Hettler, Note, Beyond a Carcieri 
Fix: The Need for Broader Reform of the Land-into-Trust Process of the Indian Reorganization Act 
of 1934, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1377 (2011); Howard L. Highland, Recent Development, A Regulatory 
Quick Fix for Carcieri v. Salazar: How the Department of the Interior Can Invoke an Alternative 
Source of Existing Statutory Authority to Overcome an Adverse Judgment Under the Chevron Doc-
trine, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 933 (2011); Melanie Riccobene Jarboe, Note, Collective Rights to Indige-
nous Land in Carcieri v. Salazar, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 395 (2010); Christian Vareika, Com-
ment, Mere Speculation: Overextending Carcieri v. Salazar in Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 
56 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 180 (2015); Sarah Washburn, Comment, Distinguishing Carcieri v. 
Salazar: Why the Supreme Court Got It Wrong and How Congress and Courts Should Respond to 
Preserve Tribal and Federal Interests in the IRA’s Trust-Land Provisions, 85 WASH. L. REV. 603 
(2010). 
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and those opposing them, but also the doctrinal and historical complexi-
ties at play.  Delving into those complexities, this article explores the 
question the Carcieri Court left unanswered—the meaning of “under 
Federal jurisdiction”—and whether there can be an Indian tribe that is 
recognized by the United States today that was not under federal jurisdic-
tion in 1934. 
I argue that, doctrinally, all Indian tribes currently recognized as 
such by the U.S. government—all “federally recognized tribes”22—
necessarily were under federal jurisdiction in 1934.  Under the doctrine 
of discovery (or discovery doctrine), the United States, like the European 
powers that preceded it, asserted jurisdiction regarding the Indigenous 
peoples within its claimed territories and assumed certain obligations to 
those peoples.23  As it developed this doctrine into the plenary Indian af-
fairs power doctrine (or plenary power doctrine), the Supreme Court ex-
plained that the federal government had since its inception possessed this 
plenary jurisdiction regarding all Indians within the United States’ 
boundaries.24  It was part of the colonial relationship: because the United 
States claimed sovereignty over their territories, the Indians living there 
fell under the federal government’s jurisdiction. 
                                                          
 22.   As explained on the Bureau of Indian Affairs website,  
  [a] federally recognized tribe is an American Indian or Alaska Native tribal entity that 
is recognized as having a government-to-government relationship with the United States, 
with the responsibilities, powers, limitations, and obligations attached to that designation, 
and is eligible for funding and services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
  Furthermore, federally recognized tribes are recognized as possessing certain inherent 
rights of self-government (i.e., tribal sovereignty) and are entitled to receive certain fed-
eral benefits, services, and protections because of their special relationship with the Unit-
ed States. 
Frequently Asked Questions, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.bia.gov/FAQs/ (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2016). 
 23.   See generally ANTHONY PAGDEN, LORDS OF ALL THE WORLD: IDEOLOGIES OF EMPIRE IN 
SPAIN, BRITAIN AND FRANCE C. 1500–C.1800 ch. 3 (1995); see also Robert A. Williams, Jr., The 
Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s 
Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219, 293 (discussing the “guardianship responsibility by 
which individual European colonizers arrogated to themselves an unquestioned authority over Indian 
Nations”).  By using the discovery doctrine and its progeny, including the plenary power doctrine, to 
make its argument, this article’s intention is neither to perpetuate nor entrench further these doc-
trines.  But so long as they remain part of United States law, the United States government and its 
institutions should abide the concomitant principle that—according to these doctrines—federal juris-
diction extends to all Indigenous peoples in territories over which the United States asserts title. 
 24.   Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 
U. PA. L. REV. 195, 207–11 (1984) (arguing that the discovery doctrine is “the central analytical el-
ement” of the federal government’s power); Judith V. Royster & Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Control 
of the Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State Intru-
sion, 64 WASH. L. REV. 581, 587 (1989) (noting that federal plenary power in Indian affairs “de-
rive[s] from the doctrine of discovery”); see infra Part IV. 
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Thus, whether federal jurisdiction exists with respect to particular 
people(s),25 or whether they are “under Federal jurisdiction” in IRA par-
lance, has always involved a singular inquiry—whether the people(s) 
continue to exist as a distinct Indian community, such that the Indian af-
fairs jurisdiction attaches to them.  Throughout U.S. history, however, 
federal decisionmakers have expressed uncertainty, and changed their 
minds, regarding whether certain people(s) were Indians or Indian tribes 
(or whether they had become too intermarried or assimilated).  But the 
fact that federal officials did not—for whatever reason—exercise juris-
diction with respect to specific people(s) does not negate its existence.  
The federal government’s Indian affairs jurisdiction was always (as-
sumed to be) there, to be exercised whenever officials decided.  That 
they eventually did exercise this jurisdiction, even if not until after 1934, 
begs the question of when and how it arose. 
Part II of this article presents an overview of the Carcieri case.  Part 
III follows with a brief discussion of the histories of particular Indige-
nous people(s) to illustrate the difference between their being, de jure, 
under federal jurisdiction and federal officials, de facto, exercising that 
jurisdiction.  Part IV discusses the meaning of jurisdiction, as it was 
commonly understood in 1934 and as it has been used in the context of 
the federal government’s jurisdiction in Indian affairs, focusing on the 
plenary power doctrine that developed in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.  Part V examines what it meant for an Indian tribe to 
be “recognized” by the federal government in the years around the IRA’s 
passage and how the concept has evolved over time into its current refer-
ence to tribes appearing on a list published annually by the Bureau of In-
dian Affairs. 
With that doctrinal and historical background, Part VI looks specifi-
cally at what Congress was doing when it passed the Indian Reorganiza-
                                                          
 25.   “Tribe” is the operative word in federal Indian law generally, and in the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act.  But it is defined and understood to include Indian nations, Pueblos, bands, communities, 
colonies, rancherias, and villages as well.  Where possible, I use the term “people(s)” because it is 
consistent with developing international human rights norms, see Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R. 
Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights, 102 CAL. L. REV. 173 
(2014) (discussing international human rights law developments and using the term “indigenous 
peoples” throughout), and because it reflects federal officials’ uncertainty regarding whether certain 
people, or groups of people, qualified as a “tribe” and therefore as an Indigenous people under Unit-
ed States law.  Cf. Sharon O’Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does the United States Maintain 
a Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1494 (1991) (“The United States must recognize 
that it has an obligation to all indigenous peoples within its borders.  The source of these obligations 
does not depend solely upon the existence of treaties and legislation which assist some and not oth-
ers, or upon the whimsical nature of the judiciary, but is based ultimately upon the status of Indians 
(and Native Alaskans, Aleuts, and Native Hawaiians) as indigenous peoples.”).  
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tion Act in 1934 and defined “Indian” in the legislation to include 
“members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdic-
tion.”26  Using the legislative history of the IRA and of post-1934 Indian 
affairs laws, I show that the Congressional debates were about—and the 
“under Federal jurisdiction” language was added to address concerns re-
garding—who was and wasn’t “Indian,” and therefore who should or 
shouldn’t qualify for federal services and programs for Indians.  I con-
clude with thoughts on some normative, interpretive, and doctrinal ques-
tions involved with deciding what it means to have been a “recognized 
Indian tribe . . . under Federal jurisdiction” in 1934. 
II. THE CARCIERI DECISION 
The Carcieri litigation involved a 31-acre land acquisition for a 
housing development for the Narragansett Indian Tribe, whose presence 
in what is now Rhode Island dates back millennia.27  The Narragansett 
had diplomatic relations with the British crown and colony of Rhode Is-
land, ceded most of their territory to Rhode Island in the early 1700s, and 
were the subject of an 1880 Rhode Island state law purporting to abolish 
the tribe’s authority and alienate all but two acres of its remaining 
lands.28  In 1983, the United States formally acknowledged a political re-
lationship with the Narragansett Tribe, finding that the Tribe had contin-
ually existed from colonial times as a distinct Indian community and pol-
ity.29  The following decade, the Tribe purchased and asked the Secretary 
of the Interior to place in trust the land at issue in the Supreme Court’s 
2009 decision.30 
                                                          
 26.   Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 § 19, 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2012) (editorially reclassified as 
§ 5129 in Aug. 2016). 
 27.   Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 384–85 (2009). 
 28.   Different versions of the tribe’s history, both of which discuss the Narragansett being 
placed under the formal guardianship of Rhode Island in the early 1700s and that guardianship’s 
ending with the 1880 law, are presented in the majority and Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinions. See 
id. at 383; id. at 403 (Stevens, J. dissenting).  A general overview of the tribe’s history can be found 
on the tribe’s website, Historical Perspective of the Narragansett Indian Tribe, NARRAGANSETT 
INDIAN TRIBE, http://www.narragansett-tribe.org/history.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2016), and in 
ROBERT A. GEAKE, A HISTORY OF THE NARRAGANSETT TRIBE OF RHODE ISLAND: KEEPERS OF THE 
BAY (2011).  
 29.   Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgement of Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode 
Island, 48 Fed. Reg. 6177 (Feb. 2, 1983) (publishing determination of Narragansett tribal status); see 
also infra notes 259–69 and accompanying text (discussing 25 C.F.R. Part 83 administrative process 
for federal recognition and criteria in 25 C.F.R. § 83.11(a), (b), (c), and (e) requiring continuous ex-
istence as a distinct community and autonomous political entity).   
 30.   Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 385.  
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The Carcieri Court held that because the Indian Reorganization Act 
authorizes the Interior Secretary to acquire land for “Indians,”31 which 
the statute defines to include “persons of Indian descent who are mem-
bers of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction,”32 
this authorization extends only to tribes that were under federal jurisdic-
tion in 1934, when Congress passed the IRA.33  The majority—in an 
opinion authored by Justice Thomas and joined by Justices Roberts, 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito—adopted a textualist approach that focused 
on the plain meaning of the word “now,” which they said was unambig-
uous.34  They relied primarily on contemporaneous dictionary definitions 
that defined “now” as “the present time or moment,”35 and noted that the 
Court had interpreted the word in other statutes consistently with those 
dictionary definitions.36 
                                                          
 31.   25 U.S.C. § 465 (2012) (editorially reclassified as § 5108 in Aug. 2016). (“The Secretary 
of the Interior is authorized . . . to acquire . . . any interest in lands . . . for the purpose of providing 
land for Indians.”).  
 32.   Id. § 479 (emphasis added) (editorially reclassified as § 5129 in Aug. 2016).  25 U.S.C. § 
479 provides that  
[t]he term “Indian” as used in this Act shall include [1] all persons of Indian descent who 
are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and [2] all 
persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing with-
in the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall further include [3] all other 
persons of one-half or more Indian blood. 
Id.  The argument in Carcieri focused only on the first prong of the definition; thus the Court did not 
discuss the other two categories—descendants and half-(or-more-)bloods—of Indians listed.  See 
Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 391–92. 
 33.   Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 395.  The Court rejected the United States’ and Narragansett Tribe’s 
argument that “now” referred to the time at which the Interior Department decided to acquire the 
land.  Id. at 391.  Although the case was ostensibly about interpreting the word “now,” larger issues 
were at play.  See id. at 414 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s decision can best be described 
as protecting one sovereign (the State) from encroachment from another (the Tribe).  Yet in matters 
of Indian law, the political branches have been entrusted to mark the proper boundaries between 
tribal and state jurisdiction.”).  Justices Roberts and Kennedy expressed their concerns at oral argu-
ment about the federal government’s taking land into trust for tribes—thereby removing it from state 
jurisdiction—being an infringement on states’ rights.  See supra note 18. Also in the background 
was a concern that the Narragansett Tribe might try to build a casino on the land.  See supra note 20 
(discussing Assistant Solicitor General’s exchange with Chief Justice Roberts about “the specter of 
gaming” during Carcieri oral argument); see also Carcieri v. Norton, 290 F. Supp. 2d 167, 172 
(D.R.I. 2003) (discussing “possible use of the parcel for gaming purposes”), aff’d en banc sub. nom. 
Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F .3d 15 (1st Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).  
 34.   Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 395 (“We hold that the term ‘now under Federal jurisdiction’ in § 
479 unambiguously refers to those tribes that were under the federal jurisdiction of the United States 
when the IRA was enacted in 1934.”); id. at 390 (referring to § 479 as “this unambiguous statute”).   
 35.   Id. at 388 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1934) (“[a]t the 
present time . . . moment”) (alteration in original) and BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933) 
(“[a]t this time; . . . present moment; . . . ‘[n]ow’ as used in a statute ordinarily refers to the date of 
its taking effect”) (alterations in original)).  
 36.   Id. at 388–89 (examining opinions interpreting “now” in legislation passed before and af-
ter the IRA).  The majority also noted that interpreting “now” to mean 1934 “align[ed] with the natu-
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Having held that “now” meant 1934,37 the majority concluded that 
the Narragansett were not under federal jurisdiction then, although the 
issue was not briefed or argued.  Rhode Island asserted in its petition for 
certiorari and during oral argument that the Narragansett Tribe was not 
under federal jurisdiction in 1934,38 neither the United States nor the 
Tribe (who participated as an amicus curiae) challenged this assertion, 
and, according to the Court, the only evidence in the record indicated that 
the Tribe was not under federal jurisdiction in 1934.39  Thus the Court 
never debated whether the Narragansett were, or even what it meant to 
be, under federal jurisdiction in 1934.40  The Court simply treated the 
point as conceded with respect to the Narragansett Tribe. 
Justices Souter and Ginsburg noted as much, arguing that the case 
should be remanded because “the very notion of jurisdiction as a distinct 
statutory condition was ignored in th[e] litigation.”41  They also ex-
                                                          
ral reading of the word within the context of the IRA[,]” pointing to two other places where the IRA 
used “now or hereafter,” and that Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier had explained in 
1936 that the IRA definition included Indians who were members of tribes that were “under Federal 
jurisdiction at the date of the Act.”  Id. at 389–90 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 468 and 472).  
 37.   Id. at 395.  Justices Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg, in their concurring opinions, found the 
“now under Federal jurisdiction” language to be ambiguous but deferred to the Interior Department’s 
historic practice of interpreting “now” to mean 1934.  Justice Breyer thought that the statutory lan-
guage was ambiguous but agreed that “now” meant 1934 principally because the Interior Depart-
ment took that position in the years after the IRA’s passage.  See id. at 396 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
Justices Souter and Ginsburg agreed with Breyer on this point.  Id. at 400–01 (Souter, J., concurring 
in part).   
 38.   Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 552 U.S. 1229 (2008) (No. 
07-526); Transcript of Oral Argument at 20–21, 57, Carceiri, 555 U.S. 379 (No. 07-526). 
 39.   Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 382 (“[T]he record in this case establishes that the Narragansett Tribe 
was not under federal jurisdiction when the IRA was enacted . . . .”); id. at 384 (“[I]n correspond-
ence spanning a 10-year period from 1927 to 1937, federal officials . . . not[ed] that the Tribe was, 
and always has been, under the jurisdiction of the New England States, rather than the Federal Gov-
ernment.”).  The Court ended its opinion by noting that 
[n]one of the parties or amici, including the Narragansett Tribe itself, has argued that the 
Tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.  And the evidence in the record is to the 
contrary.  Moreover, the petition for writ of certiorari filed in this case specifically repre-
sented that “[i]n 1934, the Narragansett Indian Tribe . . . was neither federally recognized 
nor under the jurisdiction of the federal government.”  The respondents’ brief in opposi-
tion declined to contest this assertion.  Under our rules, that alone is reason to accept this 
as fact for purposes of our decision in this case. 
Id. at 395–96 (second alteration and omission in original) (citations omitted).  
 40.   Id.; see Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, supra note 17, at 17 (noting that “the 
issue of whether the [Narragansett] Tribe ‘was under federal jurisdiction’ was not litigated before the 
Court” and that “neither the Court nor the parties elaborated on what would be necessary to demon-
strate that a tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934”).  
 41.   Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 401 (Souter, J., dissenting in part).  Noting the federal government’s 
explanation during oral argument that the Department had “understood recognition and under Feder-
al jurisdiction at least with respect to tribes to be one and the same,” id. (quoting Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 42, Carceiri, 555 U.S. 379 (No. 07-526)), Justices Souter and Ginsburg said it was “not 
surprising that neither [the United States] nor the Tribe raised a claim that the Tribe was under fed-
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plained that the United States’ ignoring—or being “ignorant of”—“a 
tribe in 1934 does not preclude that tribe from having been under federal 
jurisdiction [in 1934].”42  Justice Breyer agreed that a tribe could have 
been under federal jurisdiction in 1934 even though government officials 
did not believe so at the time,43 and he offered treaty obligations, con-
gressional appropriations, and “enrollment (as of 1934) with the Indian 
Office” as examples of indicia of a relationship between a tribe and the 
United States “that could be described as jurisdictional.”44  Breyer also 
offered the examples of three specific tribes the Interior Department—
after 1934—formally recognized, or treated, as Indian tribes under feder-
al jurisdiction and acknowledged “that it should have recognized . . . in 
1934 even though it did not[,]” including a tribe the department thought 
had been “dissolved” and another tribe the department concluded “no 
longer existed” based on an early 1900s anthropological study.45 
The Court was mistaken, however, in its assumptions regarding basic 
federal Indian law doctrine(s) and how it situated Narragansett tribal his-
tory in that doctrinal context.  First, the Justices (except Ginsburg, Sout-
                                                          
eral jurisdiction in 1934: they simply failed to address an issue that no party understood to be pre-
sent.”  Id.  Souter and Ginsburg also stated that they “kn[e]w of no body of precedent or history of 
practice giving content to the condition sufficient for gauging the [Narragansett] Tribe’s chances of 
satisfying it[,]” but they “c[ould] agree . . . that the current record raise[d] no particular reason to 
expect that the Tribe might be shown to have been under federal jurisdiction in 1934.”  Id.  
 42.   Id. at 400 (“[T]he fact that the United States government was ignorant of a tribe in 1934 
does not preclude that tribe from having been under federal jurisdiction at that time.”).  
 43.   Id. at 399 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also id. at 397–98 (discussing tribes that were “‘un-
der Federal jurisdiction’ in 1934—even though the Department did not know it at the time.”)  Like 
the majority, Justice Breyer accepted that the Narragansett Tribe was not under federal jurisdiction 
in 1934.  Id. at 399–400 (“[B]oth the State and Federal Government considered the Narragansett 
Tribe as under state, but not under federal, jurisdiction in 1934.  And until the 1970’s there was ‘lit-
tle Federal contact with the Narragansetts as a group.’”) (quoting Memorandum from Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary – Indian Affairs (Operations) to Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs 8 (July 29, 
1982)); id. at 399 (“Neither the Narragansett Tribe nor the Secretary has argued that the Tribe was 
under federal jurisdiction in 1934. . . . And I have found nothing in the briefs that suggests the Nar-
ragansett Tribe could prevail on [this] theory.”).  
 44.   Id. at 399 (discussing examples of “post-1934 recognition on grounds that implied a 1934 
relationship between the tribe and Federal Government that could be described as jurisdictional, for 
example, a treaty with the United States (in effect in 1934), a (pre-1934) congressional appropria-
tion, or enrollment (as of 1934) with the Indian Office.”); id. at 397 (“[A]n examination of the provi-
sion’s legislative history . . . shows that Congress expected the phrase would make clear that the Sec-
retary could employ § 465’s power to take land into trust in favor only of those tribes in respect to 
which the Federal Government already had the kinds of obligations that the words ‘under Federal 
jurisdiction’ imply.”).  It is unclear what exactly Justice Breyer meant by “enrollment . . . with the 
Indian Office”; presumably he was talking about local BIA agencies keeping censuses of or other 
records regarding certain Indians, administering services to and corresponding with them, and such. 
 45.   Id. at 398–99 (discussing the Stillaguamish Tribe, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and 
Chippewa Indians, and the Mole Lake Tribe); see also infra notes 132–33, 253, 256 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Stillaguamish, Grand Traverse, and Mole Lake Tribes).   
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er, and Stevens) wrongly equated the exercise of federal jurisdiction with 
its existence.46  Whether a government exercises jurisdiction in any given 
instance is a factual inquiry distinct from whether that jurisdiction exists 
as a matter of law.47  Second, the Court was wrong to suggest that the 
Narragansett Tribe, which in 1983 was added to the list of Indian tribes 
recognized by the United States based on an administrative determina-
tion that the Tribe had existed continually since the 1600s,48 was not un-
der federal jurisdiction in 1934.  If the Narragansett were an Indian tribe 
before, in, and after 1934, and the United States (according to the dis-
covery and plenary power doctrines) has jurisdiction over all tribes with-
in its territory, how could they not have been under federal jurisdiction in 
1934?49 
                                                          
 46.   Justices Souter and Ginsburg, as noted, thought the case should have been remanded to 
give the Narragansett Tribe and the United States an opportunity to argue the Tribe was under feder-
al jurisdiction in 1934—and to explain what “under Federal jurisdiction” means, since it was not 
argued in the litigation.  Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 400–01 (Souter, J., dissenting in part); see also supra 
notes 43–44 and accompanying text.  Justice Stevens wrote a lone dissent arguing that because the 
IRA authorizes the Secretary to acquire land for Indian tribes as well as individual Indians and plac-
es no temporal restraint on the definition of “Indian tribe,” it was senseless to argue about whether a 
tribe was under federal jurisdiction in 1934 so as to qualify as an “Indian” under the statute.  Id. at 
409–13 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Brief of Historians Frederick E. Hoxie, Paul C. Rosier, and 
Christian W. McMillen As Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 28, Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 
552 U.S. 1229 (2008) (No. 07-526) [hereinafter Historians’ Brief] (“[I]t is hardly plain—or even 
likely—that Congress meant the disputed language to affect the Act’s application to tribes, rather 
than just to ‘persons.’”). 
 47.   See infra notes 143–49 and accompanying text.  
 48.   See supra note 29 and accompanying text.  
 49.   The fact that federal (and state) officials considered the Narragansett to be under state ju-
risdiction in 1934, see Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 382–84, id. at 399–400 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also 
infra notes 72–95 and accompanying text (discussing federal officials’ correspondence regarding the 
Narragansett and other East Coast tribes), based on a relationship between the Narragansett Tribe 
and Rhode Island predating the United States, does not preclude them from also having been under 
federal jurisdiction.  See Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 1077 
(2014) [hereinafter Ablavsky, Constitution] (noting that “many states claimed and exercised a con-
stitutional right to govern Indians until well after the Civil War”) (citing, among other sources, DEB-
ORAH A. ROSEN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND STATE LAW: SOVEREIGNTY, RACE, AND CITIZENSHIP, 
1790–1880, at 51–79 (2007)). 
  Indeed, in litigation involving whether the Narragansett Tribe fell within the federal gov-
ernment’s jurisdiction under the Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012), which was first passed 
in 1790 and voids land transfers “from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians” without federal approv-
al—and through which, courts have found, a (jurisdictional) trust relationship exists between the 
federal government and Indigenous people(s) that (continually) exist(ed) as an Indian tribe (or na-
tion) within the meaning of the Act (which, in turn, requires that the people continually exist as a 
distinct Indian community)—the U.S. district court in Rhode Island explained that  
neither the State’s alleged unilateral attempt to disband the tribe in 1880, nor its assump-
tion of “almost exclusive responsibility for the protection and welfare of the” tribe’s 
members in the face of almost complete disregard by the federal government . . . could 
operate to terminate the trust relationship between the tribe and the federal government 
which would be established by proof that the Nonintercourse Act applies herein. 
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III. JURISDICTION AND RECOGNITION: EXISTENCE VERSUS EXERCISE 
This article’s examination of federal Indian law doctrine, policy, and 
history, and the legislative history of the Indian Reorganization Act—
which the Carcieri Court did not undertake—demonstrates that people(s) 
like the Narragansett who continuously existed as distinct Indian com-
munities were always considered to be under federal jurisdiction as a 
matter of law.  However, as the histories of the Narragansett and other 
people(s) discussed in this Part exemplify, federal officials did not al-
ways treat, or recognize, certain people(s) as Indians or tribes, whether 
because they thought those people(s) were too intermarried (with non-
Indians) or assimilated (into the larger economy and society), because of 
a lack of resources or political or bureaucratic will, or for a combination 
of these and/or other reasons.50  But as Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and 
                                                          
Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. S.R.I. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798, 803–04 (D.R.I. 1976) 
(citing and quoting Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 649, 
652–53, 663 n.15 (D. Me.), aff’d, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975)); see also Mashpee Tribe v. Sec’y of 
the Interior, 820 F.2d 480, 482 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that the Nonintercourse Act applies “only if 
plaintiffs show they are . . . entities that 1) were tribes at the time the land was alienated and 2) re-
main tribes at the time of suit”).  The Narragansett Tribe court never decided whether the Noninter-
course Act applied to the Narragansett Tribe; the litigation led to the Rhode Island Indian Claims 
Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 95-395, 92 Stat. 813 (1978) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. 
(2012)), which recognized Narragansett title to 1,800 acres of their ancestral lands and provided 
monetary compensation to the Tribe.  See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 384. 
  Similarly, the Second Circuit, in a Nonintercourse Act case involving the Mohegan Tribe 
(which also resulted in Congressional settlement legislation, see Mohegan Nation of Connecticut 
Land Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-377, 108 Stat. 3501 (1994) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 
1775 et seq. (2012))), stated that  
the fact that the federal government disclaimed responsibility for the[] [Mohegan and 
other New England] tribes is not determinative here.  We believe that, although consider-
able evidence amassed by the State supports the proposition that the federal government 
did not avail itself of the provisions of the Nonintercourse statute and appeared to leave 
management of the affairs of the eastern tribes to the individual states, it does not follow 
that the federal government had no obligation to do so, or that the states had the authority 
unimpeded by the Acts to buy land from the eastern tribes without federal approval. 
Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612, 623 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 50.   Federal officials often based their decisions about exercising the government’s Indian af-
fairs jurisdiction regarding certain people(s) on whether they thought those people(s) were Indian 
enough, either racially (because of intermarriage) or culturally (because of acculturation), or both, 
see MARK EDWIN MILLER, FORGOTTEN TRIBES: UNRECOGNIZED INDIANS AND THE FEDERAL AC-
KNOWLEDGMENT PROCESS 16 (2004) (“Legislative acknowledgment and federal court decisions 
generally . . . favored groups that retained some anachronistic survivals of aboriginal culture and 
visible racial features; in essence, groups that ‘looked’ Indian.”), id. at 30 (noting that Interior De-
partment determinations of tribal status in the mid-twentieth century “often hinged on the perceived 
level of assimilation of the group in question, racial issues, finances, or opinions whether the group 
needed wardship—not necessarily on the merits of a group’s tribal identity or status”), and across 
decades and centuries have changed their positions about whether some of these people(s) should be 
under federal jurisdiction.  See infra notes 76–103 and accompanying text (discussing changed De-
partment of Interior positions regarding the status of the Narragansett, Shinnecock, and other tribes), 
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Souter noted in Carcieri,51 just because federal officials did not exercise 
the government’s Indian affairs jurisdiction with respect to particular 
people(s) doesn’t mean that jurisdiction did not exist. 
Two patterns demonstrating federal officials’ scattered approach to 
tribal recognition, and the exercise of jurisdiction based thereon, are evi-
dent in U.S. history.  On one hand, some people(s), including the Narra-
gansett and other East Coast tribes, had to convince federal decisionmak-
ers that they continued to exist as distinct Indian communities (and that 
they were still racially and culturally “Indians”) and therefore came with-
in the government’s Indian affairs jurisdiction.  On the other hand, some 
people(s) whose “Indianness,” or identity as Indian communities, no one 
questioned struggled to persuade reluctant bureaucrats to exercise juris-
diction they knew—and even acknowledged—existed but, for whatever 
reason(s), did not want to employ. 
In both scenarios, the federal government for some period of time 
does not exercise jurisdiction it assumed under the law but later “recog-
nizes” those people(s) as Indian tribes, accords them the same legal sta-
tus as other tribes, and (re)establishes a formal government-to-
government relationship through which the United States exercises the 
Indian affairs jurisdiction always presumed there.52  Federal officials’ 
haphazardness regarding tribal recognition was exacerbated by the fact 
there was no formal policy or process for determining tribal status until 
                                                          
notes 219–26 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court cases holding Pueblo Indians in 
New Mexico were not Indians and later that they were Indians), and notes 132–36 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Department of the Interior opinions changing Department position regarding 
whether the Catawba, Nooksack, Burns Paiute, and Stillaguamish tribes were under federal jurisdic-
tion).  Limited federal resources also played a role, and may have led to federal officials’ prioritizing 
among tribes based on their perceived “Indianness” and needs.  See MILLER, supra, at 30 (noting 
that “John Collier and the Indian Service . . . denied recognition to many Chippewa and Ottawa 
bands in Michigan for the simple reason that federal funds were thin during the Great Depression.”); 
see also infra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing Interior Department officials’ concerns 
about the fiscal impacts of extending the Indian Reorganization Act to people(s) in Michigan). 
 51.   See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text.  
 52.   See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 694 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(“Federal recognition is just that: recognition of a previously existing [tribal] status.”).  Discussing 
the “fluidity of tribal existence,” a group of professors specializing in federal Indian law explained in 
an amicus brief filed in Carcieri that  
historically tribal status was not static.  Some groups considered Indian tribes early in 
their history were ultimately no longer identified by the federal government as such, be-
cause their membership had significantly dwindled in size or had fully assimilated into 
white society.  On the other hand, some groups determined not to be tribes later regained 
their tribal status.  
Brief of Law Professors Specializing in Federal Indian Law As Amicus Curiae Supporting Respond-
ents at 4, Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 552 U.S. 1229 (2008) (No. 07-526) [hereinafter Law Professors’ 
Brief].  
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1978, and no requirement to publish a list of tribes recognized by the 
United States until 1994.53  The examples discussed below of the 
Pamunkey Indian Tribe, Shinnecock Indian Nation, Mashpee Wampa-
noag Tribe, and Tejon Indian Tribe—the four peoples added to the list of 
federally recognized Indian tribes within the past decade—illustrate fed-
eral decisionmakers’ historical arbitrariness.54 
A. Eastern Seaboard Tribes (the Original Thirteen States) 
For most of its history, United States government officials treated the 
Narragansett, Pamunkey, Shinnecock, Mashpee, and other Indigenous 
people(s) along the eastern seaboard as “remnants” or “fragments” of 
polities that had formed political and economic relationships with the 
British crown and its colonies, which continued these relationships after 
they became states.  Federal officials for the most part deferred to the 
states’ exercise of authority regarding these tribes, citing their jurisdic-
tional relationships with the various states and, in some instances, their 
intermarriage with non-Indians and adaptation to Anglo culture.  Howev-
er, historical documents show that federal officials also understood that, 
although they were not doing so, they always had the prerogative to ex-
ercise the federal Indian affairs jurisdiction—what the Supreme Court 
has called the “power to deal with” these people(s)55—should they 
choose.  And they eventually did, raising the question(s) of when and 
how this jurisdiction arose. 
The different eastern seaboard tribes’ jurisdictional relationships 
with the states around them date back to seventeenth century colonial 
                                                          
 53.   See infra notes 259–63 and accompanying text (discussing Interior Department regulations 
adopted in 1978 and codified at 25 C.F.R. Part 83).  Though the first such list was published in the 
Federal Register in 1979, see Indian Tribal Entities that Have a Government-to-Government Rela-
tionship with the United States, 44 Fed. Reg. 7235 (Jan. 31, 1979), in conjunction with the imple-
mentation of the 1978 regulations, the Department was not required to (and did not regularly) pub-
lish a list until Congress passed the Federally Recognized Indian Tribes List Act of 1994, mandating 
the publication of a list annually in the Federal Register.  Pub. L. 103-454, tit. I, § 104, 108 Stat. 
4791 (1994) (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 479a-1 (editorially reclassified as § 5131 in Aug. 2016)).  
 54.   The Pamunkey, Shinnecock, Mashpee, and Tejon were added to the list in 2016, 2010, 
2007, and 2012, respectively.  See infra notes 97–100, 113 (citing Federal Register notices).  
 55.   United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 653 (1978).  Consistent with their dictionary and ju-
risprudential meanings (which equate them), this article uses the words jurisdiction, power, and au-
thority interchangeably.  See infra notes 143–49 and accompanying text.  However, I try to use “ju-
risdiction” where possible to reflect the statutory language in the Indian Reorganization Act, and 
“power” more when discussing the phenomenon described by the Supreme Court (and to reflect the 
Court’s own usage).  
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treaties and were embodied in subsequently enacted state laws.56  Some-
times called “tributary tribes” or “tributary Natives” because of these re-
lationships, these peoples lived (and continue to live) on reservations in 
Virginia, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Maine 
(which was part of Massachusetts until 1820), and South Carolina set 
aside under colonial and state laws.57  State laws regulated land owner-
ship and use, natural resources, and economic activity on these reserva-
tions,58 and the states (like the colonies before them) appointed guardi-
                                                          
 56.   See David H. DeJong, American Indian Treaties: A Guide to Ratified and Unratified Co-
lonial, United States, State, Foreign, and Intertribal Treaties and Agreements, 1607–1911, at 14–16 
(2015) (discussing seventeenth century British treaties with the Powhatan Confederacy in present-
day Virginia, the Wampanoag in Massachusetts, the Pequot in Connecticut, and the Narragansett in 
Rhode Island); Helen C. Rountree, Pocahontas’s People: The Powhatan Indians of Virginia Through 
Four Centuries 87 (1990) (discussing 1646 treaty between the Powhatan Confederacy and the Eng-
lish); Diana Scully, Me. Indian Tribal-State Comm’n, Maine Indian Claims Settlement: Concepts, 
Context, and Perspectives 4–5 (1995), http://www.mitsc.org/documents/21_Body.doc.pdf (discuss-
ing eighteenth-century Passamaquoddy, Penobscot, Maliseet, and Micmac treaties with the British 
and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and an unratified 1777 treaty with the United States).   
 57.   See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.02[9] (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 
2012) (discussing reservations and “relationships that developed with English colonies and contin-
ued with the states after the American Revolution”).  The various colonial and state laws for Massa-
chusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Maine, New York, Virginia, and South Carolina (as well as 
New Jersey and North Carolina, where state reservations existed into the 1700s) can be found in 
LAWS OF THE COLONIAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS, RELATING TO INDIANS AND INDIAN AFFAIRS, 
FROM 1633 TO 1831, INCLUSIVE (photo. reprint 1979) (1832).  Gregory Ablavsky has used the phrase 
“tributary Natives” to refer generally to “eastern tribes surrounded by Anglo-American communi-
ties” that “were subject to state law.”  Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 
YALE L. J. 1012, 1054 (2015) [hereinafter Ablavsky, Beyond]; see also CAROLE E. GOLDBERG ET 
AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 61 (7th ed. 2015) (not-
ing that “the Commonwealth [of Virginia] entered into treaties that established the . . . tribes of that 
region . . . as ‘tributary tribes,’ formally paying feudal tribute to the colonial government”); JAMES 
H. MERRELL, THE INDIANS’ NEW WORLD: CATAWBAS AND THEIR NEIGHBORS FROM EUROPEAN 
CONTACT THROUGH THE ERA OF REMOVAL 150–51, 198–202 (1989) (discussing South Carolina 
colonial governor’s reference to Catawba Indians as “Tributaries,” military commissions extended to 
Catawba leaders by South Carolina, and British crown superintendence regarding the Catawba res-
ervation in South Carolina). 
 58.   E.g., DANIEL R. MANDELL, TRIBE, RACE, HISTORY: NATIVE AMERICANS IN SOUTHERN 
NEW ENGLAND, 1780–1880, at 10–12 (2008) (discussing land management and resource use laws 
for the Mashpee in Massachusetts, the Mohegan in Connecticut, and the Narragansett in Rhode Is-
land); id. at 18–20, 125 (discussing laws protecting Mashantucket Pequot and Mohegan lands in 
Connecticut and Wampanoag lands in Massachusetts); id. at 71 (noting that by the early 1800s, 
“laws in the [New England] region for more than two centuries had barred the sale of tribal lands to 
outsiders without the approval of the legislature”); ROSEN, supra note 49, at 161–63 (2007) (discuss-
ing Massachusetts laws regarding property and contracts); ROUNTREE, supra note 56, at 112–15 
(discussing Virginia laws governing Pamunkey land sales and leases adopted in the late 1600s and 
early 1700s); SCULLY, supra note 56, at 6 (discussing Maine laws governing timber harvesting and 
land sales and leases).   
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ans, or trustees, to oversee the administration of these laws and the 
tribes’ affairs.59 
When the United States came into existence, federal officials focused 
their attention and limited resources on relationships with the Native 
peoples who governed lands the new nation claimed along its western 
border.60  Colonists already occupied almost all the aboriginal lands of 
the eastern seaboard tribes, whose populations and military and econom-
ic power had declined significantly since the mid-1600s.61  Most people, 
                                                          
 59.   GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 57, at 61 (“During the colonial period, Massachusetts . . . , 
Connecticut, and other colonies . . . formally appointed non-Indian trustees to supervise Indian 
lands . . . .”); MANDELL, supra note 58, at 70–75, 129, 171–72 (discussing the appointment and au-
thority of guardians in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island following the Revolutionary 
War); ROSEN, supra note 49, at 10, 163 (discussing guardians in Massachusetts); ROUNTREE, supra 
note 56, at 164–65 and 177–79 (discussing the appointment of trustees by Virginia for the Pamunk-
ey, colonial guardians and superintendent of Indian affairs in Massachusetts, and New York laws 
appointing trustees for the Shinnecock and Montauk Indians on Long Island in the 1700s); see also 
Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of the Pamunkey Indian Tribe, 80 Fed. Reg. 
39144, 39147 (July 2, 2015) (discussing appointment of trustees for the Pamunkey in the 1700s).  
 60.   See Ablavsky, Constitution, supra note 49, at 1003–04, 1004 n.12 (“When the Constitution 
was written, powerful Native nations owned and governed much of the territory mapmakers labeled 
‘United States.’ . . . [N]early all territory west of the Appalachians . . . remained Indian country, both 
de facto and de jure.”).  When he was President, for example, George Washington apparently felt 
inconvenienced by (and tried to avoid) meetings with delegations of Catawba Indians; but he and 
other British colonial leaders sought the Catawbas’ alliance just decades earlier during the Seven 
Year’s War against France.  See MERRELL, supra note 57, at 280–81 (citing correspondence from 
President Washington and explaining that “[h]e and most of his fellow Americans had come to re-
gard Catawbas as something of a nuisance, a ragged, insignificant people hardly worth a second 
thought, or even a first”).  And a U.S. congressional committee, who met with a Catawba delegation 
that traveled to Philadelphia in 1782 “in an attempt to establish relations with the federal govern-
ment,” simply “recommended that South Carolina ‘take such Measures for the Satisfaction and secu-
rity of the . . . Tribe as the [South Carolina] Legis[lature] shall in their wisdom think fit.’”  Id. at 208 
(quoting Letter from Benjamin Lincoln, Sec’y of War, to President of Congress (Nov. 1, 1782)) 
(second alteration in original).  Similarly, President Washington, in response to a request from the 
Archbishop of Baltimore for help with the Catholic Church’s proselytizing among Indians in Maine 
(then part of Massachusetts), wrote that “[a]ny application, therefore, relative to those Indians . . . 
would seem most proper to be made to the government of Massachusetts” because they (like other 
Indians “who dwell[ed] in the eastern extremity of the United States”) were “so situated as to be ra-
ther considered a part of the inhabitants of the State of Massachusetts than otherwise, and that State 
has always considered them under its immediate care and protection.”  PETER GUILDAY, THE LIFE 
AND TIMES OF JOHN CARROLL 606–07 (1922) (quoting Letter from George Washington to Arch-
bishop John Carroll (Apr. 10, 1792)). 
 61.   Ablavsky, Constitution, supra note 49, at 1010 (noting that the U.S. population was “heav-
ily concentrated along the coast between New England and Virginia”).  The declines in population 
and military power among these tribes resulted from years of ecological, epidemiological, and mili-
tary depredations, including recurring epidemics of smallpox and other European-brought diseases in 
the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, as well as wars between the Powhatan Confed-
eracy and the English in Virginia in the 1620s and 1640s, the 1636–1638 war between the Pequot 
and the English and their Mohegan and Narragansett allies, and the 1675–1676 war between the 
English and the Wampanoag, Narragansett, and other tribes.  See DANIEL K. RICHTER, FACING EAST 
FROM INDIAN COUNTRY: A NATIVE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICA 53–60, 75, 95–96, 101–106, 173 
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including the drafters of the United States’ founding documents, assumed 
that the (former-colonies-turned-)states would continue to exercise juris-
diction regarding these Eastern tribes.62  This assumption is reflected in 
both the Articles of Confederation and the United States Constitution,63 
and it is borne out in historical practice continuing well into the nine-
teenth century.64 
Underlying the assumption and practice regarding state jurisdiction 
over Eastern tribes was the belief, widely shared inside and outside of 
government, that they (and other Indians) were doomed to cultural, if not 
                                                          
(2001) (discussing the impacts of these events, and European colonization generally, on Eastern sea-
board tribes). 
 62.   See MANDELL, supra note 58, at 117 (“While the U.S. Constitution had given the national 
government control over relations with sovereign Indian tribes, . . . no state or federal official ques-
tioned the paradigm that southern New England Natives had been subjugated during the colonial 
period.”); ROSEN, supra note 49, at 56 (noting that “[b]y the early national period, many Indians had 
already been dispossessed from northeastern states, and those who remained were left under state 
jurisdiction[,]” and that “[t]he premise that Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, 
and Pennsylvania would continue to have the same authority over Indians that they had exercised as 
colonies met with no serious challenge”). 
 63.   The Indian affairs power clause in the Articles of Confederation granted Congress the 
“sole and exclusive right and power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the In-
dians, not members of any of the States; provided that the legislative right of any State, within its 
own limits, be not infringed or violated.”  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, § 4.  The 
Apportionment Clause in Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution excludes “Indians not taxed” from 
(and, by implication, includes those who were taxed among) the populations of free persons used for 
apportioning legislative representatives and taxes.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 3.  (“Indians not 
taxed” are similarly excluded from the Apportionment Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. 
amend. XIV, § 2.)  Gregory Ablavsky has suggested that members of “eastern tribes surrounded by 
Anglo-American communities [that] were subject to state law” were “likely the ‘members of the 
States’ under Article IX of the Articles” and “presumably also the ‘taxed’ Indians implied in the 
Constitution.”  Ablavsky, Beyond, supra note 57, at 1054–55; see also GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 
57, at 61 (noting that “[Thomas] Jefferson specifically referred to the Virginia tributary or feudatory 
tribes when he proposed the somewhat confused Indian affairs clause of the Articles of Confedera-
tion to the Continental Congress”).  To the extent Indians in New England and other states were not 
taxed and did not have rights as state citizens until after the U.S. Civil War, see Danzell v. 
Webquish, 108 Mass. 133, 134 (1871) (“By the law of Massachusetts, until very recently [1869], 
these Indians were not subjected to taxation, nor endowed with the ordinary civil and political rights 
of citizens, but were treated as wards of the Commonwealth.”); ROSEN, supra note 49, at 160–61 
(noting that Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island did not extend citizenship rights to Indi-
ans until the late 1800s), they would seem to fall outside of these categories (of, respectively, Indians 
that were “members of” a state and “taxed” Indians). 
 64.   See MANDELL, supra note 58, at 216 (noting that “Indians in [New England] were under 
state rather than federal administration, and many held their reserves under colonial treaties and laws 
that continued to have strong legal power within the states” throughout the nineteenth century); id. at 
195–96 (noting that “[b]etween 1860 and 1880, . . . the three southern New England states [Connect-
icut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts] ended the special legal status of nearly all Indians” and dis-
cussing state laws “terminating” tribes and authorizing land divisions and sales); id. at 117 (“Special 
[state] legislative commissions and commissioners visited and reported on the Narragansetts in 1831, 
1832, 1843, 1858, and 1879–80; the Mohegans in 1830, 1859, and 1860; the Golden Hill Paugussetts 
in 1823; the Mashantucket Pequots in 1855; and most Indian groups in Massachusetts in 1827, 1849, 
and 1861.”).  
434 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
physical, extinction.  This belief was manifest in the “vanishing Indian” 
stereotype that developed and was prevalent in the late 1700s and early 
1800s,65 itself a reflection of Anglo societal thinking that Indigenous 
peoples along the eastern seaboard (among whom, some more than oth-
ers, intermarriage with non-Indians increased significantly after the Rev-
olutionary War) were no longer racially or culturally “pure” Indians.66  
The vanishing Indian trope pervaded popular culture (including literature 
and news accounts, and among historians) and all levels of government.67 
                                                          
 65.   As described by Kathryn Fort,  
[t]he vanishing Indian concept refers to a literary, historical, and cultural understanding 
of the clash between “civilized” colonizers and “savage” Indians.  The concept is rooted 
in the belief that in the face of “advancing civilization,” tribes and tribal citizens would 
necessarily and inevitably disappear.  This idea shifted over time from one of extirpation 
of all individual Indians to the disappearance of tribes as sovereign governments as an 
organizing force, and the assimilation of tribal members into the dominant society.   
Kathryn E. Fort, The Vanishing Indian Returns: Tribes, Popular Originalism, and the Supreme 
Court, 57 ST. LOUIS L.J. 297, 309 (2013); id. at 310 (noting that “[t]hroughout the early 1800s the 
vanishing Indian became ‘a habit of thought’”) (quoting BRIAN W. DIPPIE, THE VANISHING AMERI-
CAN: WHITE ATTITUDES AND U.S. INDIAN POLICY 15 (1982)).  
 66.   See MANDELL, supra note 58, at 35, 193 (explaining that “[b]y the end of the Revolution-
ary War, Anglo-Americans increasingly viewed the remaining coastal Indians as part of an undiffer-
entiated group of people of color[,]” and that “[t]he vanishing Indian trope that appeared in so 
many . . . [early nineteenth century] writings rested in large part on hardening notions of race”); 
Gregory Ablavsky, Comment, Making Indians “White”: The Judicial Abolition of Native Slavery in 
Revolutionary Virginia and Its Racial Legacy, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1457, 1472, 1510–12, 1520 (2011) 
[hereinafter Ablavsky, Comment] (noting the “demographic transformation that occurred [in Virgin-
ia] over the course of the eighteenth century” alongside the “rise of racial essentialism,”; that, fol-
lowing the Revolutionary War, “Virginia elites assumed . . . that Natives had disappeared from their 
society”; and that Indians in Virginia “were relegated to an undifferentiated underclass along with 
Africans and mixed-race peoples” [because] “[t]he[y] . . . no longer represented a supposedly ‘pure’ 
Native culture”); id. at 1510 (noting that, at the turn of the nineteenth century in Virginia, “[o]nly a 
handful of Indians remained on state-created reservations, where their supposed abandonment of 
their traditional culture and intermarriage with non-Natives compromised their identity in Anglo-
Virginian eyes”); see also Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940, 944 (D. Mass. 
1978) (noting that “a very large number” of Mashpee men were killed during the Revolutionary 
War, leaving some “70 widows . . . out of a population of a few hundred[,]” a “situation [that] en-
couraged a considerable influx of unattached non-Indian males, mostly black”), aff’d sub nom. 
Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1979); MANDELL, supra note 58, at 
43–44, 49 (discussing Indian male population declines and increasing intermarriage, particularly 
between Native women and African-American men, among New England tribes after the Revolu-
tionary War).  
 67.   See DIPPIE, supra note 65, at 10–25 (examining the development and prevalence of the 
vanishing Indian stereotype in early nineteenth-century American popular culture and literature, in-
cluding the 1826 publication of James Fenimore Cooper’s The Last of the Mohicans, which Dippie 
calls the “solitary masterpiece” in the Vanishing Indian American fiction literature genre); MAN-
DELL, supra note 58, at 145–46, 178–79 (discussing the vanishing Indian trope in late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth-century popular literature and poetry); id. at 175 (noting early historians’ “increas-
ing[] sensitiv[ity] . . . to scientific notions of race [that] began to gain credence” and their general 
agreement “that the few ‘pure bloods’ who remained were but a shadow of their ancestors.”); Fort, 
supra note 65, at 311–12 (describing how the “societal and cultural understanding of the vanishing 
Indian informed political leaders from the local to the national level” and “informed their decision-
 
2016 INDIANS, TRIBES, AND (FEDERAL) JURISDICTION 435 
In the 1780s, for example, Thomas Jefferson “describ[ed] what he 
regarded as the remnants of Virginian Indian tribes . . . [as] no longer 
‘pure’ and ha[ving] ‘lost their language[s].’”68  In his first annual address 
to Congress in 1829, President Andrew Jackson referred to the Narragan-
sett and Mohegan as tribes who “ha[d] left but remnants to preserve for a 
while their once terrible names.”69  A report prepared for the War De-
partment earlier that decade on the Narragansett, Mashpee, Mohegan, 
and other New England Indians said that 
[t]hese Indians are all provided for . . . by the governments and reli-
gious associations, of the several states in which they reside . . . .  
Should the Government of the United States[] provide an Asylum for 
the remnants of these depressed and wretched people . . . a portion of 
them might be persuaded to take shelter in it from the ruin which oth-
erwise seems inevitably to await them.70 
                                                          
making processes and their policy initiatives”); see also MANDELL, supra, at 24, 146, 190 (discuss-
ing early 1800s newspaper and other accounts of the “last” Indians in different New England towns 
and noting “how many Indians described as the last ones in town were also noted as having children 
and even grandchildren”).  
 68.   Ablavsky, Comment, supra note 66, at 1510 n.308 (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON 
THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 1781–1787 (1787), reprinted in BY THOMAS JEFFERSON WITH RELATED 
DOCUMENTS, 147 (David Waldstreicher ed., 2002)) (final alteration in original); see also ARICA L. 
COLEMAN, THAT THE BLOOD STAY PURE: AFRICAN AMERICANS, NATIVE AMERICANS, AND THE 
PREDICAMENT OF RACE AND IDENTITY IN VIRGINIA 58–59 (2013) (quoting Jefferson’s statements 
about language use and intermarriage among the Pamunkey and other tribes and noting that “Jeffer-
son envisioned the American Indians of Virginia as historical artifact, rather than present day reality.  
In Jefferson’s estimation, the Virginia Indians were all but extinct.”); 2 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, 
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGIN-
IA, app. H, 66 (1803) (stating that “[t]he number of Indians and their descendants in Virginia . . . is 
too small to require particular notice”).  
 69.   President Andrew Jackson, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 8, 1829).  Speaking of 
eastern seaboard tribes generally, Jackson said that 
[b]y persuasion and force they have been made to retire from river to river and from 
mountain to mountain, until some of the tribes have become extinct and others have left 
but remnants to preserve for a while their once terrible names.  Surrounded by the whites 
with their arts of civilization, which by destroying the resources of the savage doom him 
to weakness and decay, the fate of the Mohegan, the Narragansett, and the Delaware is 
fast overtaking the Choctaw, the Cherokee, and the Creek. 
Id.; see also President Andrew Jackson, Message to Congress ‘On Indian Removal’ (Dec. 6, 1830) 
(“The tribes which occupied the countries now constituting the Eastern States were annihilated or 
have melted away to make room for the whites.”).  
 70.   JEDIDIAH MORSE, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR OF THE UNITED STATES ON IN-
DIAN AFFAIRS 23–24 (1822); see also id. at 75 (noting that Connecticut had “assumed the care” of 
the  Mohegans and their property “in like manner as the other New England States have done for 
their Indians”).  From its creation in 1789 until the Office of Indian Affairs (or Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs) was established in 1824, the War Department handled all federal Indian affairs matters.  See 
RONALD N. SATZ, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE JACKSONIAN ERA 151–52 (1975); see also 
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And dicta in some nineteenth century Supreme Court opinions refer-
ences “remnants of tribes” in the original thirteen states to whom state 
law applied by treaty or because they had “lost the power of self gov-
ernment” due to “their reduced numbers.”71 
                                                          
STEPHEN J. ROCKWELL, INDIAN AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY chs. 2–4 (2010) (discussing U.S. Indian affairs administration up through the 1820s). 
  According to historian Daniel Mandell, Morse and the author of an 1831 Rhode Island state 
report on the Narragansett “both focused on how few pure-blood Indians remained in the communi-
ties, and both embraced the paradigm that this racial makeup meant that the groups were no longer 
truly Indian and therefore should no longer be protected or separated by distinct laws.” MANDELL, 
supra note 58, at 197; see also Mashpee Tribe v. Sec’y of the Interior, 820 F.2d 480, 483 (1st Cir. 
1987) (quoting Morse’s statements that “the number of pure blooded Indians [at Mashpee] is ex-
tremely small, say fifty or sixty, and is rapidly decreasing”; that the Mashpee and other Indians in 
Massachusetts had “altogether adopted the habits of civilized life”; and that the number of Indians at 
Mashpee was “diminishing, though rather slowly” (alteration in the Mashpee Tribe opinion)).  Simi-
lar attitudes regarding eastern seaboard Indians are evident in other state documents from the mid-
1800s.  See MANDELL, supra note 58, at 146 (quoting the chair of the Massachusetts state Indian 
commission’s 1848 statement that “[t]here are not probably half a dozen” families (or perhaps indi-
viduals; the statement is not clear) “of pure Indian blood” in the state and that “[t]he red man is gone, 
and has left only the most vicious of his characteristics”).  
 71.   Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 580 (1832) (M’Lean, J., concurring) (“In . . . Massa-
chusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and other[] [states], where small remnants of tribes remain . . . 
who, by their reduced numbers, had lost the power of self government, the laws of the state have 
been extended over them, for the protection of their persons and property.”); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 
U.S. 87, 146 (1810) (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting) (referring to Indian nations that “ha[d] 
totally extinguished their national fire, and submitted themselves to the laws of the states[,]” and 
“others [that] ha[d], by treaty, acknowledged that they hold their national existence at the will of the 
state within which they reside[,]” and distinguishing these polities from those that “retain[ed] a lim-
ited sovereignty, and the absolute proprietorship of their soil”); see also Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 
108 (1884) (describing Indians in Massachusetts as “remnants of tribes never recognized by the trea-
ties or legislative or executive acts of the United States as distinct political communities”) (citing 
Pells v. Webquish, 129 Mass. 469 (1880) (regarding lands at Mashpee); Danzell v. Webquish, 108 
Mass. 133 (1871) (lands at Herring Pond); MASS. STATUTES 1862, ch. 184 (establishing the district 
of Gay Head on Martha’s Vineyard, encompassing the lands of the Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head 
(Aquinnah)); MASS. STATUTES 1869, ch. 463 (extending Massachusetts citizenship status and rights 
to Indians)).  In Justice Johnson’s opinion concurring with the Court’s 1831 holding that the Chero-
kee Nation, although a “state” in the general political sense, was not a foreign state for purposes of 
Article III standing, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1831) (noting that “[t]he acts of 
[the U.S. government] plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a state” but holding that the Chero-
kee Nation was not a foreign state), Justice Johnson expressed concern about the breadth of any rule 
recognizing Native polities as foreign states: 
Where is the rule to stop?  Must every petty kraal of Indians, designating themselves a 
tribe or nation, and having a few hundred acres of land to hunt on exclusively, be recog-
nized as a state?  We should indeed force into the family of nations, a very numerous and 
very heterogeneous progeny.  The Catawbas, having indeed a few more acres than the re-
public of San Marino, but consisting only of eighty or an hundred polls, would then be 
admitted to the same dignity.  They still claim independence, and actually execute their 
own penal laws, such as they are, even to the punishment of death; and have recently 
done so.  We have many ancient treaties with them; and no nation has been more distinct-
ly recognized, as far as such recognition can operate to communicate the character of a 
state. 
Id. at 25 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
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Federal officials continued to refer to Indigenous peoples in New 
England and elsewhere along the eastern seaboard as “remnants” or 
“fragments” of tribes throughout the nineteenth century, while noting 
they still existed as tribal communities.72  The Secretary of the Interior’s 
1890 annual report to Congress identified the Mashpee (and other Wam-
panoag) and Shinnecock Indians as among those “within the limits of the 
thirteen original States . . . found holding a tribal relation and in posses-
sion of specific tracts [of land].”73  And the Secretary wrote in an 1899 
memorandum on the Narragansett, Shinnecock, and other New England 
tribes that 
[t]hese Indians were and their remnants are residents of that portion of 
the country which constituted the Territory of the thirteen original 
states. . . .  Their political status is unknown, but it is presumed that 
                                                          
 72.  See Mashpee Tribe v. Sec’y of the Interior, 820 F.2d 480, 507 (1st Cir. 1987) (reproducing 
a portion of the 1850 Henry Schoolcraft Report) (listing eastern seaboard tribes, including the Mash-
pee and Narragansett, in a table of “Fragmentary Tribes still existing within the Boundaries of the 
Old States”)); id. at 497–501 (reproducing Letter from Thomas McKenney to Secretary of War (Jan. 
10, 1825) (referring to a table listing “sixty-four tribes and remnants of tribes of Indians” that “re-
main[ed] within the limits of the different states and territories” and listing peoples in New England 
(including the Mashpee and Narragansett), New York, Virginia, and South Carolina)); see also id. at 
502–03 (reproducing a portion of H.R. Rep. No. 23-474 (1834) (listing Indians in New England, 
New York, Virginia, and South Carolina in a table of “[t]he tribes east of the Mississippi . . . who 
have not yet agreed to remove west of the Mississippi”)). 
 73.   DEP’T OF INTERIOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 51st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 26–29 (1890) (stating that “no Indians within the limits of the thirteen original States 
retained their original title of occupancy, and only in Massachusetts, New York, and North Carolina 
are they found holding a tribal relation and in possession of specific tracts[,]” and mentioning 
(Wampanoag) Indians at Mashpee, Chappaquiddick, and Gay Head in Massachusetts; Shinnecock, 
Seneca, Oneida, Onondaga, St. Regis Mohawk, and Tuscarora Indians in New York; and the Eastern 
Cherokees in North Carolina).  Courts would later determine that, contrary to the Commissioner’s 
statement, at least some Indigenous peoples on the eastern seaboard retained aboriginal title to their 
lands (which required those peoples to show continual existence as Indian tribes, see supra note 49).  
See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 235–36 (1985); Joint Tribal Council 
of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 376–79 (1st Cir. 1975).  And the Commis-
sioner’s successors would determine that other peoples (besides those mentioned), including the 
Narragansett (in Rhode Island) and Pamunkey (in Virginia), maintained “a tribal relation” and re-
mained in possession of specific tracts of land from (before) the 1700s through the present, including 
when the Commissioner wrote his report.  See infra notes 96–103 and accompanying text.  Aborigi-
nal title litigation involving the Narragansett and other tribes was settled without the courts deter-
mining whether their title still existed.  See Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 
95-395, 92 Stat. 813 (1978) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.) (following Narragansett Tribe of 
Indians v. S.R.I. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798 (D.R.I. 1976)); Wampanoag Tribal Council of 
Gay Head, Inc., Indian Land Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 100-95, 101 Stat. 704 (1987) (codi-
fied at 25 U.S.C. § 1771 et seq.) (following Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc. v. Town 
of Gay Head, No. 74-cv-5826 (D. Mass. 1974)); Mohegan Nation of Connecticut Land Claims Set-
tlement, Pub. L. No. 103-377, 108 Stat. 3501 (1994) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1775 et seq.) (follow-
ing Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 528 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Conn. 1982)). 
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they are citizens and subject to the laws of the several States in which 
they reside. . . .74 
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs’ annual report that same year 
mentioned the Shinnecock among the “fragments of tribes on Long Is-
land.”75 
In the early twentieth century, Interior Department officials contin-
ued to defer to the colonies-turned-states’ jurisdiction regarding—and to 
focus on racial and cultural purity (or lack thereof) among—peoples they 
categorized together as “small Eastern [Indian] groups” or “communities 
of Indian blood.”76  The Narragansett, Shinnecock, Pamunkey and vari-
ous other eastern seaboard tribes still functioned as polities that main-
tained their historical relationships with the states.77  Federal officials, 
however, refused to extend services, programs, or legal protections to 
these tribes, although some of their children attended federal boarding 
schools for Indians.78 
                                                          
 74.   Memorandum from Sec’y of the Interior to Comm’r of Indian Affairs (June 23, 1899), 
quoted in William W. Quinn, Jr., Federal Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes: The Histori-
cal Development of a Legal Concept, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 331, 353 (1990) (final omission in 
Quinn); see also id. 353–54 (“Their political condition is, therefore, radically different from that of 
what might be termed the ‘plains’ Indians . . . not all of whom, however, have been officially recog-
nized as wards by formal treaty or agreement.” (omission in Quinn)).  
 75.   A.W. Ferrin, Report Concerning Indians in New York, in DEP’T OF INTERIOR, ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 262 (1899).  
 76.   Letter from John Collier, Comm’r of Indian Affairs, to Mabel L. Avant (undated) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Undated Collier Letter] (referring to “small Eastern groups under the 
States,” “Indian groups or communities of Indian blood under the State,” and “Indian communi-
ties . . . not formally covered by the Federal Indian program”); Letter from William Zimmerman, 
Assistant Comm’r of Indian Affairs, to Rep. Dave E. Satterfield, Jr. (Nov. 25, 1944) (on file with 
author) (referring to “small Indian groups in the thirteen original colonies”); see also Letter from W. 
Carson Ryan, Jr., Dir. of Educ., Office of Indian Affairs, to James F. Peebles, Superintendent of 
Schools, Bourne, Mass. (Nov. 20, 1934) (on file with author) (referring to “communities with slight 
Indian blood directly under the State”) (emphasis added).  
 77.   See ROUNTREE, supra note 56, at 204–05, 237 (describing a late-nineteenth century com-
pilation of Pamunkey laws and noting that they and other tribes in Virginia had “tribal governments 
and . . . churches which belonged to them but were run on Anglo-Virginian lines”); GLADYS TAN-
TAQUIDGEON, DEP’T OF INTERIOR, SURVEY OF THE NEW ENGLAND INDIANS 10–11, 24 (1934) (on 
file with author) (outlining tribal organizations and government structures for the Narragansett; the 
Mohegan, Pequot, and Scaghticoke in Connecticut; the Mashpee, Gay Head, and other Wampanoag 
tribes in Massachusetts; and the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy in Maine); SHINNECOCK INDIANS, 
http://shinnecockindians.org/home (last visited Sept. 29, 2016) (discussing Shinnecock governance 
from 1792 to 2007 through a trustee system established under New York state law); see also Histori-
ans’ Brief, supra note 46, at 16 n.7 (noting that the Narragansett Tribe functioned under a Rhode 
Island state charter issued in 1934).  
 78.  Historians’ Brief, supra note 46, at 9 (describing officials’ “reluctance to provide federal 
services . . . based on the (legally untenable) premise that, as ‘State Indians’ they were outside the 
federal government’s ‘guardianship’ responsibility”). 
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As the Supreme Court noted in Carcieri, the Narragansett sought 
federal assistance with land and other issues in the early 1900s, but fed-
eral bureaucrats denied their requests, saying that the Tribe was under the 
jurisdiction of Rhode Island and not the U.S. government.79  And though 
Congress held hearings in 1900 regarding the taking of Narragansett 
lands, Narragansett children attended federal Indian boarding schools in-
to the twentieth century, and Narragansetts were included on federal In-
dian Office censuses as late as 1930,80 federal officials in the 1920s and 
1930s wrote that “[t]he Federal Government ha[d] never had any juris-
diction over the[m]” and that their “affairs should be taken up with the 
proper state officials.”81  Similarly, although Mashpee children were sent 
to Carlisle Indian School,82 federal officials in the 1930s said they could 
not provide educational or other assistance to the Mashpees living on 
their ancestral lands on Cape Cod because there was no “Federal policy 
                                                          
 79.   Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 383–84 (2009) (“[I]n correspondence spanning a 10-
year period from 1927 to 1937, federal officials . . . not[ed] that the [Narragansett] Tribe was, and 
always had been, under the jurisdiction of the New England States, rather than the Federal Govern-
ment.”); see also MANDELL, supra note 58, at 220 (mentioning unsuccessful efforts by Narragansett 
tribal leaders in 1906 and 1913 “to get the federal government to adjudicate” title to lands taken in 
the eighteenth century).  
 80.   Historians’ Brief, supra note 46, at 16 n.7 (citing Ethel Boissevain, Narraganset Survival: 
A Study of Group Persistence Through Adapted Traits, 6:4 ETHNOHISTORY 347–62 (1959)).  
 81.   Brief of Petitioner Town of Charlestown at 8, Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 552 U.S. 1229 
(2008) (No. 07-526) (quoting Letter from Assistant Comm’r of Indian Affairs to John Noka (May 5, 
1927)).  In response to a letter from John Noka, a Narragansett tribal leader, “request[ing] the Feder-
al Government to take charge of the affairs of the Narragansett Indians[,]” id. at 7–8 (quoting Letter 
from John Noka to Comm’r of Indian Affairs (Apr. 25, 1927)), the Assistant Commissioner of Indi-
an Affairs wrote that  
[t]he Narragansett Indians are and have been under the jurisdiction of different states of 
New England.  The Federal Government has never had any jurisdiction over these Indi-
ans and Congress has never provided any authority for the various Departments of the 
Federal Government to exercise the jurisdiction which is necessary to manage their af-
fairs. . . . [A]ll communications in regard to your affairs should be taken up with the 
proper state officials. 
Id. at 8 (omission and second alteration in original) (quoting Letter from Assistant Comm’r of Indian 
Affairs to John Noka (May 5, 1927)); id. (citing Letter from Assistant Comm’r of Indian Affairs to 
John Noka (July 19, 1927)) (stating that “[t]he Narragansett Indians are not under the jurisdiction of 
the Federal Government” and returning a list of Narragansett Indians “for submission to the proper 
state authorities” (alteration in original)); see also id. (citing Letter from Assistant Comm’r of Indian 
Affairs to Daniel Sekater (June 29, 1927)) (withholding aid in letter to different Narragansett tribal 
leader).  Taking the same position the following decade, federal officials cited, and repeated verba-
tim, language from this 1927 correspondence.  Id. at 8–10 (citing Letter from the Comm’r of Indian 
Affairs to Daniel Sekater (Jan. 11, 1930) and Letter from John Collier, Comm’r of Indian Affairs, to 
Rep. John M. O’Connell (Mar. 18, 1937) (referencing June 29, 1927 letter and stating that “[t]he 
situation has not changed since th[at] letter was written”)). 
 82.   Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940, 946 (D. Mass. 1978) (noting that 
“several students at the Carlisle Indian School . . . g[a]ve[] ‘Mashpee’ as their tribal designation dur-
ing th[e] period” between 1870 and 1920).  
440 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
at the present time with regard to . . . Indian groups or communities of 
Indian blood under the State.”83  And in the 1940s, bureaucrats said that, 
because the federal government “ha[d] no responsibility for” the 
Pamunkey and other tribes in Virginia, they could not “intervene in any 
official capacity” (but only “in an advisory capacity”) with these tribes’ 
efforts to “obtain[] proper racial recognition from” the state so that their 
children would not have to attend “colored” schools.84 
While officials’ perceptions about the groups’ racial and cultural 
“Indianness” played a role in their refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction 
                                                          
 83.   Undated Collier Letter, supra note 76 (stating that “[i]n the absence . . . of any Federal 
policy at the present time with regard to other Indian groups or communities of Indian blood under 
the State – such as I understand the Mashpee community to be – I am unable to hold out any hope to 
you that the Federal Government can be of help at this particular time[,]” and explaining that the 
Mashpee would have to seek help “through local and State channels” like “any other Massachusetts 
community”); see also Letter from W. Carson Ryan, supra note 76 (using the same language as the 
Undated Collier Letter though referring to “communities with slight Indian blood directly under the 
State,” and noting that the federal government built schools only for Indian children “in recognized 
Federal Indian areas where the Federal Indian Service operates its own schools or pays the school 
district Indian tuition because of the untaxed Federal land”); Letter from Fred Daiker, Assistant to 
the Comm’r, Office of Indian Affairs, to Chief Wild Horse (Oct. 2, 1937) (on file with author) (stat-
ing that “the Indian Office can offer no assistance to Indians not members of a tribe under Federal 
jurisdiction[,]” and that the Mashpee “are of the same status as other citizens of the State of Massa-
chusetts, and . . . must look to the local authorities for assistance”); Letter from Fred Daiker, Assis-
tant to the Comm’r, Office of Indian Affairs, to Chief Wild Horse (Dec. 21, 1936) (on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter 1936 Daiker Letter] (referencing Chief Wild Horse’s December 14, 1936 letter and 
stating that “[t]he Indians of the Mashpee Tribe are not under Federal jurisdiction or control.  They 
have never been regarded as wards of the United States.”). 
 84.   Letter from John Collier, Comm’r of Indian Affairs, to Douglas Freeman, Editor, Rich-
mond News Leader (May 3, 1943) (on file with author) (discussing Virginia tribes’ efforts to “ob-
tain[] proper racial recognition” and stating that because “the United States . . . [had] no treaties with 
the Virginia Indians” and Congress had not “enacted any laws assuming responsibility for them,” the 
Office of Indian Affairs “ha[d] no responsibility for the Virginia Indians, as a matter largely of his-
torical accident[,]” and therefore could not “intervene in any official capacity, but w[as] . . . interest-
ed in [the Virginia tribes] as descendants of the original inhabitants of the region”); Letter from Wil-
liam Zimmerman, Assistant Comm’r of Indian Affairs, to Rep. Dave E. Satterfield, Jr. (Nov. 25, 
1944) (on file with author) (noting Pamunkey objections to being “classified by the state [of Virgin-
ia], for various purposes [including education], as ‘colored’” but stating that the Office of Indian 
Affairs was “unwilling to interfere except in an advisory capacity” without “an express declaration 
by Congress that the Pamunkeys are a Federal responsibility” because “[l]ike some other small Indi-
an groups in the thirteen original colonies, the Pamunkeys are a tribe with which the Federal gov-
ernment has not had a treaty[,]” “live[d] on . . . a state reservation[,]” and “ha[d] always been under 
state supervision”).  As noted in Assistant Commissioner Zimmerman’s 1944 letter, Pamunkey chil-
dren were “refused admission to schools . . . for white children, and . . . they refuse[d] to attend 
schools for colored children.”  Id.  After a staff visit to Virginia reservations in 1945, the Indian Of-
fice’s Director of Education, Willard Beatty, began allowing children from the Pamunkey and other 
(state) reservations in Virginia to attend Indian boarding schools in North Carolina, Kansas, and 
South Dakota.  ROUNTREE, supra note 56, at 236–37.  For a discussion of the racial classification of 
Virginia Indians in the twentieth century, Virginia’s 1924 Racial Integrity Act (and its administration 
by Registrar Walter Ashby Plecker), and the relationship to tribal identity, see COLEMAN, supra note 
68, at chs. 3–7, Epilogue and ROUNTREE, supra note 56, at 219–29.  
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regarding the Narragansett, Mashpee, and Pamunkey,85 they were more 
explicit in their correspondence regarding the Shinnecock—who the De-
partment said could not organize a government under the Indian Reor-
ganization Act in the 1930s because they were too intermarried with 
Black people and had lost their culture.86  In the opinions of the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs, Interior Department Solicitor, and Secretary of 
the Interior, the Shinnecock were “not Indians” because they had “none 
of the traditional or cultural traits of Indians.”87  Their conclusions were 
                                                          
 85.   A 1934 letter from the Office of Indian Affairs’ Director of Education regarding the 
Mashpee, for example, refers to them and other Eastern tribes as “communities with slight Indian 
blood” under state jurisdiction, Letter from W. Carson Ryan, supra note 76 (emphasis added), and 
the Indian Affairs Office inquired about whether Indian children in Virginia looked “negroid” before 
admitting them to federal Indian schools in the 1940s.  See ROUNTREE, supra note 56, at 236, 236 
n.144; see also MANDELL, supra note 58, at 197 (noting that the author of the 1822 War Department 
report on the Narragansett, Mashpee, and other New England Indians “focused on how few pure-
blood Indians remained in the communities, and . . . embraced the paradigm that this racial makeup 
meant that the groups were no longer truly Indian and therefore should no longer be protected or 
separated by distinct laws”).  
 86.   MILLER, supra note 50, at 30 (noting that Department officials rebuffed the Shinnecock 
“on the basis that a researcher determined that the[y] . . . were too intermarried with blacks”).  
 87.   Letter from John Collier, Comm’r of Indian Affairs, to William Harrison, Special Agent in 
Charge, N.Y. Agency (May 18, 1936) (on file with author) (describing “Indians located on the so-
called Shinnecock and Poosepatuck [sic] Reservations” as “those who might be classed as Indians 
but who apparently were not so recognized in their own community and have none of the traditional 
or cultural traits of Indians,” and stating that “these so-called reservations are not Federal territory 
but state reservations which have never been under Federal supervision”); see also Memorandum 
from John Collier, Comm’r of Indian Affairs, to Harold Ickes, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Interior (May 18, 
1936) (on file with author) (“These Indians have not been under the jurisdiction of the Federal Gov-
ernment; they have not got the [requisite] degree of blood . . . and culturally viewed, they are not 
Indians at all.”).  The letter from Collier to Special Agent Harrison is stamped “Approved” by Interi-
or Secretary Ickes on May 21, 1936, see 1936 Collier Letter, supra, and the Memorandum to Secre-
tary Ickes bears handwriting dated May 19, 1936 from Interior Solicitor Nathan Margold stating his 
“opinion that the [Shinnecock] . . . are not Indians and therefore not within the application of the 
Indian Reorganization Act.”  1936 Collier Memorandum, supra.   
  Collier’s memorandum to the Secretary, like other Department post-IRA correspondence 
regarding Eastern tribes, appears to conflate (improperly) the different prongs of the definition of 
“Indian” in the IRA—one for members of tribes that were under federal jurisdiction in 1934, and 
another for “persons of one-half or more Indian blood” (regardless of whether they were tribal mem-
bers, or whether the tribes they were members of were under federal jurisdiction), see 25 U.S.C. § 
479 (editorially reclassified as § 5129 in Aug. 2016); see also supra note 32 (discussing the different 
prongs)—something that (at least some) senators also seemed confused about in the legislative de-
bates on the definition.  See Undated Collier Letter, supra note 76 (suggesting that the Mashpee 
Tribe would have to “prove its people have the requisite degree of Indian blood” before the federal 
government would assist them); Letter from W. Carson Ryan, supra note 76 (same); but see Memo-
randum from Felix S. Cohen, Assistant Solicitor, Dep’t of the Interior, to John Collier, Comm’r of 
Indian Affairs (Apr. 3, 1935) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1935 Cohen Memorandum] (stating 
that, because they were “not a ‘recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction,’” “the Siouan 
Indians of North Carolina” (the Lumbee people) could, “like many other Eastern groups, . . . partici-
pate in the benefits of the [IRA] only in so far as individual members may be of one-half or more 
Indian blood[,]” and that those benefits included the IRA’s education and employment benefits as 
well as the ability to organize a government under the Act, and discussing the possibility of “[a] 
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based on a report by a field agent who was more crude in his assessment, 
describing the Shinnecock as “no longer Indians,” both “biologically” 
and “culturally,” and stating that “these people are not Indians at all; . . . . 
They are Negroes.”88 
Whatever racial (and racist) attitudes they reflect, federal officials’ 
statements over the centuries also reflect their understanding that they 
could exercise jurisdiction regarding these people(s), even though they 
refused to do so (and instead deferred to the states).89  The author of the 
1822 War Department report on the Narragansett, Mashpee, and other 
New England tribes, for example, allowed for the possibility of the fed-
                                                          
group of . . . [Lumbee] Indians of one-half blood or more . . . approved by the Commissioner of In-
dian Affairs . . . purchas[ing] a suitable tract of land and submitting title to the United States to be 
held in trust for the group”) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 479 (editorially reclassified as § 5129 in Aug. 
2016)); 1936 Daiker Letter, supra note 83 (explaining that the IRA provided opportunities “[f]or 
Indians, irrespective of tribal membership or residence on a reservation, who can prove they are of 
one-half degree or more Indian blood”); see also infra notes 300–04 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing confusion among senators during IRA legislative debates).  In June 1936, Indian Office bu-
reaucrats “conduct[ed] scientific tests to determine how much Indian blood” Lumbee people in 
North Carolina had by “examin[ing their] various physical features . . . such as the color of their 
skin, eyes, and hair and the shape of their noses, lips, and cheekbones.”  MALINDA MAYNOR LOW-
ERY, LUMBEE INDIANS IN THE JIM CROW SOUTH: RACE, IDENTITY, AND THE MAKING OF A NATION 
2–3 (2010).  Based on these tests (or “racial diagnoses”), Department officials concluded that twen-
ty-two Lumbees (out of the 209 studied) were half-blood (or more) Indians—and thus qualified un-
der the IRA—but that some of their full siblings were not.  Id. at 196–201 (noting that “[i]n twelve 
separate cases, [the Department] identified individuals as ‘less than one-half Indian’ while . . . desig-
nat[ing] their full siblings as ‘borderline,’ ‘near borderline,’ or ‘more than one-half Indian’). 
 88.   REPORT ON THE SHINNECOCK AND POOSEPATUCK INDIAN RESERVATIONS, IN RELATION 
TO THE REORGANIZATION ACT 1, 10 (Jan. 1936) (on file with the author); see id. at 1 (“The assimila-
tion of the original Indian with the Negro has proceeded so far that the former would appear to have 
been completely absorbed, racially by the latter.”); id. at 2, 10 (pointing to a supposedly “complete 
extinction of Indian culture” among the Shinnecock and stating that “[c]ulturally, they have ceased 
to be Indians, though . . . a few superficial practices . . . remain”); id. at 2 (discussing the 
Shinnecocks’ “hair and features” and stating that “the ‘Shinnecock Indians’ present, in their appear-
ance, such marked negroid physical characteristics that it is difficult for me even to speak of them as 
Indians”); id. (“[T]o the casual observer, these people are Negroes.  They are so considered by the 
white people in the neighboring city of Southampton.”); cf. Ablavsky, Comment, supra note 66, 
1523 & n.376 (noting that non-Natives on Long Island still sometimes refer to Shinnecocks as “‘mo-
nigs,’ meaning ‘more nigger than Indian’”) (citing and quoting Ariel Levy, Reservations, NEW 
YORKER (Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/12/13/reservations).  
 89.   The various reports and documents containing these statements also evidence some mini-
mal, even if indirect, supervision on the part of federal officials.  To the extent they contemplate re-
moval of, or the extension of other specific federal policies to, Eastern tribes, these documents 
demonstrate more concrete manifestations of supervision—or the exercise of jurisdiction.  See infra 
note 90 and accompanying text (discussing nineteenth century reports regarding the removal of east-
ern seaboard tribes); see also infra notes 95 and 135 and accompanying text (discussing memoranda 
from the Department of the Interior’s Office of the Solicitor discussing Congressional appropriations 
for the removal of the Catawba Indian Tribe).  Removal undoubtedly is an (egregious) exercise of 
federal jurisdiction, and federal officials’ contemplating—and taking steps towards effecting—the 
removal of these people(s) to Indian Territory certainly evidences a federal jurisdictional relationship 
between them and the government.  
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eral government “provid[ing] an Asylum for” them, and federal officials 
contemplated their removal to Indian Territory.90  Similarly, the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs’ statement in his 1899 annual report that the 
Indian Office’s “New York agent has not exercised any jurisdiction over 
[the Shinnecock] during my knowledge[]” implies that such jurisdiction 
existed and could be exercised, if the agent chose.91 
In the 1930s, Indian Office officials (including the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs) said they would reconsider their decision to deny educa-
tional assistance to the Mashpee “[i]f at any time the Federal Govern-
ment should undertake further provision for [them and other] small East-
ern groups under the States.”92  Other officials explained that the states’ 
exercise of jurisdiction did not “involv[e] a surrender by the U.S. of its 
right to assume jurisdiction at any time[,]”93 and urged that “[t]he United 
States Government should not recede from its possession of technical su-
periority over the State of New York in the matter of guardianship and 
should be prepared at any time to step into the picture” to protect the 
Shinnecocks’ rights.94  And though concluding that the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act did not apply to the Shinnecock because they were not Indi-
ans, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior (the highest-ranking 
                                                          
 90.   MORSE, supra note 70, at 24; MANDELL, supra note 58, at 110–11, 197, 215–16 (discuss-
ing the report and federal officials’ considering removal of New England tribes, and the tribes’ op-
position); see also Mashpee Tribe v. Sec’y of the Interior, 820 F.2d 480, 503 (1st Cir. 1987) (repro-
ducing a portion of H.R. Rep. No. 23-474 (1834) (listing Indians in New England, New York, 
Virginia, and South Carolina in a table of “[t]he tribes east of the Mississippi . . . who have not yet 
agreed to remove west of the Mississippi”)).  In recommending against removal of the Mashpee spe-
cifically, Morse wrote that even “were they in favor of the measure, it would scarcely be an object[]” 
because the Mashpee “[we]re of public utility [in Massachusetts], as expert whalemen and manufac-
turers of various light articles.”  MORSE, supra note 70, at 70 (also noting the Mashpee’s attachment 
to their lands and that “of course, the idea of alienating them and removing to a distance, would be 
very unpopular”).  Though not clear whether in response to Morse’s  report, the War Department in 
1831 provided funding to support a teacher for the Mohegans’ school.  MANDELL, supra note 58, at 
116.  
 91.   A.W. Ferrin, Report Concerning Indians in New York, in Dep’t of Interior, Annual Report 
of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report Concerning Indians in New York, at 262 (1899). 
 92.   Undated Collier Letter, supra note 76; see Letter from W. Carson Ryan, supra note 76; see 
also supra note 87 (noting that these letters, based on a misinterpretation of the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act’s language, mistakenly suggest that the Mashpee Tribe would also have to show that its 
members were half-blood (or more) Indians). 
 93.   Memorandum from Kenneth Meiklejohn, Assistant Solicitor, Dep’t of Interior, to Fred 
Daiker, Director, Welfare Div., Office of Indian Affairs 1 (May 14, 1936) (on file with author) (“Ju-
risdiction over these Indians [of the Allegheny, Cattaraugus, Onondaga, St. Regis, Tonawanda, and 
Tuscarora reservations] has long been exercised by the State of New York, without involving a sur-
render by the United States of its right to assume jurisdiction at any time.”).  
 94.   REPORT ON THE SHINNECOCK, supra note 88, at 11.  
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legal official in the Department) opined in 1936 that the IRA “applies to 
Indians living on reservations that are not federal reservations.”95 
Eventually, federal officials changed their positions on the tribal sta-
tus of, and on whether to exercise (even if reluctantly) jurisdiction re-
garding, the Shinnecock and other eastern seaboard tribes.  Following 
years of litigation and a federal district court decision finding that “the 
Shinnecock Indians are in fact an Indian Tribe” under federal law,96 the 
Interior Department in 2010 determined that the Shinnecock were indeed 
Indians—and had always existed as an Indian tribe—and added them to 
the list of federally recognized tribes.97  Three years earlier (and similarly 
only after years of litigation), Department officials added the Mashpee 
                                                          
 95.   Memorandum from John Collier, Comm’r of Indian Affairs, to Harold Ickes, Sec’y, Dep’t 
of the Interior (May 18, 1936) (on file with author).  This memorandum bears handwriting (dated 
May 19, 1936) from Interior Solicitor Nathan Margold stating his “opinion that the occupants of 
these reservations are not Indians and therefore are not within the application of the Indian Reorgan-
ization Act even though that act applies to Indians living on reservations that are not federal reserva-
tions.”  In a May 14, 1936 memorandum, the Department’s Assistant Solicitor likewise opined the 
IRA applied to Indians on state reservations—and to the Shinnecock and Poospatuck in particular.  
Memorandum from Kenneth Meiklejohn, supra note 93, at 1 and 3 (noting that “[t]here is nothing to 
indicate that [the IRA] was intended to be limited to reservations established and recognized under 
Federal jurisdiction” and that, although the residents of the Shinnecock and Poospatuck reservations 
“possess[ed] more of the characteristics of Negroes than of Indians,” the Department was “not con-
cerned, when dealing with the application of the Indian Reorganization Act to the residents of a res-
ervation, with the degree of blood possessed by such residents[,]” and stating that the Department 
“should call an election at these two reservations”).  Interior Department lawyers and bureaucrats 
also disagreed—in correspondence authorizing the Catawba Indian Tribe to organize a government 
under the IRA in the 1940s—regarding the Catawbas’ status, with Solicitor Fowler Harper question-
ing Collier’s statement that “‘[t]he Federal Government has not considered these Indians as Federal 
wards.’”  See Catawba Tribe—Recognition Under IRA, 2 Op. Solicitor on Indian Affairs 1255 
(1944) (Solicitor Harper stating that he was “not entirely clear what is intended by [Collier’s] state-
ment” and concluding that the IRA applied to the Catawba because Congress had appropriated (nev-
er-used) funds for their removal to Indian territory in the mid-1800s, and because the Catawbas’ 
tribal organization continually existed); Questions of the Catawbas’ Identity and Organization as a 
Tribe and Right to Adopt IRA Constitution, 2 Op. Solicitor on Indian Affairs 1261 (1944) (conclud-
ing same, with Solicitor Harper stating that he “must disagree” with any implication by Collier “that 
the Catawba tribe has not been recognized by the Federal Government”).  
 96.   New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 400 F. Supp. 2d 486, 489 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (find-
ing that the Shinnecock were an Indian tribe under the federal common law test discussed in Part 
V.B, infra); see generally Shinnecock Indian Nation v. Kempthorne, No. 06-CV-5013, 2008 WL 
4455599 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008) (discussing the decades-long history of Shinnecock engagement 
with the Interior Department’s administrative process, dating back to its implementation in 1978, 
and litigation over bureaucratic delays).  
 97.   Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, 75 Fed. Reg. 66124 (Oct. 19, 2010) (supplementing the 2010 BIA List of federally 
recognized tribes to include the Shinnecock Indian Nation and “announc[ing] that, as of October 1, 
2010, the Shinnecock Indian Nation is an Indian entity recognized and eligible to receive services 
from the Bureau of Indian Affairs”); see also Ariel Levy, Reservations, NEW YORKER (Dec. 13, 
2010), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/12/13/reservations (noting that “[a]nxiety about 
being perceived as insufficiently Indian was one of the reasons that it took the Shinnecocks so long 
to gain federal recognition”).  
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Indian Tribe to the list after determining that they had always existed as 
an Indian tribe.98  Most recently, the Department added the Pamunkey 
Indian Tribe to the list in May 2016,99 following a 2015 determination 
that they had continually existed and functioned as a “distinctly Pamunk-
ey settlement” and “distinct self-governing community” on their reserva-
tion in Virginia since the 1600s.100 
All of these tribes, like the Narragansett, were “recognized” through 
a process—and under criteria—that required them to prove, and the Inte-
rior Department to conclude, they had continuously existed as distinct, 
self-governing Indian communities since their first contact with non-
Indians.101  According to the most basic federal Indian law principles, 
they (as continuously existing Indigenous polities) were also always sub-
ject to the federal Indian affairs jurisdiction,102 an understanding reflected 
in the various government documents discussed above.  And though Inte-
rior Department officials determined in 1983 that “the Narragansett 
community and its predecessors have existed autonomously since first 
contact” and that “[t]he tribe has a documented history dating from 
1614[,]”103 the United States did not argue in the Carcieri litigation that 
the Narragansett therefore were under federal jurisdiction in 1934.  A 
majority of Justices concluded they were not, based on the aforemen-
tioned correspondence from the 1920s and 1930s wherein federal offi-
cials opined that the Narragansett were under state and not federal juris-
diction.104 
                                                          
 98.   Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgement of the Mashpee Wampanoag Indian 
Tribal Council, Inc. of Massachusetts, 72 Fed. Reg. 8007 (Feb. 15, 2007).  The Mashpees’ decades-
long effort to litigate their tribal status in federal court, including in cases involving aboriginal title 
to their lands, is discussed in Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 
1097 (1st Cir. 2003) and Mashpee Tribe v. Secretary of the Interior, 820 F.2d 480, 482 (1st Cir. 
1987).  Like the Shinnecock, the Mashpee began the administrative process under 25 C.F.R. Part 83 
shortly after it was adopted in 1978.  See Wampanoag Tribal Council, 336 F.3d at 1097. 
 99.   Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, 81 Fed. Reg. 26826 (Apr. 25, 2016) (updating list to include the Pamunkey Indian 
Tribe).  
 100.   Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgement of the Pamunkey Indian Tribe, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 39144, 39145–48 (July 2, 2015).  
 101.   See infra notes 262–63 and accompanying text (discussing criteria in 25 C.F.R. § 83.11(b) 
and (c)).  As noted infra, the criteria were amended in 2015 to require continual existence as a dis-
tinct Indian community since 1900, but all tribes acknowledged through the Part 83 process to date 
were evaluated under the previous criteria, which required continual existence since first contact. 
 102.   See infra Parts IV.B, IV.C, and V.A. 
 103.   Final Determination for Federal Acknowledgement of Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode 
Island, 48 Fed. Reg. 6177, 6178 (Feb. 2, 1983).  
 104.   See supra note 79 and accompanying text.  
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However federal officials viewed or described them over the years, 
the Narragansett, Pamunkey, Shinnecock, and Mashpee always remained 
self-governing peoples.  What changed was whether federal deci-
sionmakers thought they still existed as Indian tribes, as opposed to too-
intermarried and/or too-acculturated “remnants” or “fragments” thereof, 
and treated them like other Indian tribes.  Federal jurisdiction was always 
there; it was simply a matter of whether officials chose to exercise it. 
B.   United States and Empire: The Tejon Indian Tribe in California 
While federal officials decided not to exercise jurisdiction regarding 
the Narragansett and other tribes in the United States’ original territory—
whether because officials did not think those people(s) still existed as In-
dian tribes,105 were unsure of their legal status,106 chose to defer to the 
states’ exercise of jurisdiction,107 lacked or were unwilling to expend 
government resources,108 or were corrupt or just incompetent109—the 
                                                          
 105.   See Quinn, supra note 74, at 348 (“The administrative ‘extinction’ of the New England 
tribes and other Atlantic seaboard tribes subject to state supervision prior to 1783 was considered a 
fait accompli and never dealt with, but other tribes would occasionally become ‘extinct’ and thus 
lose federal acknowledgment.”); cf. MILLER, supra note 50, at 29–30 (“It was never clear how to 
decide whether a tribe’s extinction was voluntary, or how to determine if the band in question was 
really extinct.”).  
 106.   Compare E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. United States, 117 U.S. 288, 309 (1886) 
(“[T]hey have never been recognized as a separate nation by the United States; no treaty has been 
made with them; they can pass no laws; they are citizens of that state [North Carolina], and bound by 
its laws.”) and State v. Ta-Cha-Na-Tah, 64 N.C. 614, 615 (1870) (holding that Eastern Cherokees 
were subject to North Carolina state criminal laws), with United States v. Boyd, 83 F. 547, 552 (4th 
Cir. 1897) (holding that Eastern Band of Cherokee were a tribe under federal jurisdiction), and Unit-
ed States v. Wright, 53 F.2d 300, 312 (4th Cir. 1931) (upholding constitutionality of congressional 
act exempting Eastern Cherokee lands from state taxation); see also JOHN R. FINGER, THE EASTERN 
BAND OF CHEROKEES 1819–1900 xii (1984) (noting that “the Eastern Band endured a precarious and 
anomalous legal status vis-à-vis their white neighbors, the State of North Carolina, and the federal 
government” during the nineteenth century and that “certain features of mixed [federal and state] 
jurisdiction continued” in the twentieth century, after federal courts had declared them to be “wards” 
under the jurisdiction of the federal government).  
 107.   See supra notes 62–64, 76–84, 92–94 and accompanying text (discussing federal officials’ 
deference to state jurisdiction regarding Indians in Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, and 
Virginia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).  
 108.   See MILLER, supra note 50, at 27 (noting that federal officials during the nineteenth centu-
ry “often overlooked many viable Indian tribes and peoples, seeing them as simply too weak, de-
pendent, or numerically insignificant to bother with.  These forgotten tribes were left outside the 
federal circle as a result.”); id. at 30 (discussing federal officials’ correspondence regarding the una-
vailability of resources to provide services to Indians in Michigan); Grand Traverse Cty. Bd. of 
Comm’rs v. Acting Midwest Reg’l Dir., 61 IBIA 273, 280 (2015), 2015 WL 10939236 (suggesting 
that “the Department’s reticence to extend IRA benefits to the [Grand Traverse Band] in the 
1930s . . . reflected fiscal concerns”). 
 109.   See, e.g., United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 642–43 (1978) (describing federal officials’ 
dealings with, and failure to fulfill legal obligations to, Choctaws who remained in Mississippi dur-
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United States necessarily assumed jurisdiction regarding other Indige-
nous peoples as it asserted its sovereignty across other areas of North 
America.110  Significant among these assumptions of jurisdiction is the 
Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo by which the United States expanded to 
California, home to more federally recognized tribes than any other state 
in the contiguous United States, as well as numerous Carcieri-based fee-
to-trust challenges.111  California is also home to the Tejon (also known 
as the Kitanemuck or Tejoneño) people,112 whose history exemplifies the 
federal government’s arbitrary and haphazard exercise of its jurisdiction 
in California and elsewhere. 
                                                          
ing the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as “characterized by incompetence, if not corruption, 
[which] proved an embarrassment and an intractable problem for the Federal Government for at least 
a century”).  
 110.   As the Supreme Court explained in 1913, “the United States as a superior and civilized 
nation [assumed] the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all de-
pendent Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or territory sub-
sequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a state.”  United States v. Sandoval, 
231 U.S. 28, 46–47 (1913).  After acquiring its original boundaries from Great Britain in the 1783 
Treaty of Paris, the United States entered into the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 (covering all or parts 
of eighteen present-day states), the Adams-Onis Treaty in 1819 (acquiring Florida and parts of pre-
sent-day Mississippi, Alabama, and Colorado from Spain), the Convention of 1818 and the 1846 
Treaty of Oregon (drawing the United States northwestern boundary at the forty-ninth parallel, to 
include, respectively, parts of present-day Minnesota and North Dakota, and present-day Idaho, Ore-
gon, and Washington), the Texas Annexation in 1846, the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo in 1848 
(California, Nevada, Utah, and parts of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Wyoming) and the 
Gadsden Purchase in 1853 (present-day Arizona and New Mexico along the U.S.-Mexico border).  
The United States similarly assumed jurisdiction regarding Indigenous peoples in Alaska, Hawai’i, 
and islands in the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean (American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and Virgin 
Islands) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
 111.   E.g., Stand-Up for California! v. Dep’t of Interior, No. 12-2039, 2016 WL 4621056 
(D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2016) (North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians); Butte Cty. v. Chaudhuri, No. 1:08-
cv-519, 2016 WL 3919803 (D.D.C. July 15, 2016) (Mechoopda Indian Tribe); Cty. of Amador v. 
Dep’t of Interior, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1193 (E.D. Cal. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-17253 (9th Cir. 
Nov. 13, 2015) (Ione Band of Miwok Indians); Citizens for a Better Way v. Dep’t of Interior, No. 
2:12-cv-3021, 2015 WL 5648925 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2015) (Estom Yumeka Maidu Tribe of the 
Enterprise Rancheria)); Pres. of Los Olivos v. Dep’t of Interior, 635 F. Supp. 2d 1076 (C.D. Cal. 
2008), appeal filed, No. 15-55486 (9th Cir.) (Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians); Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n v. Pacific Reg’l Dir., 51 IBIA 141 (2010), 2010 WL 722024 (Big Lagoon Rancheria); see 
also Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 789 F.3d 947, 953 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting as untimely 
California’s argument that 1994 fee-to-trust acquisition was unlawful because the tribe was not un-
der federal jurisdiction in 1934). 
 112.   A request for confirmation of status submitted by the Tejon Indian Tribe to the Interior 
Department in 2006 explains that “the Tejon Indian Tribe is the historic Kitanemuck Tribe,” who 
over time adopted the name federal officials used to refer to them because their ancestral lands in-
clude an area in southern California “variously described” as Tejon Canyon, Tejon Ranch, Tejon 
Pass, Tejon Valley, “or simply Tejon.”  THE TEJON INDIAN TRIBE REQUEST FOR CONFIRMATION OF 
STATUS 3 (2006) (on file with author).  The use of “Tejoneños” in reference to the Tejon Tribe dates 
back to Spanish and Mexican colonization of the area.  See GEORGE HARWOOD PHILLIPS, “BRING-
ING THEM UNDER SUBJECTION:” CALIFORNIA’S TEJÓN INDIAN RESERVATION AND BEYOND, 1852–
1864 2 (2004) [hereinafter PHILLIPS, SUBJECTION].  
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The Tejon Indian Tribe was added to the list of federally recognized 
tribes in 2012,113 after the Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs deter-
mined that the Tribe had been improperly excluded when the list was 
first compiled in 1979 and ever since.114  Their ancestral lands, located 
seventy-five miles north of Los Angeles, were set aside in an 1851 treaty 
with the United States in which the Tejoneños and other Indians 
“acknowledged themselves to be under the exclusive jurisdiction, con-
trol, and management of the United States.”115  The U.S. Senate never 
ratified the treaty,116 but in 1853 the United States established the Tejon 
Indian Reservation, which included the Tejoneños’ villages.117  Follow-
ing a series of reorganizations in the Indian affairs bureaucracy in Cali-
fornia, the federal government abandoned the Tejon Reservation in 
1864.118 
After a consortium of Los Angeles investors acquired title to the 
former reservation land in the early 1900s,119 federal officials attempted 
(without success) to purchase and set aside some of it for the Tejon 
                                                          
 113.   Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, 77 Fed. Reg. 47868, 47871 (Aug. 6, 2012).  
 114.   Letter from Larry Echo Hawk, Assistant Sec’y – Indian Affairs, to Kathryn Morgan, 
Chairwoman, Tejon Indian Tribe (Jan. 6, 2012) [hereinafter AS–IA Tejon Letter], 
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc015962.pdf, (“affirm[ing] the Federal rela-
tionship between the United States and the Tejon Indian Tribe” and explaining that the affirmation 
“concludes the long and unfortunate omission of the Tejon Indian Tribe from the list of federally 
recognized tribes”); see also Memorandum from Assistant Sec’y – Indian Affairs to Reg’l Dir., Pac. 
Region and Deputy Dir., Office of Indian Services 1 (Apr. 24, 2012) [hereinafter AS–IA Tejon 
Memorandum], http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc-018480.pdf (stating that 
although the Tejon Tribe had been “recognized by the Federal Government and received services 
from the BIA[,] . . . it was simply disregarded in 1978 as the BIA developed its list of recognized 
tribal entities pursuant to the [Part 83] regulations”); id. at 4 (discussing the “inadvertent omission of 
the Tribe by the Department from the Bureau’s [1979] list of federally recognized tribes – an error 
that was unintentionally carried through to successive lists”).  
 115.   PHILLIPS, SUBJECTION, supra note 112, at 37 (quoting treaty); see also id. at 36–38 (dis-
cussing treaty negotiation).  
 116.   Id. at 73.  It was one of eighteen treaties the United States negotiated with California Indi-
an peoples between March 1851 and January 1852 which the Senate rejected in a secret session in 
June 1852, classified as secret and sealed in a vault in the Senate basement, and did not make public 
until 1905.  See GEORGE HARWOOD PHILLIPS, INDIANS AND INDIAN AGENTS: THE ORIGINS OF THE 
RESERVATION SYSTEM IN CALIFORNIA, 1849–1852 182 (1997) (discussing the Senate’s rejection of 
the California treaties).  
 117.   See PHILLIPS, SUBJECTION, supra note 112, at 106, 112, 120.  
 118.   Id. at 250.  Most Tejoneños continued to live at Tejon Ranch after the reservation’s aban-
donment, and after the United States established another, separate reservation for them and other 
Indians in 1873.  See AS–IA Tejon Memorandum, supra note 114, at 4 (“In 1873, the Tule River 
Indian Reservation was established . . . for the Tejon (Manche Cajon) and other bands of Indians.  
But not all Tejon Indians moved there.”).  The United States set aside 880 acres of different land 
from the public domain for the El Tejon Band of Indians in 1916.  Id. at 7. 
 119.   Id. at 4–5. 
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Tribe.120  The United States Department of Justice, acting as the “guardi-
an” for the Tejon Indians—who it said had “now and from time imme-
morial . . . been tribal Indians, and at all times since July 7, 1846, ha[d] 
been . . . wards of the United States”—litigated a case up to the Supreme 
Court in defense of the Tejoneños’ land rights.121  When the Court ruled 
against the United States and the tribe in 1924,122 federal officials entered 
into an agreement with the investors which allowed the Tejoneños to stay 
in their villages.123  Government efforts to set aside land for the Tejon 
Tribe had ceased by 1952, when an earthquake destroyed many of their 
homes and federal officials monitored the situation but decided not to use 
Indian services appropriations to help them.124  Federal officials did not 
exercise jurisdiction with respect to the Tejon Indians again until 2011, 
when the Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs “[re]affirm[ed] the Federal 
relationship between the United States and the Tejon Indian Tribe.”125 
The government’s early twentieth century efforts to set aside land for 
the Tejoneños were part of a larger program to secure lands for Califor-
nia Indians after the unratified U.S. treaties with the Tejon Tribe and oth-
er California Indians were made public in 1905.126  For the next three 
decades, Congress passed legislation to fund land purchases for non-
                                                          
 120.   Id. at 5.  
 121.   THE TEJON INDIAN TRIBE REQUEST FOR CONFIRMATION OF STATUS 4 (2006) (quoting Bill 
of Complaint at 1, United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co. (S.D. Cal.) (Complaint filed Dec. 20, 
1920)); United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 481 (1924) (“This is a suit by the Unit-
ed States, as guardian of certain Mission Indians, to quiet in them a ‘perpetual right’ to occupy, use, 
and enjoy a part of a confirmed Mexican land grant in Southern California . . . .”); Bill of Complaint 
at 1, United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co. (S.D. Cal.) (Complaint filed Dec. 20, 1920) (on file with 
author) (stating that it filed suit “as guardian for sundry Indians known as the Tejon Band or Tribe of 
Indians now and from time immemorial residing on certain premises . . . in what is now Kern Coun-
ty, California[,]” and that the Tejoneños “are and from time immemorial have been tribal Indians, 
and at all times since July 7, 1846, have been and now are wards of the United States”); AS–IA 
Tejon Memorandum, supra note 114, at 6 (“From 1920–1924, the [Interior] Department worked 
with the Department of Justice to secure the Tribe’s rights to Tejon Ranch land, first meeting with 
the Tribe’s Chief and endeavoring to open negotiations with the ranch owners, and then through liti-
gation.”) (citations omitted). 
 122.   Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. at 486–87 (ruling that the Tejoneños lacked rights in the 
land).  
 123.   AS–IA Tejon Memorandum, supra note 114, at 5 (citing BIA officials’ correspondence).  
The investors refused to sell a tract for the Tejoneños but agreed they could stay in their villages if 
no further claims were made challenging the investors’ title.  Id.  Federal officials pointed to this 
agreement throughout the 1920s and 1930s, in part as a reason for not making further efforts to pur-
chase lands for the Tejon Tribe.  Id. at 5–6.  
 124.   Id. at 6.  
 125.   AS–IA Tejon Letter, supra note 114; see AS–IA Tejon Memorandum, supra note 114, at 
1.  
 126.   See William Wood, The Trajectory of Indian Country in California: Rancherías, Villages, 
Pueblos, Missions, Ranchos, Reservations, Colonies, and Rancherias, 44 TULSA L. REV. 317, 356–
57 (2008).  
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reservation Indians in California, but the program ended during the Great 
Depression, with many California Indians still lacking a land base.127  
Federal officials in charge of the program readily admitted they had nei-
ther the resources nor time to carry out the task Congress bestowed, such 
as when the superintendent of the Sacramento BIA agency wrote that “it 
ha[d] not been physically possible to comply literally with [their] instruc-
tions” to locate Indian communities and buy land for them, in part be-
cause the BIA had prepared Indian censuses in only seven of the forty-
five counties in the agency’s jurisdiction, which covered most of Cali-
fornia.128  As a contemporary observer explained in the California Law 
Review, the United States assumed a colonial fiduciary jurisdiction re-
garding the Tejoneños and other California Indians following the U.S.–
Mexico War, but it was an “indisputably slothful” guardian that had for 
the most part failed to exercise that jurisdiction—thus illustrating the dif-
ference between the “legal status” or “theoretical status” of Indians in 
California “as . . . federal ward[s], as declared by the Supreme Court[,]” 
and their “actual status, as that wardship is administered.”129 
C. Jurisdiction: Exercise ≠ Existence 
The examples discussed above illustrate clearly the difference be-
tween the federal government’s having jurisdiction, and even explicitly 
acknowledging it had jurisdiction regarding certain Indians, and actually 
exercising it.  Other people(s), including those mentioned in Justice 
Breyer’s concurring opinion in Carcieri,130 share similar histories.  
Sometimes Congress affirmed their tribal status;131 otherwise, affirmation 
was by the Interior Department, either through a formal administrative 
process or in a legal opinion.  All of these situations involve the federal 
government establishing (or, in some cases, reestablishing) a formal po-
                                                          
 127.   See id. at 357–58 nn.224–27 (citing legislation and providing historical background).  
 128.   See Letter from L.A. Dorrington, Superintendant, to Comm’r Indian Affairs 1, 27 (June 
23, 1927) (on file with author) (“In conclusion, kindly be advised that it has not been physically pos-
sible to comply literally with Office instructions, and it is believed from the foregoing the magnitude 
of the undertaking will be realized, especially as census, so far as we are aware, is available for only 
seven counties.”).  Superintendent Dorrington in Sacramento also reported to his superiors in Wash-
ington throughout the 1920s on the situation at Tejon.  See AS–IA Tejon Memorandum, supra note 
114, at 5–6 (citing 1924, 1925, and 1927 letters from L.A. Dorrington to the Commissioner and As-
sistant Commissioner for Indian Affairs).  
 129.   Chauncey S. Goodrich, The Legal Status of the California Indian, 14 CAL. L. REV.  83, 
97–98 (1926).  
 130.   Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 398–99 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing the 
Stillaguamish Tribe, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, and the Mole Lake 
Tribe). 
 131.   See infra note 135. 
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litical relationship with people(s) who were already under federal juris-
diction as a matter of law. 
Interior Department officials in the 1930s refused to extend the Indi-
an Reorganization Act to the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chip-
pewa Indians, arguing that an 1855 treaty had terminated the tribe, but 
the Department later rejected this “erroneous belief” and in 1980 
acknowledged the tribe’s status.132  After the Stillaguamish sued the 
United States to have their tribal status and fishing rights recognized in 
the 1970s, the Department—reversing previous determinations to the 
contrary—concluded in 1980 that the Stillaguamish were a tribe, focus-
ing on their “continuous tribal existence” and noting two other instances 
(involving the Burns Paiute Tribe and the Nooksack Indian Tribe) where 
the Department had “reassessed the status of groups initially determined 
not to be tribes.”133  And though it refused to provide assistance to the 
Catawba in the early 1900s, saying they were “state Indians” for whom 
the federal government had no responsibility,134 the Department deter-
                                                          
 132.   Grand Traverse Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Acting Midwest Reg’l Dir., 61 IBIA 273, 279–80 
(2015), 2015 WL 10939236 (discussing the tribe’s history, including 1795, 1836, and 1855 treaties 
with the United States, and explaining that “the correspondence reflected the erroneous belief, held 
by the Department at the time, that the 1855 Treaty had terminated the tribe, an idea later rejected by 
both the Department and the courts”); see also Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 398 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(discussing Grand Traverse Band history); Grand Traverse, 61 IBIA at 280 (suggesting that “the 
Department’s reticence to extend IRA benefits to the Tribe in the 1930s also reflected fiscal con-
cerns”).  The Grand Traverse Band was the first tribe recognized through the administrative process 
in 25 C.F.R. Part 83.  Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 408 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  In 2013, the Interior De-
partment acquired approximately 159 acres of land for the tribe under the IRA, finding that the tribe 
was a recognized Indian tribe “under Federal jurisdiction . . . in 1934.”  Grand Traverse, 61 IBIA at 
273, 277.  In September 2015, the Interior Board of Indian Appeals, an administrative hearing body 
within the Interior Department, rejected a challenge to this determination.  Id. at 273. 
  Similarly, although Indian Affairs Commissioner John Collier wrote in 1933 that the 
Cowlitz were “no longer in existence as a communal entity,” the government later changed this 
“mistaken belief” and recognized the Cowlitz Indian Tribe in 2002.  Confederated Tribes of the 
Grand Ronde Cmty. v. Jewell, 830 F.3d 552, 565 (D.C. Cir.) (explaining that Collier’s statement 
reflects a “sentiment [that] goes to the government’s mistaken belief at the time that the Cowlitz had 
been absorbed into the greater population”), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Citizens Against Reser-
vation Shopping v. Jewell (U.S. Oct. 27, 2016) (No. 16-572). 
 133.   Memorandum of Hans Walker, Jr., Assoc. Solicitor, Indian Affairs, on Reconsideration of 
Status of Stillaguamish Tribe (Oct. 1, 1980) (on file with author) at 7–8; see also Carcieri, 555 U.S. 
at 398 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing Stillaguamish–U.S. relations); Stillaguamish Tribe of In-
dians v. Kleppe, No. 75-1718, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17381, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 1976) (or-
dering determination of Stillaguamish tribal status); Mark D. Myers, Comment, Federal Recognition 
of Indian Tribes in the United States, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 273 (2000) (discussing Stil-
laguamish litigation). 
 134.   Historians’ Brief, supra note 46, at 15 (noting that “the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
had advised the Catawbas in 1906 and again in 1909 that the Interior Department would not seek 
relief on their behalf, on the ground that they were ‘state Indians’ for whom the United States had no 
responsibility”) (quoting South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 515 (1986) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)).  
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mined in 1944 that the Catawba could organize under the IRA because 
they had continually existed as a tribe since at least the mid-1800s, when 
Congress appropriated funds to remove them to Indian Territory.135  The 
situation of the Catawba, who remained on lands in South Carolina set 
aside under a nineteenth century treaty with the state,136 is particularly 
noteworthy because senators’ uncertainty about the Catawbas’ status dur-
ing the debates on the Indian Reorganization Act—and questions about 
whether they (and other tribes) were still Indians, and thus whether the 
Act should apply to them—led to the “now under Federal jurisdiction” 
language being added to the IRA’s definition of Indian.137 
In a 1978 case rejecting Mississippi’s argument against federal juris-
diction over the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians based on “the long 
                                                          
 135.   See Catawba Tribe—Recognition Under IRA, 2 Op. Solicitor on Indian Affairs 1255 
(1944) (stating that the Catawba Indian Tribe was “recognized by” the federal government via the 
Congressional legislation, and explaining that “although such recognition is of ancient date, the trib-
al organization has been continuously maintained and there is no serious dispute now as to the exist-
ence of membership of the tribe”) (citing Act of July 29, 1848, 9 Stat. 252, 264; Act of July 31, 
1854, 10 Stat. 315, 316); Questions of the Catawbas’ Identity and Organization as a Tribe and Right 
to Adopt IRA Constitution, 2 Op. Solicitor on Indian Affairs 1261 (1944) (stating that the Depart-
ment’s “files are full of evidence which is conclusive that a tribal organization has been continuously 
maintained” and that “[t]here can be no doubt that the Catawba Indians now exist as a tribe and have 
had a known tribal existence for almost a century”).  In a memorandum to the Indian Affairs Com-
missioner the following year, D’Arcy McNickle wrote that the Catawbas “occupy a position identi-
cal with that of the Alabama and Coushatta Indians in Texas, who for years were refused govern-
ment aid because they were not Federal Indians.”  Historians’ Brief, supra note 46, at 16–17 
(quoting Memorandum from D’Arcy McNickle to the Commissioner Regarding Catawba Indians 
(undated) (published in Catawba Indian Tribe of South Carolina Land Claims Settlement Act of 
1993: Hearing on H.R. 2399 Before the H. Subcomm. On Native Am. Affairs, 103rd Cong. 823 
(1993))).  Other tribes that federal officials long considered “state Indians” and refused to exercise 
federal jurisdiction regarding were the subject of Congressional and administrative actions formally 
extending them federal recognition.  See, e.g., Aroostook Band of Micmacs Settlement Act, Pub. L. 
No. 102-171, § 6, 105 Stat. 1143 (1991) (federal recognition for the Aroostook Band in Maine); 
Mashantucket Pequot Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 98-134, § 9, 97 Stat. 851 (1983) 
(federal recognition of the Mashantucket Pequot codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1758(a)); Maine Indian 
Claims Settlement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-420, § 6, 94 Stat. 1785 (1980) (federal recognition 
for the Passamaquoddy Tribe, Penobscot Indian Nation, and Houlton Band of Maliseet codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 1725(i)); Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes, 59 Fed. Reg. 12140 (Mar. 15, 1994) (feder-
al recognition for the Mohegan Indian Tribe); Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes, 52 Fed. Reg. 
4193 (Feb. 10, 1987) (federal recognition for the Wampanoag Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah), before 
passage of the Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc., Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1987, 
Pub. L. 100-95, 101 Stat. 704 (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 1171)). 
 136.   See Historians’ Brief, supra note 46, at 15 (discussing 1839 Treaty of Nation Ford between 
the Catawba Indian Tribe and South Carolina); Re: Draft Memorandum of Understanding Between 
the State of South Carolina, the Catawba Indian Tribe, the Dep’t of the Interior, and the Farm Sec. 
Admin., 1 Op. Solicitor on Indian Affairs 1080 (1942) (“By the treaty of 1840 between the Catawbas 
and . . . South Carolina, the State took charge of this tribe and has since made considerable expendi-
ture on [their] behalf . . . .”).  
 137.   See infra notes 297–304 and accompanying text.  
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lapse in the federal recognition of a [Choctaw] tribal organization,”138 the 
Supreme Court explained that “the fact that federal supervision over [the 
Mississippi Choctaw] ha[d] not been continuous” did not “destroy[] the 
federal power to deal with them.”139  Thus, though unnoticed in Carcieri, 
the Court has already distinguished between the exercise of federal juris-
diction—“federal supervision”—regarding particular Indigenous peo-
ple(s) and the existence of that jurisdiction, or the authority to deal with 
them.  In order to situate these tribal histories relative to the “under fed-
eral jurisdiction” inquiry left open by Carcieri, this article next examines 
the nature of the federal Indian affairs jurisdiction,140 the historical uncer-
tainties and evolving standards regarding what people(s) were subject to 
it,141 and how these dynamics came together in the debates leading up to, 
and the language in, the Indian Reorganization Act’s definition of “Indi-
an.”142 
IV. FEDERAL INDIAN AFFAIRS JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction, most simply, is a government’s power to exercise au-
thority within a certain area.  Both the modern and contemporaneous 
(circa 1934) editions of the Webster’s International and Black’s Law dic-
tionaries the Carcieri Court cited143 define “jurisdiction” as a sovereign’s 
general power, authority, or right to exercise its authority over persons 
and things within a particular territory.144  The 1934 Webster’s dictionary 
                                                          
 138.   United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 651 (1978). 
 139.   Id. at 653; cf. Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612, 623 (2d Cir. 1981) (opining 
that “although . . . the federal government did not avail itself of the provisions of the Nonintercourse 
[Act] and appeared to leave management of the affairs of the eastern tribes to the individual states, it 
does not follow that the federal government had no obligation to do so”); Narragansett Tribe of Indi-
ans v. S.R.I. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798, 804 (D.R.I. 1976) (finding that states’ exercising 
“‘almost exclusive responsibility for the protection and welfare of the’ tribe’s members in the face of 
almost complete disregard by the federal government” could not “terminate the trust relationship 
between” the federal government and tribes covered by the Nonintercourse Act) (quoting Joint Trib-
al Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 649, 653 (D. Me.), aff’d, 528 F.2d 
370 (1st Cir. 1975))). 
 140.   See infra Part IV.  
 141.   See infra Part V.  
 142.   See infra Part VI.  
 143.   Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 389 (2009) (citing the definition of “now” in WEB-
STER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1934) and BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 
1933)). 
 144.   WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1934) (defining jurisdiction as the 
“[a]uthority of a sovereign power to govern or legislate; power or right to exercise authority; con-
trol”); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002) (jurisdiction is “authority of a 
sovereign power to govern or legislate: power or right to exercise authority . . . sphere of authori-
ty . . . syn see POWER”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (“A government’s general power 
to exercise authority over all persons and things within its territory.”); see also THE NEW CENTURY 
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also explained that the words jurisdiction and authority “are often inter-
changeable.”145 
It appears that the Supreme Court has only once interpreted the word 
“jurisdiction” in a statute.  The legislation at issue there (amending the 
federal criminal code) was passed the same day as the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act: June 18, 1934.146  Fifty years later, a unanimous Court in 
United States v. Rodgers, noting that the statute did not define jurisdic-
tion and citing the then-current Webster’s dictionary, said that “[t]he 
most natural, nontechnical reading of the statutory language is that it co-
vers all matters confided to the authority of an agency or department.”147  
The Court explained that “[Webster’s] broadly defines ‘jurisdiction’ as, 
among other things, ‘the limits or territory within which any particular 
power may be exercised: sphere of authority.’  A department or agency 
has jurisdiction, in this sense, when it has the power to exercise authority 
in a particular situation.”148  Justices Scalia and Alito, in a dissenting 
opinion in a 2008 case, similarly relied on a contemporaneous Webster’s 
International dictionary to interpret the word “jurisdiction” in a 1905 in-
terstate compact between Delaware and New Jersey, finding that it meant 
the “authority of a sovereign power to govern or legislate.”149 
Significantly, these opinions and the dictionaries they rely on equate 
jurisdiction with the existence of government power, not its exercise.  Ju-
risdiction is the power a government has (or asserts)—and decides 
whether or not to exercise.  The Justices in Carcieri who conflated juris-
                                                          
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1927) (defining jurisdiction in part as “power or authori-
ty in general”); cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933) (defining jurisdiction as “[t]he power 
and authority constitutionally conferred upon (or constitutionally recognized as existing in) a court 
or judge to pronounce the sentence of law, or to award the remedies provided by law”); WEBSTER’S 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1934) (“1. Law. The legal power, right, or authority to 
hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in general or with reference to a particular 
matter; legal power to interpret and administer the law in the premises.”).  
 145.   Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1934).  
 146.   United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479 (1984) (discussing Act of June 18, 1934, 48 
Stat. 996 (current version codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012))). 
 147.   Rodgers, 466 U.S. at 479 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
(1976)). 
 148.   Id. (emphasis added).  In an earlier case involving the same statute, which criminalized 
false statements made “in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the 
United States,” the Court wrote that “the term ‘jurisdiction’ should not be given a narrow or tech-
nical meaning” and concluded that an individual “made a false statement in a ‘matter within the ju-
risdiction’ of the [National Labor Relations] Board” when he filed an affidavit denying affiliation 
with the Communist Party.  Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 70–71 (1969). 
 149.   New Jersey v. Delaware, 552 U.S. 597, 632 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting WEB-
STER’S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1898)).  The majority opinion 
did not interpret the word “jurisdiction”; it decided the case on other grounds.  Id. at 609 (majority 
opinion). 
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diction’s existence and exercise were wrong to do so as a general matter, 
and especially so as regards the federal government’s Indian affairs ju-
risdiction, which the Supreme Court has described as “the federal power 
to deal with” Indians.150  Across the centuries, the Court has consistently 
held that all Indians tribes have been under federal jurisdiction ever since 
they and their lands were “incorporated into” the United States.151  But as 
explained above, federal officials were not always consistent in exercis-
ing jurisdiction regarding certain people(s), or in treating them as Indians 
or Indian tribes to whom federal jurisdiction attached.152 
This Part examines the federal Indian affairs power as described and 
developed by the Supreme Court. The Court’s early cases (discussed in 
Subpart A) relied on the discovery doctrine to create a power based in 
the United States’ claims to land ownership and Constitution.  The Court 
(as discussed in Subpart B) expanded this power around the turn of the 
twentieth century, branding the power “plenary” and acknowledging that 
it is based, ultimately, not in the Constitution but rather in Indians’ pres-
ence in land claimed by the United States and their ascribed “dependent” 
and “inferior” status vis-à-vis the federal government.153  The Court has 
continued to invoke this plenary power in its modern cases (discussed in 
Subpart C), most recently describing it as a “preconstitutional power[] 
necessarily inherent” in the federal government.154 
A. The Early Federal Indian Affairs Power Cases 
The Supreme Court first addressed the federal government’s Indian 
affairs power in a trilogy of decisions authored by Chief Justice John 
Marshall in the early 1800s.155  This Marshall Trilogy of cases (as they 
are called) sets forth the foundational premises of federal Indian law,156 
                                                          
 150.   See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 653 (1978).  
 151.   See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978) (“Upon incorpo-
ration into the territory of the United States, the Indian tribes thereby came under the territorial sov-
ereignty of the United States . . . .”) (citing Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823); Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1831)). 
 152.   See supra notes 50, 76–100, 113–14, 132–35 and accompanying text; infra notes 253–56 
and accompanying text. 
 153.   See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 28 (1886) (describing the federal-
tribal relationship as “that between a superior and inferior, whereby the latter is placed under the 
care and control of the former”); see also infra notes 174–85 and accompanying text.  
 154.   United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004).  
 155.   Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); 
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).  
 156.   FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE: INDIANS, INDIAN TRIBES, AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION 87–115 (2009) (discussing Marshall Trilogy and foundational federal Indian law principles); 
Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth 
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including the characterization of Indigenous polities as “domestic de-
pendent nations” who, like their territories, are “completely under the 
sovereignty and dominion of the United States.”157  According to Mar-
shall, Indians were “in a state of pupilage,” and their “relation to the 
United States resemble[d] that of a ward to his guardian.”158 
The United States’ sovereignty and dominion were based in interna-
tional law principles, primarily the discovery doctrine.  Applied in North 
America by the same European powers that used it elsewhere, this doc-
trine holds that the Christian crown who first “discovered” a territory 
thereby obtained superior rights vis-à-vis the Indigenous peoples already 
there, as well as other colonial powers.159  And it is based on the same 
principles—that Native Americans, like non-Christians generally, were 
savage, uncivilized, and inferior peoples—which served to justify the co-
lonial enterprise throughout the Americas and the world.160 
But with this discovery power came responsibility, what this article 
calls the colonial fiduciary relationship and Rudyard Kipling called the 
“white man’s burden.”161  The colonizer took upon (itself) the general 
obligation of “civilizing” Indigenous peoples and assumed certain fiduci-
                                                          
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 33–42 (2002) (discuss-
ing Marshall Trilogy). 
 157.   Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.  
 158.   Id.  Chief Justice Marshall wrote that 
it may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged 
boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations.  
They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations.  They 
occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take ef-
fect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases.  Meanwhile they are in a 
state of pupilage.  Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his 
guardian. 
  They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; ap-
peal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great father. 
Id. 
  Although described in imperialist and paternalistic terms, the tribal-federal relationship con-
templated in the Marshall Trilogy cases was akin to relationships governing tributary and feudatory 
states in Europe, under which one sovereign receives the military protection of another but does not 
thereby lose the right to govern itself.  See N. BRUCE DUTHU, SHADOW NATIONS: TRIBAL SOVER-
EIGNTY AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL PLURALISM 12–16 (2013). 
 159.   PAGDEN, supra note 23, at ch. 2.  For a discussion of the discovery doctrine as adopted by 
the English in North America, see ROBERT J. MILLER ET AL., DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS LANDS: 
THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES ch. 1 (2010).   
 160.   See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573 (explaining that “the [Indians’] character and religion . . . af-
forded an apology for considering them as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe might 
claim an ascendency”); see also ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN 
LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 312–17 (1990) (noting that the discovery doc-
trine was “assertedly recognized as part of the Law of Nations by virtually every European colo-
nizing nation” and adopted into U.S. law in Johnson v. M’Intosh).  
 161.   Rudyard Kipling, The White Man’s Burden (1899).  
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ary duties regarding their well-being, their religious instruction and edu-
cation generally, and, importantly, their resources.162  Thus the United 
States, as the successor to Britain, France, Spain (and Spain’s successor 
Mexico), and Russia, inherited both those nations’ property interests and 
their responsibilities to the Indigenous peoples whose property interests 
they had usurped.163 
Besides the discovery doctrine, Chief Justice Marshall identified 
three constitutional sources for the Indian affairs power: the war power 
clause, the treaty clause, and the commerce clause.164  The Court’s justi-
fication for the federal Indian affairs power (regarding Native peoples, as 
opposed to the states), however, remained more territorial than constitu-
tional.165  And though the Court made broad statements about Indian 
tribes being under the United States’ dominion and authority,166  Con-
gress up through the U.S. Civil War limited its exercise of power to three 
areas: passing laws, namely the Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts (also 
called the Nonintercourse Acts), to regulate U.S. citizens’ and the states’ 
interactions with tribes and their members; ratifying treaties and funding 
obligations incurred therein; and paying for wars against Indians.167  That 
would change after 1871, when the United States stopped making treaties 
with Indian tribes and steered the federal-tribal relationship towards uni-
lateralism.168 
                                                          
 162.   See PAGDEN, supra note 23, at 86–89; see also Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573 (“The potentates of 
the old world found no difficulty in convincing themselves that they made ample compensation to 
the inhabitants of the new, by bestowing upon them civilization and Christianity . . . .”). 
 163.   See Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 
31 GEO. L.J. 1 (1943); see also Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573–84 (tracing United States land title back to 
the fifteenth century through the claims of Britain, Spain, France, and the Netherlands). 
 164.   Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832) (stating that the Constitution “confers on 
congress the powers of war and peace: of making treaties, and of regulating commerce . . . with the 
Indian tribes.  These powers comprehend all that is required for the regulation of our intercourse 
with the Indians”); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 11; art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 165.   See United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 572 (1846) (stating that “the Indians [were] con-
tinually held to be, and treated as, subject to the[] dominion and control” of the European powers 
and their successors, and that “the Indian tribes residing within the territorial limits of the United 
States are subject to their authority”) (emphasis added); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 
(1831) (“The Indian Territory is admitted to compose a part of the United States.  In all our . . . laws, 
it is so considered. . . . [Indians] are considered as within the jurisdictional limits of the United 
States . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also POMMERSHEIM, supra note 156, at 114 (“In the [Marshall] 
trilogy, the Constitution appears to constrain the states, but there is no express discussion about 
whether it constrains the federal government to any significant degree.”). 
 166.   See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.   
 167.   See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 156, at 60–66; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Original Un-
derstanding of the Political Status of Indian Tribes, 82 SAINT JOHN’S L. REV. 153, 170–73 (2008).  
 168.   Indian Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (“[H]ereafter no 
Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized 
as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty.”). 
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B. The “Plenary” Indian Affairs Power Doctrine 
After pursuing policies of war against and removal of Indigenous 
peoples for most of the nineteenth century, the United States in the late 
1800s adopted a formal policy of trying to assimilate Indian people(s), 
most of whom lived on reservations set aside through treaties or Execu-
tive Orders, into American society as (second-class) citizens.169 Aimed at 
destroying traditional Indigenous societies and institutions, the policy 
was premised on Indians’ ascribed racial and cultural inferiority—the 
same basis for the discovery doctrine—and the idea that Indians, as 
“wards” of the United States, were subject to federal government control 
of their property, education, religious practices, and other aspects of dai-
ly life until deemed “civilized” enough to become American citizens. 
Lawmakers considered private property ownership under the Anglo-
Saxon model a hallmark of civilized society, and so a centerpiece of as-
similation era Indian policy was allotment—a process through which 
tribes’ collective (national) landholdings were divided up among indi-
vidual tribal members, who government officials hoped would become 
farmers and ranchers.170  These allotted reservation lands were subject to 
federal oversight and restrictions against alienation, and federal bureau-
crats managed individual Indians’ property interests.171  The growing 
federal Indian affairs bureaucracy also administered the distribution of 
goods and services, ran boarding schools for Indian children, oversaw the 
activities of missionaries, and enforced laws criminalizing traditional 
cultural practices.172 
As the reservation system and the federal government’s involvement 
in Indians’ lives expanded, the Supreme Court found itself having to jus-
tify the United States’ intruding into tribes’ internal affairs and supplant-
                                                          
 169.   See generally CORNTASSEL & WITMER, supra note 5, at 9–12 (discussing assimilation pol-
icy); FREDERICK E. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS, 1880–
1920 (1984). 
 170.   CORNTASSEL & WITMER,  supra note 5, at 9–11; ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDI-
ANS OF THE UNITED STATES 299–300 (1985 ed.); POMMERSHEIM, supra note 156, at 126–31.  The 
General Allotment Act of 1887 (also known as the Dawes Severalty Act or Dawes Act), the princi-
pal allotment legislation, was drafted by Henry Dawes, a U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, and 
based at least in part on the Massachusetts Indian Citizenship Act of 1869.  MANDELL, supra note 
58, at 196; ROSEN, supra note 49, at 179; see also supra note 63 (discussing Massachusetts law).  
 171.   See Graham D. Taylor, The New Deal and American Indian Tribalism: The Administra-
tion of the Indian Reorganization Act, 1934–45 5–6 (1980).  
 172.   ROCKWELL, supra note 70, at 246, 254 (discussing expansion of the federal Indian affairs 
bureaucracy from the 1850s to 1890s); TAYLOR, supra note 171, at 8 (noting new Bureau of Indian 
Affairs divisions and programs in the late 1800s); Newton, supra note 24, at 226–28 (describing fed-
eral control over tribal members’ lives). 
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ing tribal laws and institutions.173  It did so in a body of jurisprudence 
that emphasized Indians’ status as wards under federal law who were de-
pendent on the federal government for protection.174  Departing from the 
Marshall Trilogy’s principles of military protection and political depend-
ency, the Court relied instead on Indians’ “factual dependency”175 to de-
velop what Nell Newton calls a “guardianship power over Indian tribes, 
which [the Court] frankly acknowledged to be extraconstitutional.”176 
The Supreme Court first expressly located the federal Indian affairs 
power wholly outside the Constitution in United States v. Kagama,177 an 
1886 case involving Congress’s authority to exercise criminal jurisdic-
tion over Indian-against-Indian crimes on Indian lands.  Finding that nei-
ther the Commerce Clause nor the Apportionments Clauses (the only 
constitutional clauses that mention Indians or Indian tribes) provided a 
basis for Congress to pass the law in question,178 the Court explained that 
Congress nonetheless had such authority because Indian tribes exist 
“within the geographical limits of the United States”179 and 
                                                          
 173.   Newton, supra note 24, at 207 (explaining that “the Court was forced to develop new ra-
tionales to justify federal actions concerning Indians”). 
 174.   O’Brien, supra note 25, at 1465 (“As the government’s objective turned from relating to 
tribes as national entities to supervising dependent individuals whose future lay in assimilation, the 
courts increasingly characterized Indians as ‘wards.’”). 
 175.   See DUTHU, supra note 158, at 85 (“[T]he Court emphasized elements of . . . factual de-
pendency, as opposed to Worcester’s international-law-derived notions of intergovernmental or po-
litical dependency in the tribal-federal relationship.”); Gerald Torres, Who Is an Indian? The Story of 
United States v. Sandoval, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 109, 143–44 (Carole Goldberg et al. eds., 2011) 
(discussing the Court’s use of “factual dependency” as a justification for the plenary power doc-
trine); see also Lauren Benton, Shadows of Sovereignty: Legal Encounters and the Politics of Pro-
tection in the Atlantic World, in ENCOUNTERS OLD AND NEW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JERRY BENTLEY 
(Alan Karras & Laura Mitchell eds., forthcoming 2017) (discussing nineteenth-century changes in 
the meanings of “protection” as used in the context of political and jurisdictional relationships be-
tween Native peoples and colonial powers in North America).  
 176.   Newton, supra note 24, at 207.  
 177.   118 U.S. 375 (1886).  
 178.   Id. at 378–79 (discussing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power to 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes;”), art. I, § 2, cl. 3 and amend. XIV, § 2 (both “excluding Indians not taxed” for apportion-
ment purposes)).  The Court said that “it would be a very strained construction of th[e commerce] 
clause that a system of criminal laws for Indians living peaceably in their reservations . . . was au-
thorized by the grant of power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes” and that the Apportion-
ments Clauses did not “shed much light on the power of congress over the Indians in their existence 
as tribes distinct from the ordinary citizens of a state or territory.”  Id. 
 179.   Id. at 379; id. at 384–85 (stating that the power “must exist in th[e federal] government, 
because it has never existed anywhere else; because the theater of its exercise is within the geograph-
ical limits of the United States; because it has never been denied; and because it alone can enforce its 
laws on all the tribes.”).  
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are the wards of the nation.  They are communities dependent on the 
United States . . . . From their very weakness and helplessness, so 
largely due to the course of dealing of the federal government with 
them . . . there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.180 
This, according to the Court, “ha[d] always been recognized by the 
executive, and by congress, and by this court, whenever the question has 
arisen.”181 
Over the next few decades, the Court entrenched the extraconstitu-
tional power invoked in Kagama—which it described as the govern-
ment’s “plenary power” regarding Indian affairs—in a series of cases 
wherein Indians challenged federal acts appropriating tribal property and 
regulating other tribal matters.182  As it had in Kagama, the Court justi-
fied these exercises of authority on the grounds that Indians were within 
the geographic (or territorial) limits of the United States and therefore 
subject to its authority and control,183 and that they were “wards” in a 
state of “pupilage” and “dependent” on the United States’ “protec-
tion.”184  The Court also continued to emphasize that the federal govern-
ment had possessed this “plenary authority” over Indians from its begin-
                                                          
 180.   Id. at 383–84 (third emphasis added).  
 181.   Id. at 384 (emphasis added); see id. at 380–81 (citing United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 
(1846)). 
 182.   Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903) (rejecting challenge to legislation allot-
ting the lands of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Tribes); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 
U.S. 294, 307–08 (1902) (upholding law authorizing the United States to lease Cherokee Nation 
lands for mining); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 478–79 (1899) (using the “plenary 
power” label for the first time and finding Congressional authority to enact legislation to determine 
the citizenship, allot the lands, and regulate the judicial systems and other institutions of the Chero-
kee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Muscogee (Creek), and Seminole Nations); Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. 
Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 656–57 (1890) (holding that Congress had the power to take Cherokee Na-
tion land for a railroad). 
 183.   S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. at 657 (stating that the Cherokee Nation and its citizens were 
“within the geographical limits of the United States . . . [and] subject to the authority of the general 
government”); id. at 653–55 (citing and quoting Kagama, Rogers, and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 
30 U.S. 1 (1831)); see also Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. at 305 (citing Southern Kansas 
Railway and Stephens for the proposition that “Indian tribes domiciled within the United States” 
were “subject to the paramount authority of the United States”); Stephens, 174 U.S. at 484–86 (quot-
ing Southern Kansas Railway, Kagama, Rogers, and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, and other case 
law regarding tribes’ being under the “sovereignty and dominion” and “political control”—and “sub-
ject to the[] authority”—of the federal government because they were within the United States’ “ter-
ritorial limits” or “geographical limits”).  
 184.   Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. at 305–06 (noting that Indian tribes were “regard-
ed as in a condition of pupilage or dependency” and opining that Congress had the “undoubted pow-
er to legislate . . . for the protection of the tribal property”) (citing Stephens, 174 U.S. at 484–85); S. 
Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. at 653–54 (citing case law describing Indian tribes as “wards of the nation,” 
“in a state of pupilage,” and “dependent political communities”); see Tiger v. W. Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 
286, 286 (1911) (“Congress has had at all times, and now has, the right to pass legislation in the in-
terest of the Indians as a dependent people . . . .”).   
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ning, pointing in 1913 to a rule established by “long continued legislative 
and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions” that 
“attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the 
power and . . . duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all 
dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether within its 
original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within 
or without the limits of a state.”185 
C. The Plenary Indian Affairs Power Doctrine—Continued . . . 
The Court continued to rely on the plenary power doctrine through-
out the twentieth century, and to locate this power both inside and out-
side of the Constitution.186  It still does today.  As recently as 2004, the 
Court grounded the plenary Indian affairs power not just in the Constitu-
tion’s text (the Commerce and Treaty Clauses), but also in “the Constitu-
tion’s adoption of preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in any 
Federal Government, namely, powers that th[e] Court has described as 
‘necessary concomitants of nationality.’”187 
                                                          
 185.   United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913) (emphasis added); see Lone Wolf, 187 
U.S. at 565 (“Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Con-
gress from the beginning . . . .”) (emphasis added); S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. at 653 (“From the be-
ginning of the government to the present time, [Indians] have been treated as ‘wards of the na-
tion’ . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
 186.   See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 155 n.21 (1982) (stating that 
“when Congress acts with respect to the Indian tribes, it generally does so pursuant to its authority 
under the Indian Commerce Clause, or by virtue of its superior position over the tribes”); Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–52 (1974) (explaining that Congress’s power “to deal with . . . Indians 
is drawn both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself” and that the United States, “[i]n 
the exercise of the war and treaty powers, . . . overcame the Indians and took possession of their 
lands, . . . leaving them . . . needing protection,” and therefore “[o]f necessity . . . assumed the duty 
of furnishing that protection, and with it the authority to do all that was necessary to perform that 
obligation”) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 715 (1943) for the second and 
third passages)); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 n.4 (1959) (“The Federal Government’s power 
over Indians is derived from [the Indian Commerce Clause] and from the necessity of giving uni-
form protection to a dependent people.” (citing Kagama and Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478 
(1914)); Perrin, 232 U.S. at 482 (1914) (stating that the federal Indian affairs power “arises in part 
from the [Commerce] clause . . . and in part from the recognized relation of tribal Indians to the Fed-
eral government”); see also DUTHU, supra note 158, at 150–51 (discussing twentieth century cases 
that relied on “the Constitution’s text and . . . the non-textually based, dependency theory as the 
source of federal power in Indian affairs”); Cleveland, supra note 156, at 77 (“As late as 1942, . . . 
lower courts continued to portray Congress’s power over tribes as ‘[f]ull; entire; complete; absolute; 
perfect; [and] unqualified.’”) (alterations in original) (citations omitted); Newton, supra note 24, at 
216–22 (noting the early twentieth century Court’s focus on the guardian-ward relationship as the 
basis for the plenary power doctrine).  
 187.   United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200–01 (2004) (quoting United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)). 
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But whether tied to some constitutional provision or couched as a 
“pre-constitutional” power implicit in the Constitution, the plenary Indi-
an affairs power is based, ultimately, in the discovery doctrine and colo-
nial fiduciary relationship.188  Though no longer using the overtly racist 
and imperialist language from its foundational federal Indian law cases, 
the Court still invokes the same extraconstitutional plenary power doc-
trine.189  Because the United States asserts territorial claims and jurisdic-
                                                          
 188.   See Cleveland, supra note 156, at 26, 31, 34 (examining different sources for the power, 
including the discovery doctrine, and explaining that the Court early on “established that U.S. au-
thority over tribes . . . originated from two sources: colonial prerogatives deriving from discovery, 
and the nature of Indians as savages and incomplete sovereigns”); Newton, supra note 24, at 207 
(describing an extraconstitutional “guardianship power” over Indian tribes that the Court developed 
based on the discovery doctrine and the United States’ property interests and fiduciary obligations, 
and calling the discovery doctrine “the central analytical element” of the government’s power); 
Royster & Fausett, supra note 24, at 587, 587 n.13 (describing the Court’s attempts at using the 
Constitution to justify Congress’s exercises of plenary power as “little more than an after-the-fact 
search for legal underpinnings” and commenting that the “bare skeleton of the doctrine” is “that the 
federal government has plenary legal power simply because it has the concomitant raw political 
power”). 
  Although scholars disagree about the scope and nature of federal power regarding Native 
peoples that the Framers intended, see Ablavsky, Beyond, supra note 57, at 1053, 1053 n.216, 1058, 
1083 (questioning the assertion that plenary power and other “powers derived from sovereignty” are 
nineteenth-century judicial innovations inconsistent with the Constitution’s original understanding) 
(citing William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1800–
05 (2013); Cleveland, supra note 156, at 54–63; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Preconstitutional Federal 
Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 509, 555–60 (2007); Newton, supra note 24, at 212–16; Saikrishna Prakash, 
Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069, 1077–79 (2004)), the plenary power doctrine 
certainly encompasses authority beyond what the Framers had in mind.  Ablavsky, Beyond, supra 
note 57, at 1082–1084 (describing “an internalist story for the development of plenary power” 
whereby “the first federal leaders’ narrow claims of sovereignty over Native nations became the doc-
trinal tools for ever more aggressive assertions of federal authority to regulate Indians[,]” and noting 
that “the authority that the United States originally claimed over Indian tribes was importantly dif-
ferent from later, more aggressive invocations of federal power.  It was not plenary[.]”).  And both 
the plenary power and more limited power envisioned by the Framers are grounded in the same prin-
ciples—federal power over Indigenous peoples living in places where the United States asserts juris-
diction—as, and can be traced back to, the discovery doctrine.  See id. at 1082 (noting that “earlier 
and more limited federal claims of authority over Native nations rested on principles of dominance 
that . . . expand[ed] . . . into an assertion of complete and unfettered power”); see also supra notes 
24, 155–63 and accompanying text. 
 189.   See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDI-
AN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 156 (2005) (noting that the Court’s 
opinion in Lara was “thoroughly cleansed of any of the embarrassing or anachronistic racist lan-
guage or imagery from the nineteenth century . . . so often used by the Court in the past to justify 
Congress’s plenary power over Indian tribes” and recognized a federal power “to make ‘major poli-
cy changes in the metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty,’ . . . without making any reference to the 
foundational principles of racial inferiority supporting U.S. powers over tribes under the Marshall 
[Trilogy] model.”) (quoting Lara, 541 U.S. at 202); see also Ablavsky, Beyond, supra note 57, at 
1082–83 (“Little has changed in plenary power doctrine in the century since Kagama was decided, 
except that as the racialized rhetoric and theories of unenumerated federal powers employed in 
Kagama fell out of favor in the late twentieth century, the Court dragged in the Indian Commerce 
Clause post hoc to sanitize the doctrine.”). 
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tion over certain geographies where Indigenous peoples are present, the 
federal government assumes powers regarding (and obligations to) these 
people(s). 
The Court has always presumed that this power attached to people(s) 
determined to be Indians and (members of) Indian tribes, as explained in 
the next Part.  Whether government officials treated, or recognized, cer-
tain Indigenous people(s) as Indians or Indian tribes—and on that basis 
exercised the United States’ Indian affairs jurisdiction with respect to 
those people(s)—is a separate, but related, issue. 
V. “RECOGNIZED” INDIAN TRIBES 
With a basic understanding of how the Supreme Court has described 
the federal Indian affairs power, and equated the federal government’s 
power or authority with its jurisdiction, this Part looks at the criteria used 
over time for determining whether people(s) were “Indians” and “tribes,” 
such that the federal Indian affairs jurisdiction attached to them—
whether, in Indian Reorganization Act parlance, they were “recognized 
Indian tribe[s] . . . under Federal jurisdiction.”190  While the phrase “rec-
ognized Indian tribe” has a fairly straightforward meaning today—
namely, an Indian tribe on the list of “Indian Entities Recognized and El-
igible To Receive Services From the United States Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs” published annually,191 or the “BIA List”—this meaning only coa-
lesced at the end of the twentieth century.192  For most of its history, the 
                                                          
 190.   25 U.S.C. § 479 (2012) (editorially reclassified as § 5129 in Aug. 2016).  As with “under 
Federal jurisdiction,” the Carcieri majority did not address the meaning of “recognized.”  See Car-
cieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).  But a majority of the Justices seemed to agree that the word 
“now” modifies only “under Federal jurisdiction,” and not “any recognized Indian tribe.”  See id. at 
398 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that the IRA “imposes no time limit upon recognition”); id. at 
400 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[T]he statute imposes no time limit upon recognition . . . .”); id. at 402 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The plain text of the Act . . . places no temporal limitation on the defini-
tion of ‘Indian Tribe.’”); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 46–47, Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379 
(2009) (No. 07-526) (statement of Scalia, J.) (“‘Recognized tribe under Federal jurisdiction,’ that, to 
me, means two different requirements.”).  Plaintiffs in some of the ongoing Carcieri-based fee-to-
trust challenges have argued—unsuccessfully to date—that “now” modifies both phrases, such that a 
tribe must have been both a recognized Indian tribe and under federal jurisdiction in 1934 to qualify 
under the IRA.  Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. v. Jewell, 830 F.3d 552, 558–60 
(D.C. Cir.) (holding that statute is ambiguous and deferring to agency’s interpretation that “now” 
modifies only “under federal jurisdiction”), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Citizens Against Reser-
vation Shopping v. Jewell (U.S. Oct. 27, 2016) (No. 16-572); No Casino in Plymouth v. Jewell, 136 
F. Supp. 3d 1166, 1183–84 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (rejecting argument that “now” modifies both “recog-
nized Indian tribe” and “under Federal jurisdiction”).  
 191.   81 Fed. Reg. 26826 (Apr. 25, 2016) (emphasis added) (publishing the most recent list).  
 192.   Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. v. Jewell, 75 F. Supp. 3d 387, 406–07 
(D.D.C. 2014) (noting that the “modern notion[] of ‘federal recognition’ . . . evolved in the 1970s, 
after the Department promulgated procedures by which a tribe could demonstrate its status as an 
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United States had no formal policy regarding tribal recognition.  Yet fed-
eral officials still had to decide whether to deal with, or recognize, par-
ticular groups as Indian tribes.  That required determining they existed 
(or continued to exist) as a tribe and employing standards, however crude 
or inconsistently applied, for making this determination. 
The earliest references to Indigenous people(s) “recognized as” Indi-
an tribes by, or Indian tribes “recognized by,” the United States appear in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence from the late nineteenth century, during the 
same time (and in some of the same cases where) the Court crafted the 
plenary power doctrine.  This case law is examined in Subpart A, along-
side cases from the late 1800s and early 1900s that set forth criteria for 
determining whether particular Indigenous people(s) were “tribes” (or 
“bands”) and how to distinguish among them, and what made people(s) 
distinctly “Indian” communities.193  Those rudimentary criteria were still 
in use when Congress adopted the Indian Reorganization Act and first 
defined “Indian” and “tribe” in 1934, at a time when federal officials in 
all three branches were uncertain about whether certain Indigenous peo-
ple(s) were Indian tribes toward whom the United States had legal obli-
gations.194 
Congress’s defining “Indian” in the IRA to include members of “any 
recognized Indian tribe . . . under Federal jurisdiction” led the Interior 
                                                          
Indian tribe”), aff’d, 830 F.3d 552 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Citizens Against Res-
ervation Shopping v. Jewell (U.S. Oct. 27, 2016) (No. 16-572); Memorandum from Hilary C. 
Tompkins, supra note 17, at 24 (“The political or legal sense of the term ‘recognized Indian tribe’ 
evolved into the modern notion of ‘federal recognition’ or ‘federal acknowledgment’ in the 1970s.”); 
see Quinn, supra note 74, at 334–35 (discussing lists published since 1979, pursuant to regulations 
adopted in 1978).  
  As a group of professors specializing in federal Indian law noted in an amicus brief filed in 
Carcieri,  
[p]rior to enactment of the IRA, the government had not made any comprehensive effort 
to catalog Indian tribes.  In 1934, therefore, there was no list of recognized tribes to 
which the scope of the Act could be limited.  Nor were there standard criteria for deter-
mining whether recognition had been or should be extended to particular Indian groups.  
Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 52, at 3. 
 193.   Developed in the Assimilation Era, these standards reflected popular ideas about racial and 
cultural hierarchies based in eugenics and ethnography, as well as the prevailing sentiment among 
both the public and policymakers that Indian people(s) and cultures had largely disappeared in most 
of, and were fast disappearing elsewhere in, the United States.  See Quinn, supra note 74, at 347–49 
(explaining that “[r]eservations, provision of services to Indians, and the BIA itself were all viewed 
as more or less temporary by policy makers and the American public at large” in the late 1800s and 
early 1900s); see also CORNTASSEL & WITMER, supra note 5, at 9–12 (noting that “[s]tereotypical 
images of indigenous peoples as ‘childlike’ and ‘vanishing’ are common in newspaper accounts and 
policy dictates” from the late 1800s); Fort, supra note 65, at 317–20 (discussing nineteenth century 
Supreme Court jurisprudence and noting that the Court “understood and accepted the issue of the 
time to be the inevitable disappearance of the Indian”). 
 194.   See infra note 218, 236–37 and accompanying text.  
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Department to develop criteria, discussed in Subpart B, that Department 
officials applied over the following decades to decide whether particular 
Indigenous people(s) qualified as Indian tribes for purposes of the IRA 
and other federal laws.  These criteria were replaced by the current regu-
lations and process for determining whether people(s) are an Indian tribe, 
discussed in Subpart C, that have been in place since 1978 and were up-
dated in July 2015. 
The one requirement common to all these benchmarks—across the 
centuries and changing criteria—is that the people(s) continue to exist as 
a distinctly Indian community.  That is, fundamentally, the question fed-
eral officials in whatever branch have always asked when determining 
whether people(s) are Indian tribes and whether to deal with them ac-
cordingly and exercise the federal Indian affairs jurisdiction. 
A. The Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (Before the Indian 
Reorganization Act) 
As it first appeared in U.S. law in reference to Indian tribes, “recog-
nized” was used in what William Quinn, in perhaps the most exhaustive 
and cited (including in Carcieri)195 history of the concept of federal 
recognition, calls “the cognitive sense, i.e., that federal officials simply 
‘knew’ or ‘realized’ that an Indian tribe existed, as one would ‘recog-
nize,’ for example, the existence of a large Irish population in Boston.”196  
The early cases that talk about whether people(s) were recognized as In-
dian tribes by federal officials are discussed below, together with early 
cases setting forth criteria for being an Indian tribe (or band). 
1. Indians “Recognized” (by Federal Officials) as Tribes 
The first use of  “recognized” in the context of the federal govern-
ment’s relationship with Indian tribes was in United States v. Holliday, 
where the Supreme Court announced in 1865 that it would defer to “the 
executive and other political departments of the government” regarding 
whether people(s) were Indian tribes.197  If they were “recognized as a 
tribe” by those departments, the Court said, it would follow course.198  
                                                          
 195.   555 U.S. at 398 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Quinn, supra note 74, at 356–59).  
 196.   Quinn, supra note 74, at 333.  
 197.   70 U.S. 407, 419 (1865). 
 198.   Id. (“[I]t is the rule of this court to follow the action of the executive and other political 
departments of the government, whose more special duty it is to determine such affairs.  If by them 
[certain] Indians are recognized as a tribe, this court must do the same.”).  
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And if they were a tribe of Indians, they came within the federal Indian 
affairs jurisdiction.199 
Holliday said nothing about what made people an Indian tribe, but 
the Court offered some initial criteria the following year, stating in The 
Kansas Indians that it meant “exist[ing] . . . as a distinct people in the 
presence of [U.S.] civilization.”200  The Court explained that “[i]f the 
tribal organization of [a people] is preserved intact, and recognized by 
the political department of the government as existing, then they are a 
‘people distinct from others’” and subject to the federal Indian affairs ju-
risdiction.201  Throughout the late nineteenth and into the early twentieth 
century, the Court continually used “recognized” when discussing 
whether certain Indigenous people(s) were “recognized as” Indian tribes 
by, or “recognized by,” the U.S. government.202  It also relied on whether 
people maintained a “tribal organization” or “tribal relation” as the defin-
ing criterion for whether they were an Indian tribe to whom the federal 
Indian affairs jurisdiction attached.203 
                                                          
 199.   Id. (“If they are a tribe of Indians, then, by the Constitution of the United States, they are 
placed, for certain purposes, within the control of the laws of Congress.”).  
 200.   72 U.S. 737, 756 (1866).  
 201.   Id. at 755 (“If the tribal organization of the Shawnees is preserved intact, and recognized 
by the political department of the government as existing, then they are a ‘people distinct from oth-
ers,’ capable of making treaties, separated from the jurisdiction of Kansas, and to be governed exclu-
sively by the government of the Union.”); see United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 
U.S. 188, 195 (1876) (“As long as these Indians remain a distinct people, with an existing tribal or-
ganization, recognized by the political department of the government, Congress has the power to say 
with whom, and on what terms, they shall deal, and what articles shall be contraband.”). 
 202.   E.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913) (stating that it was Congress’s, and 
not the judiciary’s, job to determine “whether, to what extent, and for what time [Indians] shall be 
recognized and dealt with as dependent tribes requiring the guardianship and protection of the Unit-
ed States”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99, 109 (1884) (hold-
ing that the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship and Fifteenth Amendment’s voting rights provi-
sions did not apply to persons “born a member of one of the Indian tribes within the limits of the 
United States which still exists and is recognized as a tribe by the government of the United States.”) 
(emphasis added); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, REPORT ON INDIANS TAXED AND NOT TAXED IN 
THE UNITED STATES (EXCEPT ALASKA) AT THE ELEVENTH CENSUS: 1890 664 (1894) (stating that 
“[i]f the tribal organization of Indian bands is recognized by the national government[,]” states have 
no jurisdiction over them) (emphasis added).  
 203.   E.g., United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 600 (1916) (stating that Congress’s plenary 
power applied to Indians “during the continuance of the tribal relation”); Perrin v. United States, 232 
U.S. 478, 481 (1914) (describing Indians who were “still wards of the government” because their 
“tribal relation” had not “been dissolved”); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886) (not-
ing that Indians “were, and always have been” regarded as separate peoples “when they preserved 
their tribal relations”). The inquiry regarding whether the people as a whole preserved (or had 
“abandoned” or “dissolved”) their tribal organization or relation, see Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. at 
755–56, 758 (contrasting the situation where a tribal organization was “preserved intact” with one 
where the tribal organization was “so weaken[ed] . . . as to effect its voluntarily abandonment, and, 
as a natural result, the incorporation of the Indians with[in] the great body of the people”), is distinct 
from whether individuals had severed their tribal relations and joined the U.S. body politic.  See In-
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2. “Tribes” (and “Bands”) 
During the same time, in a series of what are known as Indian depre-
dation cases, the U.S. Court of Claims was dealing with the question of 
whether certain groups of Indians were “tribes” or “bands” that were “in 
amity with” the United States.204  These late-nineteenth century Court of 
Claims cases used “recognized” in the context of deciding how to appor-
tion liability (in the form of treaty offsets) among different groups, or 
subdivisions, of Sioux, Apache, Cheyenne, and other Indians—and the 
extent to which the federal government had recognized, or accepted, 
these divisions.205 
                                                          
dian Homestead Act of 1875, ch. 131, sec. 15, 18 Stat. 402, 420 (1875) (making individual Indians 
who “abandoned” their “tribal relations” eligible for homesteads and citizenship); Instructions to 
Enumerators, Tenth Census, 1880, reprinted in, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 200 YEARS OF U.S. CENSUS 
TAKING: POPULATION AND HOUSING QUESTIONS, 1790–1990 30 (1989) (stating that “Indians not in 
tribal relations . . . who are found mingled with the white population, residing in white families, en-
gaged as servants or laborers, or living in huts or wigwams on the outskirts of towns or settlements 
are to be regarded as part of the ordinary population of the country”); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Instruc-
tions to U.S. Marshals, Eighth Census 14 (1860) (“Indians not taxed are not to be enumerated.  The 
families of Indians who have renounced tribal rule, and who under state or territory laws exercise the 
rights of citizens, are to be enumerated.”).  The Supreme Court also noted that U.S. citizenship, 
which was extended to all Native Americans by the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 (also known as 
the Snyder Act), ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924), “is not incompatible with tribal existence or continued 
[federal] guardianship.”  Nice, 241 U.S. at 598; see also Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 48 (noting that “citi-
zenship is not in itself an obstacle to the exercise” of Congress’s plenary power). 
 204.   The court in these cases was interpreting language in the Indian Depredation Act, ch. 538, 
26 Stat. 851 (1891), which allowed the United States to deduct from treaty payments monies used to 
compensate U.S. citizens for property damage attributed to the actions of Indians who were members 
of a “band, tribe, or nation in amity with the United States.”  Id. § 1, 26 Stat. 851–52. 
 205.   In addition to showing judicial deference regarding the subdivisions “recognized by” trea-
ty or the Department of the Interior, the court adopted a policy of “accept[ing] the subdivision into 
tribes or bands made by the Indians themselves.”  Dobbs v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 308, 315–16 
(1898).  The Court of Claims explained in 1898 that 
a nation, tribe, or band will be regarded as an Indian entity where the relations of the In-
dians in their organized or tribal capacity has been fixed and recognized by treaty; . . . 
[but] where there is no treaty by which the Government has recognized a body of Indians, 
the court will recognize a subdivision of tribes or bands which has been recognized 
by . . . officers of the Government . . . [and] where there has been no such recognition by 
the Government, the court will accept the subdivision into tribes or bands made by the 
Indians themselves. 
Id. (citing Tully v. United States, 32 Ct. Cl. 1 (1896)); see also Tully, 32 Ct. Cl. at 6–7  (noting that 
“the United States ha[d] not by treaty recognized the separate bands comprising the Apache nation” 
and that “[t]he policy of the United States in dealing with the Indians has been . . . to accept the sub-
divisions of the Indians into such tribes or bands as the Indians themselves adopted, and to treat with 
them accordingly.”); Graham v. United States, 30 Ct. Cl. 318, 331, 333–34 (1895) (stating that “[t]he 
Sioux . . . have always been recognized by the political departments of the Government as belonging 
to the Siouan family or race” and that “the[ir] relations . . . in their organized or tribal capacity . . . 
[had been] fixed and recognized” by treaties with the U.S.).  
468 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
In Montoya v. United States, a 1901 case involving the Mescalero 
Apache Tribe’s liability for the actions of a group of Apaches known as 
Victoria’s Band, the Supreme Court first set forth some criteria for de-
termining who was an Indian “tribe” or “band.”206  It described a tribe as 
“a body of Indians of the same or similar race, united in a community 
under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular though 
sometimes ill-defined territory.”207  The Court in Montoya and Conners 
v. United States,208 a companion case involving the status of Cheyennes 
who escaped from military imprisonment in Oklahoma (then Indian Ter-
ritory), explained that a “band” also required a common leadership but 
was “an inferior and less permanent organization” than a tribe.209  Like 
earlier courts, the Court in Conners and Montoya used the word “recog-
nized” when discussing whether the Indians in question were treated as 
polities distinct from other groups of Indians—whether, respectively, 
they “had . . . been recognized either by the [U.S.] government or by the 
                                                          
 206.   180 U.S. 261, 269–70 (1901).  See Quinn, supra note 74, at 352 (calling Montoya the “first 
case that attempted to establish some criteria, however primitive, for what constituted a federally 
recognized tribe”). 
 207.   Montoya, 180 U.S. at 266.  Cf. MILLER, supra note 50, at 28 (“[T]o white officials a tribe 
was a political unit living under leaders who controlled and directed the community’s behavior.”).  
Illustrating the thought process behind its categorization (and how it thought about Indigenous peo-
ples generally), the Montoya Court described an Indian “nation” as  
little more than a large tribe or group of affiliated tribes possessing a common govern-
ment, language, or racial origin, and acting, for the time being, in concert.  Owing to the 
natural infirmities of the Indian character, their fiery tempers, impatience of restraint, 
their mutual jealousies and animosities, their nomadic habits, and lack of mental training, 
they have as a rule shown a total want of that cohesive force necessary to the making up 
of a nation in the ordinary sense of the word.   
Montoya, 180 U.S. at 265. 
 208.   180 U.S. 271 (1901).  
 209.   The Court in Conners explained that  
[t]o constitute a “band” . . . it [was not] necessary that the Indians composing it be a sepa-
rate political entity, recognized as such, inhabiting a particular territory, and with whom 
treaties had been or might be made.  These peculiarities would rather give them the char-
acter of tribes.  The word “band” implies an inferior and less permanent organization, 
though it must be of sufficient strength to be capable of initiating hostile proceedings. 
Id. at 275.  A “band” of Indians, according to the Montoya Court, was 
a company of Indians not necessarily, though often, of the same race or tribe, but united 
under the same leadership in a common design.  While a “band” does not imply the sepa-
rate racial origin characteristic of a tribe, of which it is usually an offshoot, it does imply 
a leadership and a concert of action.  How large the company must be to constitute a 
“band” . . . it is unnecessary to decide.  It may be doubtful whether it requires more than 
independence of action, continuity of existence, a common leadership, and concert of ac-
tion. 
Montoya, 180 U.S. at 266.  
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[Northern Cheyenne] tribe as separate entities,”210 or were “known and 
recognized as a band, separate and distinct in its organization and action 
from the several [other Apache] tribes.”211 
Thus the first cases to set forth criteria for what made people an Indi-
an tribe (or band) required that the people maintain a “tribal organiza-
tion”212 or “tribal relation”213 and share a common leadership,214 such that 
they continue(d) to exist215 as a distinct or separate people.216  The feder-
al Indian affairs jurisdiction attached to these people(s) because they 
were, or were members of, Indian tribes.217  The criteria used for deter-
mining whether people(s) were Indian tribes to whom this jurisdiction 
attached, however, are circular and vague. 
These early cases say that people must maintain a tribal organization 
or relation to be a tribe, but they are silent regarding what maintaining a 
tribal organization entailed, or exactly what made an organization (or re-
lation) “tribal.”  Moreover, the requirements presuppose that the peo-
ple(s) are “Indians.”  But whether particular people(s) were, or should be 
treated as, Indians and (therefore) Indian tribes, was something federal 
decisionmakers were unsure about in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries.218 
                                                          
 210.   Conners, 180 U.S. at 271 n.1 (“These so-called bands had no autonomy, and had not been 
recognized either by the government or by the tribe as separate entities.”) (quoting Conners v. Unit-
ed States, 33 Ct. Cl. 317, 320 (1898)). 
 211.   Montoya, 180 U.S. at 264 n.1 (quoting Montoya v. United States, 32 Ct. Cl. 349, 353 
(1897)). 
 212.   See supra note 201.  
 213.   See supra note 203.  
 214.   See Conners, 180 U.S. at 275; Montoya, 180 U.S. at 266.  
 215.   See Montoya, 180 U.S. at 266 (requiring “continuity of existence”); see also United States 
v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 195 (1876) (requiring “an existing tribal organiza-
tion”); The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 755 (1866) (requiring that “the tribal organization . . . is 
preserved intact, and . . . existing”).  
 216.   See supra notes 201, 210–11 and accompanying text.   
 217.   See Forty-Three Gallons, 93 U.S. at 195 (holding that federal liquor trafficking laws ap-
plied because Congress had power to legislate regarding Indians who “remain[ed] a distinct people, 
with an existing tribal organization”); Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. at 755–56 (holding that the federal 
Indian affairs power applied to preempt Kansas’s taxation of lands belonging to the Shawnees and 
other Indians because they “preserved intact” their “tribal organization” and remained “a ‘people 
distinct from others’”); United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 417–19 (1865) (holding that federal 
Indian trade laws governed the sale of liquor to an Indian who was a member of “a tribe of Indians” 
and therefore subject to Congress’s Indian affairs power); see also supra notes 173–85 and accom-
panying text (discussing contemporaneous plenary power jurisprudence which assumed that the fed-
eral Indian affairs jurisdiction attached to all Indian people(s) within the United States’ territory).  
 218.   Quinn, supra note 74, at 332 (“[T]he historical record reveals a consistent uncertainty and 
even confusion on the part of the several branches of the government of the United States about its 
relations with and legal obligations toward certain Indian tribes throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.”); see also id. at 348 (noting concerns within the government’s Indian Office 
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3. “Indians” 
The uncertainty, and arbitrariness, around whether people(s) were 
considered Indians—and the criteria used for determining this—are per-
haps best illustrated in case law from the late 1800s and early 1900s in-
volving whether Pueblo peoples in New Mexico, specifically those at 
Taos Pueblo and Santa Clara Pueblo, were “Indians” for specific statuto-
ry purposes.219  In United States v. Sandoval, the Supreme Court in 1913 
explained that whether people(s) were Indians depended on their race, 
culture, and institutions, writing that 
[t]he people of the pueblos, although sedentary rather than nomadic in 
their inclinations, and disposed to peace and industry, are nevertheless 
Indians in race, customs, and domestic government.  Always living in 
separate and isolated communities, adhering to primitive modes of life, 
largely influenced by superstition and fetichism, and chiefly governed 
according to the crude customs inherited from their ancestors, they are 
essentially a simple, uninformed, and inferior people.220 
Four decades earlier, the Court in United States v. Joseph had con-
cluded that the Pueblos were not Indians, pointing to their use of the 
Spanish language and adoption of the Catholic religion, and their being 
“a pastoral and agricultural people” who lived “in fixed communities, 
each having its own municipal or local government.”221  These things, 
                                                          
about “which tribes once treated with and previously recognized no longer existed as tribes, and un-
der what circumstances [could and] did this occur”).  
 219.   United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 615–18 (1876) (holding that the Indian Trade and 
Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 180 (2012), which makes unlawful “settlement on any lands belonging, 
secured, or granted by treaty with the United States to any Indian tribe,” did not apply to Taos Pueb-
lo lands because the people at Taos were not Indians and thus not an “Indian tribe”); United States v. 
Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 38–39, 48–49 (1913) (holding that Felipe Sandoval, a non-Indian, could be 
prosecuted under a federal statute prohibiting the sale of liquor to Indians in Indian country because 
“the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands is such that Congress” could criminalize alcohol 
trafficking at the Santa Clara Pueblo); see also Torres, supra note 175, at 126–45 (discussing the 
Joseph and Sandoval cases).  
 220.   Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 39 (emphasis added).  
 221.   Joseph, 94 U.S. at 616–17 (quoting United States v. Lucero, 1 N.M. 422, 453–54 (1869)).  
Quoting the New Mexico Supreme Court, Justice Miller noted that  
[f]or centuries, . . . the pueblo Indians have lived in villages, in fixed communities, each 
having its own municipal or local government.  As far as their history can be traced, they 
have been a pastoral and agricultural people, raising flocks and cultivating the soil.  Since 
the introduction of the Spanish Catholic missionary into the country, they have adopted 
mainly not only the Spanish language, but the religion of a Christian church. . . .  They 
manufacture nearly all of their blankets, clothing, agricultural and culinary implements, 
&c.  Integrity and virtue among them is fostered and encouraged.  They are as intelligent 
as most nations or people deprived of means or facilities for education.  Their names, 
their customs, their habits, are similar to those of the people in whose midst they reside, 
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and the “degree of civilization which they had attained” generally, made 
them “Indians only in feature, complexion, and a few of their habits” and 
distinguished them from “nomadic Apaches, Comanches, Navajoes, and 
other tribes whose incapacity for self-government required . . . th[e] 
guardian care of the general government.”222  According to the Joseph 
Court, “[t]he pueblo Indians, if, indeed, they can be called Indians, had 
nothing in common” with those people(s); the Pueblos were more like 
“the other inhabitants of New Mexico.”223  Though Pueblos differed from 
other New Mexicans because they held communal title to their lands and 
practiced “a certain patriarchal form of domestic life,” that didn’t make 
them Indians, only like “the Shakers and other communistic societies.”224 
The Court in both cases based its determination regarding the Pueb-
los’ “Indianness”—whether they were Indians—on prevailing stereo-
types about how Indians were supposed to live.  And it emphasized, es-
pecially in Sandoval, the Pueblos’ race, in both an ethnographic (or 
cultural) and genealogical (or phenotypical) sense, as the defining char-
acteristic of Indianness.225  It was not just their ancestry, but their sup-
posed intellectual and moral inferiority, “primitive mode[] of life,” 
“crude customs,” and “limited civilization”—ascribed to them by judges, 
federal bureaucrats, and now anthropologists too—that made the Pueblos 
Indians.226 
These characteristics, according to the Court, also explained their 
dependence on the federal government and justified the existence and 
                                                          
or in the midst of whom their pueblos are situated. . . .  They are Indians only in feature, 
complexion, and a few of their habits; in all other respects superior to all but a few of the 
civilized Indian tribes of the country, and the equal of the most civilized thereof. 
Id. 
 222.   Id. 
 223.   Id. at 617.  
 224.   Id. at 617–18 (“If the pueblo Indians differ from the other inhabitants of New Mexico in 
holding lands in common, and in a certain patriarchal form of domestic life, they only resemble in 
this regard the Shakers and other communistic societies in this country, and cannot for that reason be 
classed with the Indian tribes of whom we have been speaking.”).  
 225.   See Torres, supra note 175, at 143 (discussing the “role of race as a defining characteristic 
of Indian identity.  Their ‘race and condition’ was a factor that drove the so-called ethnographic in-
quiry in both the district court and the Supreme Court [in Sandoval]”); cf. Cleveland, supra note 156, 
at 75–76 (“[T]he critical question [in Sandoval] . . . was . . . whether the Pueblo . . . were civilized.”).  
 226.   United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39, 47 (1913) (discussing the Pueblos’ “Indian 
lineage, isolated and communal life, primitive customs and limited civilization”).  Sandoval intro-
duced the use of anthropology as a (then-developing) body of knowledge weighing on these deter-
minations, grafting these new ethnographic conceptions onto Enlightenment and nineteenth century 
ideas about racial and cultural hierarchies.  See id. at 44 (“This view of Pueblo customs, government, 
and civilization finds strong corroboration in the writings of ethnologists . . . .”); see also Cleveland, 
supra note 156, at 76 (criticizing the Court’s “pseudo-anthropological analysis” of the Pueblo peo-
ples).  
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exercise of federal plenary Indian affairs jurisdiction regarding the Pueb-
los and other Indians.227  Because they were determined to be Indians 
based on these criteria, the federal Indian affairs power applied to them.  
That was the rule established by 
long continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current 
of judicial decisions [which] attributed to the United States as a superi-
or and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering 
care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its 
borders, whether within its original territory or territory subsequently 
acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a state.228 
The Sandoval Court, however, emphasized that federal officials, and 
Congress in particular, could not exercise this power by simply calling 
any “community or body of people . . . an Indian tribe.”229  The people 
had to be a “distinctly Indian community.”230  And what made people(s), 
or communities, distinctly “Indian” in the minds of federal judges and 
bureaucrats was not only their racial ancestry but also their “customs” 
and “habits,” the same vague criteria the Supreme Court had used all 
along to distinguish Indians from non-Indians.231 
4. “Recognized Indian Tribes” and the Indian Reorganization Act 
Their deficiency notwithstanding, the Court had by the early twenti-
eth century developed some basic criteria for what made people(s) Indian 
                                                          
 227.   See Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 40–42 (citing Indian Office superintendent reports to show that 
the Pueblos were “dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the government, like reserva-
tion Indians in general; that, although, industrially superior, they are intellectually and morally infe-
rior to many of them; and . . . are easy victims to the evils and debasing influence of intoxicants”).  
 228.   Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 46 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 
384 (1886), and other turn-of-the-twentieth century plenary power cases).  
 229.   Id. at 46 (“Of course, . . . it is not meant by this that Congress may bring a community or 
body of people within the range of this power by arbitrarily calling them an Indian tribe . . . .”).  
 230.   Id. (explaining that Congress’s power extended “only . . . [to] distinctly Indian communi-
ties”).  
 231.   E.g., id. at 39–40, 47 (discussing Indians’ “customs,” “modes of life,” and “civilization” in 
addition to their “race” and “lineage”); United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 616 (1876) (describing 
Indians as “a well-known class, whose history, domestic habits, and relations to the government are 
of public notoriety”); United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 194 (1876) 
(stating that Indians’ “peculiar habits and character required” that they be “place[d] . . . under the 
protection of the . . . government”); cf. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 573 (1846) (interpret-
ing “Indian” in the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act to include “those who by the usages and customs 
of the Indians are regarded as belonging to their race[,]” or “members of . . . the race generally, — of 
the family of Indians”); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 18 (1831) (considering “the habits 
and usages of the Indians” when deciding that Indian nations were not “foreign states” under Article 
III of the U.S. Constitution).  
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tribes, such that the federal Indian affairs jurisdiction attached to them.  
They had to live in a community (or communities) in the same geograph-
ic area, share a common leadership, and maintain their tribal organization 
or relation.232  And they had to be Indians not only in terms of their phe-
notypic race, but also based on their culture(s), customs, and institu-
tions—and whether, as perceived by federal decisionmakers, those mark-
ers comported with stereotypes about how Indians were supposed to 
live.233 
The Supreme Court in the early twentieth century also continued to 
use “recognized” when referring to whether federal officials treated, or 
dealt with, people(s) as Indian tribes (as opposed to people whose “tribal 
relation . . . [had] been dissolved”),234 stating in Sandoval that it was for 
Congress, and not the courts, to determine “whether, to what extent, and 
for what time [the Pueblos and other Indians] shall be recognized and 
dealt with as dependent tribes requiring the guardianship and protection 
of the United States.”235  Yet during the decades leading up to the Indian 
Reorganization Act’s passage in 1934, uncertainty regarding whether 
certain people(s) were, and therefore should be treated as, Indians 
abounded not just in the judiciary but throughout the government.  There 
was no clear standard anywhere. 
The section of the 1892 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indi-
an Affairs titled “What Is An Indian?”, for example, began by stating that 
[o]ne would have supposed that this question would have been consid-
ered a hundred years ago and been adjudicated long before this.  Singu-
larly enough, however, it has remained in abeyance, and the Govern-
ment has gone on legislating and administering law without carefully 
discriminating as to those over whom it had a right to exercise such 
control.236 
                                                          
 232.   See United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 441–42 (1926) (applying the criteria from 
Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901) and concluding that the term “Indian tribe” in-
cluded Pueblo Indians); see also supra notes 201, 203, 207–16 and accompanying text.  
 233.   See Candelaria, 271 U.S. at 441 (concluding the Pueblos were “Indians in race, customs, 
and domestic government”); see also supra notes 225–31 and accompanying text.  
 234.   Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478, 487 (1914); see United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 
596–98 (1916).  
 235.   Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 46 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
 236.   T.J. Morgan, Sixty-First Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Sec-
retary of the Interior 31 (1892).  
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And a 1929 legal treatise explained that “[n]o precise, all-inclusive 
definition of ‘Indians’ has been attempted by the courts or by Con-
gress.”237 
This uncertainty is reflected in the legislative debates leading up to 
the IRA,238 where Congress for the first time defined “Indian” and 
“tribe”239 and in the definition of Indian first used the words “recognized 
Indian tribe.”240  Rather than bring clarity to the situation, however, the 
statutory language’s circularity—defining “Indians” as people who were 
members of “Indian tribes,” and “tribe” to include “any Indian tribe” (or 
“organized band” or “pueblo”) or “the Indians residing on one reserva-
tion”241—only exacerbated the confusion.  The Interior Department was 
left to figure out on a case-by-case basis whether, applying criteria based 
on the jurisprudence discussed above, certain people(s) were Indian 
tribes under the IRA and for purposes of federal Indian law generally.242 
                                                          
 237.   14 R.C.L. Indians § 1 (1929).  
 238.   See infra Part VI.A.  
 239.   See MILLER, supra note 50, at 26 (noting that in the “series of six Indian Trade and Nonin-
tercourse Acts, Congress . . . maintained a vague use of the term ‘tribe,’ stating simply that these 
laws applied to ‘any Indian nation or tribe of Indians.’  As late as 1921 the sweeping Snyder Act 
maintained this imprecise usage by identifying its beneficiaries simply as ‘the Indians throughout the 
United States’”) (footnotes omitted); see also Quinn, supra note 74, at 354 (“The enactments of 
Congress during this period were of little help, tending as they did to obscure or ignore rather than 
clarify which tribes were to receive the provisions of their appropriations or were subject to the con-
straints of their restrictive legislation.  Perhaps Congress simply assumed it was the duty of the BIA 
to make such determinations.”).  
 240.   25 U.S.C. § 479 (2012) (editorially reclassified as § 5129 in Aug. 2016) (defining “Indian” 
to include “all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under 
Federal jurisdiction,” and “tribe” as “any Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians resid-
ing on one reservation”).  
 241.   Id.  
 242.   According to William Quinn,  
[t]he issues of determining tribal status were thus left squarely with the Department of the 
Interior and the BIA and, for the ensuing two to three decades from the early 1930s, those 
agencies would attempt to make case-by-case determinations of tribal status in terms of 
recognition.  While the Department’s phraseology shifted somewhat to accommodate it-
self to that of the IRA, so that the central issue was whether an Indian group[] “could or-
ganize under the Act,” the effect—the concept—was the same. 
Quinn, supra note 74, at 357.  See Memorandum of Hans Walker, Jr., supra note 133, at 7 (“It is 
very clear from the early administration of the [Indian Reorganization] Act that there was no estab-
lished list of ‘recognized tribes now under Federal jurisdiction’ in existence in 1934 and that deter-
minations would have to be made on a case by case basis for a large number of Indian groups.”); see 
also MILLER, supra note 50, at 27–28 (“The Indian New Deal ushered in the modern tribal acknowl-
edgment issue.  During the 1930s and early 1940s questions regarding tribal acknowledgment arose 
as Indian Office lawyers had to decide which Indian communities qualified as tribes or bands eligi-
ble to hold elections and organize under the Indian Reorganization Act.”); Quinn, supra note 74, at 
356 (arguing that the IRA’s passage marked “the final point of demarcation from the cognitive usage 
of the term recognition to the jurisdictional usage” employed today to refer to tribes with whom the 
United States has a formal, government-to-government relationship, and noting “[f]rom the date of 
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B. The Twentieth Century (After the Indian Reorganization Act) 
The Department’s post-1934 determinations regarding tribal status 
came in a series of opinions issued by the Interior Department’s Office of 
the Solicitor applying criteria developed by Felix Cohen, the Department 
lawyer who also authored many of the opinions, much of the IRA, and 
the first Indian law treatise.243  Just as before, the inquiry under the IRA’s 
statutory language—whether people were a “recognized Indian tribe . . . 
under Federal jurisdiction”244—boiled down to whether the people still 
existed as an Indian tribe.  Indeed, Cohen spelled out the criteria in the 
“Tribal Existence” section of his treatise, stating that the “question of 
tribal existence, in the legal or political sense,” had generally come up 
when deciding whether people(s) were Indian tribes subject to the federal 
government’s Indian affairs jurisdiction.245  He also explained that the 
Supreme Court had based such determinations on “whether or not the in-
dividuals concerned were living in tribal relations[,] . . . thus making the 
validity of congressional and administrative actions depend upon the ex-
istence of tribes.”246 
Drawing from the Indian depredation cases (namely Montoya) and 
the Supreme Court’s opinions in Holliday, The Kansas Indians, Sando-
val, and other assimilation era cases,247 as well as prior Department prac-
                                                          
its enactment onward, only Indian tribes which were ‘recognized’ would be provided services and 
dealt with in trust relationships”).  
 243.   See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 270–71 (1942) [hereinafter 
COHEN, 1942 HANDBOOK] (“The question of what groups constitute tribes or bands has been exten-
sively considered in recent years by the administrative authorities of the Federal Government in con-
nection with [the IRA]. . . . In cases of special difficulty, a ruling has generally been obtained from 
the Solicitor . . . as to the tribal status of the group . . . .”); ELMER R. RUSCO, A FATEFUL TIME: THE 
BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT 189 (2000) (call-
ing Cohen “the principal drafter of the bill that became the IRA”); Quinn, supra note 74, at 358–59 
(discussing criteria and noting that “Cohen was probably author of many if not most of these Opin-
ions until his departure from Interior in 1948”). 
 244.   25 U.S.C. § 479 (2012) (editorially reclassified as § 5129 in Aug. 2016). 
 245.   COHEN, 1942 HANDBOOK, supra note 243, at 268 (“The question of tribal existence, in the 
legal or political sense, has generally arisen in determining whether some legislative, administrative, 
or judicial power with respect to Indian ‘tribes’ extended to a particular group of Indians.”).  
 246.   Id. (“The Supreme Court has, in a number of cases, taken the position that the applicability 
or constitutionality of congressional legislation affecting individual Indians, and the inapplicability 
or unconstitutionality of state legislation affecting such individuals, depended upon whether or not 
the individuals concerned were living in tribal relations.”).  
 247.   Id. at 268–271 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); Montoya 
v. United States, 180 U.S. 261 (1901); Conners v. United States, 180 U.S. 271 (1901); Dobbs v. 
United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 308 (1898); Tully v. United States, 32 Ct. Cl. 1 (1896); The Kansas Indians, 
72 U.S. 737 (1866); United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407 (1865)).  See also MILLER, supra note 
50, at 28 (“According to Cohen, the department’s criteria were based on the limited case law on the 
matter and past federal policies.  The Supreme Court decision [in] Montoya . . . was particularly sali-
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tice,248 Cohen set forth the “considerations which, singly or jointly, have 
been particularly relied upon in reaching the conclusion that a group con-
stitutes a ‘tribe’ or ‘band.’”249  They were whether the group had: 
(1) . . . treaty relations with the United States[;] 
(2) . . . been denominated a tribe by act of Congress or Executive Or-
der[;] 
(3) . . . been treated as having collective rights in tribal lands or funds, 
even though not expressly designated a tribe[;] 
(4) . . . been treated as a tribe or band by other Indian tribes[;] [or] 
(5) . . . exercised political authority over its members, through a tribal 
council or other governmental forms.250 
Cohen also noted that “[o]ther factors considered, though not conclu-
sive, are the existence of special appropriation items for . . . and the so-
cial solidarity of the group”—indicating that any one of the five criteria 
above (since they could be relied upon singly or jointly) was conclu-
sive—and that “[e]thnological and historical considerations, although not 
conclusive, are entitled to great weight in determining the question of 
tribal existence.”251 
In the four decades following the IRA’s passage, the Department re-
lied on some version of these Cohen Criteria (as they’re known) in Solic-
itor opinions regarding the status of nearly twenty tribes.252  Three of 
                                                          
ent.”); id. (“The Montoya definition of tribe, although somewhat vague and imprecise, would be the 
primary common law definition of the concept used by the Interior Department during the 1930s and 
early 1940s.”).  
 248.   COHEN, 1942 HANDBOOK, supra note 243, at 271 n.24 (citing Memorandum of the Solici-
tor on the Mole Lake and St. Croix Chippewa (Feb. 8, 1937)).  
 249.   Id. at 271 (emphasis added).  
 250.   Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  
 251.   Id. (footnote omitted).  
 252.   See Brian Klopotek, Recognition Odysseys: Indigeneity, Race, and Federal Tribal Recog-
nition Policy in Three Louisiana Indian Communities 24–26 (2011) (discussing the Cohen Criteria’s 
development and application); Miller, supra note 50, at 28 (“Until the BIA created . . . regulations 
[in 1978], the ‘Cohen Criteria’ were the primary templates officials used when determining Interior 
Department jurisdiction.”); Quinn, supra note 74, at 358–59 (citing “[a] rash of Solicitor’s Opin-
ions . . . in the late 1930s and 1940s” including for St. Croix, Mole Lake, Ho-Chunk, Nahma and 
Beaver Indians, Thopthlocco and Alabama-Dwashadi Tribal Towns, United Keetoowah Band, Mi-
ami and Peoria, Catawba); Letter from Derril B. Jordan and Steven J. Bloxham, Fredericks Peebles 
& Morgan LLP, to Larry Echo Hawk, Assistant Sec’y – Indian Affairs, and Hilary Tompkins, Solici-
tor, Dep’t of Interior, 14 & n.15 (Oct. 23, 2009) (on file with author) (stating that “[i]n addition to 
the Catawba Tribe and the Stillaguamish Tribe, in at least nine other instances between 1934 and 
1980, the Department revisited and revised its view of the extent of its administrative jurisdiction 
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these tribes—the Catawba, Mole Lake Chippewa, and Stillaguamish—
were offered by Justice Breyer (in his opinion and during oral argument 
in Carcieri)253 as examples of tribes that were under federal jurisdiction 
in 1934 “even though the Department did not know it at the time,”254 and 
that the Department later acknowledged “it should have recognized . . . 
in 1934 even though it did not.”255  These Solicitor opinions evidence not 
only the Department’s inconsistent approach to tribal status (even regard-
ing the same people), but also the extent to which the “ethnological and 
historical considerations” mentioned by Felix Cohen figured in officials’ 
determinations.256 
                                                          
and acknowledged its responsibility to particular Indian tribes[,]” and listing the Miccosukee, Burns 
Paiute, Nooksack, Sauk-Suiattle, Penobscot, Sault Ste. Marie, Coushatta, and Karuk Tribes).  In 
1947, the Department published a list of 258 Indian tribes covered by the Act, but both the Depart-
ment and the Court have recognized this list was incomplete.  See Theodore H. Haas, U.S. Indian 
Service, Ten Years of Government Under I.R.A. (1947); see also Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 
397–98 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[F]ollowing the Indian Reorganization Act’s enactment, the De-
partment compiled a list of 258 tribes covered by the Act; and we also know that it wrongly left cer-
tain tribes off the list.”) (citations omitted); Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, supra note 17, 
at 25 n.158 (noting that this report “did not purport to list all recognized or federally recognized 
tribes”). 
 253.   Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 398–99 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing the Mole Lake Chippewa 
Tribe and Stillaguamish Tribe); Transcript of Oral Argument at 26–27, Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379 (No. 
07-526) (statement of Breyer, J.) (discussing the Catawba Indians).  The Solicitor opinions on the 
Stillaguamish and Catawba are discussed, respectively, in notes 133 and 135–36, supra, and accom-
panying text.  A Solicitor opinion concluding that the Mole Lake Chippewa were—but that the St. 
Croix Chippewa were not—eligible to organize under the IRA based on differing levels of intermar-
riage (with non-Indians) and assimilation between the tribes is discussed in note 256 infra. 
 254.   Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 398 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 255.   Id. 
 256.   See supra note 251 and accompanying text; see also MILLER, supra note 50, at 29 (“The 
‘Cohen Criteria’ . . . contained a combination of legal precedent and ill-defined historical and an-
thropological methodology and concepts.  Significantly, Interior Department lawyers never made 
clear the weight afforded to each factor.”); id. at 28 (noting that the Cohen Criteria relied on Mon-
toya but “also included both political and ethnological factors”).  In a 1937 Solicitor memorandum, 
for example, Solicitor Nathan Margold opined that the St. Croix Indians in Wisconsin could not or-
ganize a government under the IRA, writing that they were “deculturated” and “highly assimilated 
into the white population.”  Status of St. Croix Chippewas, 1 Op. Solicitor on Indian Affairs 724, 
725 (1937) (first quotation from a 1936 anthropologist report); see also id. (distinguishing the St. 
Croix Chippewa from the Mole Lake Chippewa, who the Department said could organize under the 
IRA, because “whereas the St. Croix Indians live[d] in numerous white villages and towns through-
out Wisconsin,” the Mole Lake Indians “live[d] in one principal Indian community” and were “prin-
cipally full bloods and near full bloods who have kept distinct from the white population”); St. Croix 
Indians—Enrollees of Dr. Wooster, 1 Op. Solicitor on Indian Affairs 735, 736 (1937) (citing a 1914 
report that “describes the St. Croix Indians as having ‘adopted the habits and customs of civilized 
life’ and enumerates other facts which indicate abandonment of tribal relations”).  But in 1941, So-
licitor Margold said the St. Croix could “organize as a recognized band under the IRA” because they 
had “common property interests, a common history, and a common past identity.”  St. Croix Indi-
ans—Organization Under Sec. 16 of Indian Reorganization Act, 1 Op. Solicitor on Indian Affairs 
1026, 1028 (1941). 
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Courts in the twentieth century continued to apply the common law 
test from Montoya to decide the legal status of certain Indians when the 
issue arose, most notably in 1970s land claims and treaty rights litigation, 
respectively, in the Northeast and Northwest.257  This litigation, together 
with the work and recommendations of the Congressionally-appointed 
American Indian Policy Review Commission and other entities including 
the National Congress of American Indians and the United South and 
Eastern Tribes, led the Interior Department to adopt regulations in 
1978258—now codified at 25 C.F.R. Part 83—with criteria and a formal 
                                                          
  These Solicitor opinions also reflect a Department practice of evaluating whether people(s) 
were “recognized Indian tribe[s] . . . under Federal jurisdiction,” 25 U.S.C. § 479 (editorially reclas-
sified as § 5219 in Aug. 2016), at the time of the proposed agency action—which required determin-
ing whether people(s) were tribes regarding whom the agency had jurisdiction.  See St. Croix Indi-
ans—Enrollees of Dr. Wooster, supra, at 736 (stating that “it would be necessary for [the St. Croix 
Chippewas] to show that they are members of recognized Indian tribes at the time land is purchased 
under the Reorganization Act, in order to be entitled to share in its enjoyment”); see also Carcieri, 
555 U.S. at 401 (Souter, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that the United States during oral ar-
gument “explained that the Secretary’s more recent interpretation of this statutory language had ‘un-
derstood recognition and under Federal jurisdiction at least with respect to tribes to be one and the 
same’”) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (No. 07-526))).  
That makes sense in light of the jurisprudence discussed in Parts IV and V.A, supra, because, as ex-
plained infra, notes 262–70 and accompanying text, the Department (like the Court) always focused 
on whether people(s) continued to exist as distinct Indian communities, such that the federal Indian 
affairs jurisdiction attached to them.  If they continually existed as (and thus were recognized) as a 
tribe at the time of the decision, then they also existed as a tribe before (including in 1934)—and 
therefore were under federal jurisdiction at the time of and before the decision, even if federal offi-
cials had not been exercising that jurisdiction. 
  The Solicitor opinions also evidence the Department’s practice of allowing half-blood (or 
more) Indians to organize and otherwise qualify under the IRA based on blood quantum alone, re-
gardless of whether they were members of “recognized Indian tribe[s] . . . under Federal jurisdic-
tion.”  See Status of St. Croix Chippewas, supra, at 725 (discussing a proposal to purchase land for 
“the St. Croix Chippewa Indians of the half blood or more” and the subsequent organization of a 
government under the IRA); see also Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 406–07 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discuss-
ing Solicitor opinions outlining the possibility of purchasing land for (groups of) individual half-
blood St. Croix and Mole Lake Indians). 
 257.   Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 581–88 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 866 (1979), 464 U.S. 866 (1983); Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 
F.2d 370, 376–79 (1st Cir. 1975); United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 692–93 (9th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976); Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians v. Kleppe, No. 75-1718, 
1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17381, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 1976); see also MILLER, supra note 50, at 
35–36 (discussing Pacific Northwest fishing rights and New England land rights cases); Quinn, su-
pra note 74, at 362–63 (discussing litigation); O’Brien, supra note 25, at 1473–76 (same); Myers, 
supra note 133, at 273 (discussing Stillaguamish litigation).  Courts have continued to use this com-
mon law test in the twenty-first century.  Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Kent Sch. Corp. Inc., 595 
Fed. Appx. 32, 34 (2d Cir. 2014) (applying test to rule that plaintiffs were not an Indian tribe for 
purposes of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act(s)); New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 400 F. 
Supp. 2d 486, 491–93 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (applying common law criteria from Montoya and other cas-
es to find that the Shinnecock are a tribe).  
 258.   KLOPOTEK, supra note 252, at 23–31 (examining litigation and policy developments lead-
ing up to the Part 83 regulations); MILLER, supra note 50 at 35–46 (discussing the litigation and his-
tory that produced the Part 83 regulations); Quinn, supra note 74, at 362–63 (explaining that as the 
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process for establishing whether people(s) exist as Indian tribes.259  This 
process is administered by the Office of Federal Acknowledgment, a di-
vision within the Department’s Indian affairs bureaucracy that makes 
recommendations to the Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs, who then 
decides whether to acknowledge the people exist as a tribe.260  People(s) 
so acknowledged by the Assistant Secretary are placed, alongside other 
recognized tribes, on the list published annually in the Federal Regis-
ter.261 
C. “Recognized Indian Tribes” Today and Across Time 
The criteria in 25 C.F.R. Part 83 now require that, to qualify as a 
tribe, the group must—from at least 1900 until the present—be “identi-
fied as an American Indian entity on a substantially continuous basis[,]” 
and “comprise[] a distinct community and . . . exist[] as a community” 
that has “maintained political influence or authority over its members as 
an autonomous entity.”262  Until they were amended in 2015, the regula-
                                                          
litigation led to an increase of requests from tribes for clarification of their status, the Department 
“instituted an unofficial moratorium on acknowledging tribes until a system could be developed[,]” 
and, following a court order requiring the Department to make a decision on the Stillaguamish Tribe, 
“placed the formulation of standard acknowledgment regulations on high priority” and published its 
proposed regulations within months); Myers, supra note 133, at 273 (noting that “[i]n the mid 1970s, 
a dramatic increase in the number of Indian groups requesting federal recognition led to increased 
formalization of the recognition process[,]” and arguing that “the regulations were simply an attempt 
to deal with the increasing number of groups pursuing federal recognition following the decision in 
Passamaquoddy and to formalize what had been until then an ad hoc process”) (footnotes omitted). 
 259.   As originally adopted, the regulations stated their purpose was “to establish a departmental 
procedure and policy for acknowledging that certain American Indian tribes exist.”  25 C.F.R. § 54.2 
(1979) (“The purpose of this part is to establish a departmental procedure and policy for acknowl-
edging that certain American Indian tribes exist.”).  In 1994, this language was changed to reference 
a procedure and policy for “acknowledging that certain American Indian groups exist as tribes.”  25 
C.F.R. § 83.2 (1994).  The regulations were amended again in 2015 and now state that their purpose 
is “to determine whether a petitioner is an Indian tribe eligible for the special programs and services 
provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.”  25 C.F.R. § 83.2 
(2016); see Revisions to Regulations on Federal Acknowledgement of Indian Tribes, BUREAU OF 
INDIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/AS-IA/ORM/83revise/index.htm (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2016) (discussing changes from previous regulations).  
 260.   Office of Federal Acknowledgment, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.bia.gov/ 
WhoWeAre/AS-IA/OFA/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2016) (outlining the Federal Acknowledgment Pro-
cess).  
 261.   E.g., 81 Fed. Reg. 26,826 (Apr. 25, 2016) (publishing the most recent list). 
 262.   25 C.F.R. § 83.11(a)–(c) (2016).  The evidence for “determining a group’s Indian identity 
may include one or a combination of the following, as well as other evidence of identification[:] 
[i]dentification as an Indian entity by federal authorities[;] [r]elationships with State . . . [,] county, 
parish or other local government” based on identification of the group as Indian; and 
“[i]dentification as an Indian entity by anthropologists, historians and/or other scholars[,] in newspa-
pers and books[,] in relationships with Indian tribes or with national, regional, or state Indian organi-
zations[,]” or by the group itself.  Id. § 83.11(a)(1)–(7).  The regulations also require that the group’s 
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tions required petitioning groups to show continuous existence as distinct 
communities (and autonomous entities) since their “first sustained con-
tact with non-Indians.”263  Thus the Part 83 criteria, like the federal 
common law standards and Cohen criteria that preceded them, focus on 
whether people(s) continue to exist as a distinct, autonomous Indian 
community or entity.264  That has always been the defining criterion for 
being (recognized as) an Indian tribe, and for the federal Indian affairs 
jurisdiction to apply. 
Whether people(s) in fact continue to exist as Indian tribes is, of 
course, a different matter from whether federal officials acknowledge, or 
recognize—and therefore treat and deal with—them as Indian tribes un-
der the law.265  Federal recognition, or acknowledgment, is about wheth-
er government officials establish and maintain a formal political relation-
ship through which they exercise the federal Indian affairs jurisdiction 
                                                          
“membership consist[] of individuals who descend from a historical Indian tribe (or from historical 
Indian tribes that combined and functioned as a single autonomous political entity)[,]” id. § 83.11(e), 
and not be composed principally of persons who are (already) members of other federally recognized 
tribes, id. § 83.11(f); that neither the petitioning entity nor its members have been subjected by Con-
gressional termination legislation, id. at § 83.11(g); and that the entity provide its governing docu-
ments, id. § 83.11(d). 
 263.   25 C.F.R. § 83.1 (2015).  The previous regulations required that the group (or a “predomi-
nant portion” thereof) “comprise[] a distinct community and . . . exist[] as a community” that “main-
tained political influence or authority over its members as an autonomous entity” since “historical 
times,” or the group’s “first sustained contact with non-Indians.”  Id. § 83.7 (b)–(c) (2015); see also 
id. § 83.1 (“[H]istorical . . . means dating from first sustained contact with non-Indians.”).  The De-
partment explained in the Final Rule adopting the 2015 amendments that, “based on its experience in 
nearly 40 years of implementing the regulations, every group that has proven its existence from 1900 
forward has successfully proven its existence prior to that time as well, making 1900 to the present a 
reliable proxy for all of history but at less expense.”  80 Fed. Reg. 37,861, 37,863 (June 23, 2015). 
 264.   The early cases looked at whether people(s) continued to live together as distinct Indian 
communities, maintaining their tribal relations or organization and sharing a common leadership.  
See supra notes 201, 203, 210–16 and accompanying text.  Felix Cohen, synthesizing the criteria 
used in those cases and Interior Department practice, developed criteria that similarly centered on (a) 
people’s continuing existence as an Indian tribe to determine whether people(s) were “recognized 
Indian tribes . . . under Federal jurisdiction” under the IRA, and Indian tribes under federal law gen-
erally.  See supra notes 247–51 and accompanying text.  The examination under 25 C.F.R. Part 83 
likewise concentrates on whether people(s) have continued to, and whether Interior Department offi-
cials acknowledge they still, exist as an Indian tribe (or band, pueblo, village, or community).  See 
supra notes 262–63 and accompanying text; see also 25 C.F.R. § 83.1 (2016) (“Tribe means any 
Indian tribe, band, pueblo, village or community.”).  The previous regulations provided that “Indian 
tribe, also referred to herein as tribe, means any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, pueblo, village, 
or community within the continental United States that the Secretary of the Interior presently 
acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe.”  25 C.F.R. § 83.1 (2015) (second emphasis added). 
 265.   See Myers, supra note 133, at 271 (noting that “recognition does not change what a tribe in 
fact always was; rather, it offers groups one way to demonstrate that they ought to be treated as Indi-
an tribes under the law”); cf. id. at 276 (“[A] group’s failure to be recognized [through the Part 83 
process] is properly understood as a failure to provide sufficient evidence to overcome the [Depart-
ment’s] presumption that it is not an Indian tribe under the meaning of § 83; it is not determinative 
of whether the group is actually an Indian tribe.”).  
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and provide services and funding to Indian people(s) in fulfillment of the 
United States’ obligations under the colonial fiduciary relationship.266  
By acknowledging people(s) as Indian tribes under Part 83, the United 
States is just saying that they have been tribes all along and that, going 
forward, the government will exercise its jurisdiction and carry out the 
trust responsibilities that have been there all along as well.267 
While the current Part 83 administrative process is certainly not 
without its criticisms,268 any tribe added to the BIA List through it by 
definition existed before 1934 and continuously into the present.  The 
criteria expressly require so.269  If they were an Indian tribe in 1934, they 
were considered—as a matter of federal Indian law doctrine—to be un-
der federal jurisdiction, even if the Department did not acknowledge or 
exercise that jurisdiction at the time. 
Federal acknowledgment under Part 83—like determinations of trib-
al status made by the Interior Department outside of the Part 83 process 
(in Solicitor opinions or through other administrative actions), by Con-
gress, or by the judiciary—involves federal officials deciding when, 
whether, and upon what basis to treat people(s) as Indian tribes and exer-
cise the Indian affairs jurisdiction that was always presumed to exist.270  
                                                          
 266.   See Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. v. Jewell, 830 F.3d 552, 565 (D.C. 
Cir.) (“Whether the government acknowledge[s] federal responsibilities toward a tribe through a 
specialized, political relationship is a different question from whether those responsibilities in fact 
existed.”), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Citizens Against Reservation Shopping v. Jewell (U.S. 
Oct. 27, 2016) (No. 16-572). 
 267.   As explained in an amicus brief authored by Professor Phil Frickey and others filed with 
the Carcieri Court, “federal recognition . . . ‘acknowledges’ a Tribe’s continuous historical exist-
ence[,]” and “[b]ecause recognition reflects a historical fact, the only reason a tribe would be recog-
nized currently but not in 1934 is that the federal government—due to mistake, neglect, or lack of 
awareness—failed to acknowledge the Tribe’s existence.”  Brief of the National Congress of Ameri-
can Indians As Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 20, Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 552 U.S. 
1229 (2008) (No. 07-526) (citations and footnotes omitted). 
 268.   E.g., Mackinac Tribe v. Jewell, 829 F.3d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Brown, J., concur-
ring) (calling the process a “bureaucratic morass” and noting criticisms regarding lack of transparen-
cy, vagueness, and improper influence with the process), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 20, 2016) 
(No. 16-539); Myers, supra note 133, at 271 (citing the “flawed application of the federal recogni-
tion process” and “uneven application of standards”); id. at 280–85 (discussing problems with the 
standards and methods of review).  For other criticisms of the process, including the role that racial 
and political factors play in it, see RENÉE ANN CRAMER, CASH, COLOR, AND COLONIALISM: THE 
POLITICS OF TRIBAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT 37–65, 97–103 (2005); MILLER, supra note 50, at 47–78; 
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Politics, History, and Semantics: The Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes, 
82 N.D. L. REV. 487, 490–91, 494, 499, 516 (2006); Lorinda Riley, Shifting Foundation: The Prob-
lem with Inconsistent Implementation of Federal Recognition Regulations, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 629, 639–62 (2013).  
 269.   See supra notes 262–63 and accompanying text.  
 270.   In addition to acknowledging eighteen tribes through the Part 83 process, the Interior De-
partment has in recent decades issued opinions clarifying and acknowledging the tribal status of the 
Ione Band of Miwok Indians (1994), the Lower Lake Rancheria (2000), the Stillaguamish Tribe 
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The people(s) continue to live as distinct communities; that is the one cri-
terion for being an Indian tribe which has remained constant.  What 
changes over time are the other criteria government officials use to de-
termine if people(s) are Indian tribes, and whether, under those criteria, 
officials exercise the government’s jurisdiction and deal with those peo-
ple(s) as Indian tribes.  As Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter ex-
plained in their Carcieri opinions, people(s) could be under federal juris-
diction even though federal officials “did not know it[,]” were “ignorant 
of” those people(s), or simply chose not to deal with them—and did not 
(re)establish a formal political relationship with them until later.271 
So if whether particular people(s) are “recognized” as Indian tribes  
and whether they are under federal jurisdiction has always turned on the 
same determination—whether they continue to exist as distinct Indian 
communities—why did Congress include the words “now under Federal 
jurisdiction” after “any recognized Indian tribe” in the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act’s definition of Indian?  As the following Part shows, some 
senators were concerned about the government’s exercising jurisdiction 
regarding people(s) they thought were no longer Indians, or “Indian” 
enough, to qualify under the Act.  So lawmakers, defining “Indian” for 
the first time in federal legislation, tried to come up with language clari-
fying that the IRA would apply only to people(s) who satisfied those 
senators’ racial, cultural, and armchair anthropological standards for be-
ing Indians.  The “now under Federal jurisdiction” wording was offered 
as a way to limit the Act’s scope, but legislators could not agree on 
whether certain people(s) were (still) Indians who came within it.272  Un-
                                                          
(1980), the Tejon Indian Tribe (2011), and the Texas Band of Traditional Kickapoos (1981).  STA-
TUS SUMMARY OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT CASES (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.bia.gov/cs/ 
groups/xofa/documents/text/idc1-024435.pdf; Press Release, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Action Cor-
rects Oversight to Federally Recognized Tribes List (Jan. 3, 2001), http://www.bia.gov/cs/ 
groups/public/documents/text/idc-018346.pdf.  Congress has declared and acknowledged the tribal 
status of the Aroostook Band of Micmacs; Auburn Rancheria; Confederated Tribes of Coos, Lower 
Umpqua and Siuslaw Indians; Cow Creek Band of Umpqua Indians; Federated Indians of Graton 
Rancheria; Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians; Little River Band of Ottawa Indians; Loyal 
Shawnee Tribe; Mashantucket Pequot Tribe; and the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians.  STATUS 
SUMMARY, supra; see also Myers, supra note 133, at 273 & n.25 (discussing the Cow Creek Band 
of Umpqua Indians and “[f]ive other tribes . . . legislatively recognized since 1978” and listing the 
Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians as “ha[ving] had its recognition status 
clarified by legislation”).  
 271.   Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 398–400 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing tribes that 
were “‘under Federal jurisdiction’ in 1934—even though the Department did not know it at the 
time”); id. at 400 (Souter, J., concurring in part) (“[T]he fact that the United States Government was 
ignorant of a tribe in 1934 does not preclude that tribe from having been under federal jurisdiction at 
that time”).   
 272.   They were also unclear regarding what exactly the “now under Federal jurisdiction” lan-
guage entailed.  See Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. v. Jewell, 830 F.3d 552, 561 
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derstood against the doctrinal and historical background discussed above, 
and in its proper legislative context, the IRA’s “under Federal jurisdic-
tion” language simply encapsulates the same dilemma it perpetuated: try-
ing to figure out which people(s) are Indians to whom federal jurisdiction 
attaches, and what makes them so. 
VI. WHAT DID CONGRESS MEAN IN 1934? 
The Indian Reorganization Act was the centerpiece legislation of the 
Indian New Deal, a series of policy and legislative reforms brought about 
under the leadership of John Collier, who was appointed as the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs in 1933, the same year Felix Cohen joined the 
Interior Department as its Associate Solicitor.273  A principal goal of the 
Indian New Deal was to reverse some of the more disastrous effects of 
the government’s assimilationist policies, particularly allotment—
through which tribal landholdings had declined by 90 million acres, or 
approximately two thirds, since 1887274—and to rebuild tribal land bases 
and economies.275  To that end, the IRA provided a mechanism for tribes 
to (re)organize their governments (along Western models) and charter 
corporations, established an economic development loan program, im-
plemented a hiring preference in the BIA, and authorized the Secretary of 
                                                          
(D.C. Cir.) (noting that the IRA’s legislative history “[a]t most . . . reflects Congressional intent to 
limit what was a much broader concept of recognition by some ‘jurisdictional’ connection to the 
government, even though, . . . nobody seemed to know what that jurisdictional connection might 
be”), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Citizens Against Reservation Shopping v. Jewell (U.S. Oct. 27, 
2016) (No. 16-572); see also infra notes 309–10 and accompanying text (citing memoranda from 
Felix Cohen and the Interior Department Solicitor’s office expressing uncertainty over the meaning 
of the added “now under Federal jurisdiction” language). 
 273.   See DAVID W. DAILY, BATTLE FOR THE BIA: G.E.E. LINDQUIST AND THE MISSIONARY 
CRUSADE AGAINST JOHN COLLIER 3 (2004).  For a general discussion of Collier’s and others’ broad-
er reform efforts as part of the Indian New Deal, see LAWRENCE C. KELLY, THE ASSAULT ON AS-
SIMILATION: JOHN COLLIER AND THE ORIGINS OF INDIAN POLICY REFORM (1983); KENNETH R. 
PHILIP, JOHN COLLIER’S CRUSADE FOR INDIAN REFORM 1920–1954 (1977); TAYLOR, supra note 
171.  
 274.   CORNTASSEL & WITMER, supra note 5, at 11 (“By 1934 Native land holdings were re-
duced by 90 million acres, down from 138 million in 1887 to 48 million in 1934 because of rampant 
land speculation and fraud.”). 
 275.   See Grand Ronde, 830 F.3d at 556 (noting that “Congress enacted the IRA, among other 
things, to ‘conserve and develop Indian lands and resources’” and “to promote economic develop-
ment among American Indians, with a special emphasis on preventing and recouping losses of land 
caused by previous federal policies”) (first quoting the Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 
984, 984 (1934), then quoting Mich. Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne, 525 F.3d 23, 31 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008)); see also CORNTASSEL & WITMER, supra note 5, at 12 (“The appointment of long-time 
indigenous advocate John Collier as commissioner of Indian affairs in 1933 signaled a new policy 
shift toward reinstating indigenous governments. . . . [T]he Indian Reorganization Act . . . was 
passed by Congress in 1934 to counter the previous allotment policies.”). 
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the Interior to acquire lands for tribes and individual Indians.276  While 
Commissioner Collier and Burton Wheeler, the senator from Montana 
who chaired the Senate Indian Affairs Committee, are considered to be 
primarily responsible for the legislation and its content, Felix Cohen was 
its primary author.277 
Nothing indicates anyone in the Congress that passed the IRA ques-
tioned the extent of the federal government’s Indian affairs jurisdiction, 
which they like others understood to be plenary as described in Supreme 
Court opinions from the preceding decades.278  But many congressmen in 
the early 1900s remained strong supporters of assimilation.  As stated by 
Senator Wheeler, they wanted to “get rid of the Indian problem rather 
than add to it[,]”279 and thus to limit exercises of that jurisdiction. 
In the spring of 1934, a month before the IRA passed, Wheeler and 
other members of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee questioned 
Commissioner Collier regarding exactly which Indians and tribes would 
be covered by the Act.280  To address these senators’ concerns about ex-
ercising jurisdiction over people(s) they thought were not Indian 
enough—racially, culturally, or both—Collier suggested the “now under 
Federal jurisdiction” language, which was adopted almost as an after-
                                                          
 276.   See 25 U.S.C. § 5108 (land acquisition authority); id. § 5123 (provisions for tribal gov-
ernment organization); id. § 5124 (provisions for tribal corporations); id. § 5113 (establishing loan 
fund for tribal corporations); id. § 5115 (provisions for educational loans to individual Indians); id. § 
5116 (hiring preference for Indians within the Bureau of Indian Affairs); see also Match-E-Be-Nash-
She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Salazar, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2211 (2012) (describing the land 
acquisition authority as the “capstone” of the statute’s land-related provisions).  
 277.   See RUSCO, supra note 243, at 192–93, 235; Pommersheim, supra note 3, at 525–26; Sa-
rah B. Pfouts, Senator Burton K. Wheeler and the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act ii (Mar. 3, 1981) 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Montana), http://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=4544&context=etd.  According to Elmer Rusco, Collier was “the most im-
portant single actor in the adoption and implementation of the Indian Reorganization Act.”  RUSCO, 
supra note 243, at 137.  
 278.   Indeed, the legislative debates reflect senators’ concerns about the federal government 
exercising such a broad guardianship power.  See infra notes 292–305 and accompanying text; see 
also supra notes 173–89 and accompanying text (discussing plenary power cases).  Citing United 
States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), and other 
case law, a leading treatise of the time stated, under the headings “Government of Indians” and 
“Federal Jurisdiction,” that the United States (“as a superior and civilized nation”) had “the power 
and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communities 
within its borders.”  14 R.C.L. Indians § 30 (1929).  
 279.   To Grant to Indians Living Under Federal Tutelage the Freedom to Organize for Purposes 
of Local Self-Government and Economic Enterprise: Hearings Before the Comm. on Indian Affairs 
on S. 2755 and 3645, 73d Cong. 263–64 (1934) [hereinafter 1934 Hearings] (statement of Sen. Bur-
ton Wheeler, Chairman, Comm. on Indian Affairs); see also Pfouts, supra note 277, at ii (“Wheeler 
was basically an assimilationist in his attitude toward the American Indian.”).  
 280.   See infra notes 286–90 and accompanying text.  
2016 INDIANS, TRIBES, AND (FEDERAL) JURISDICTION 485 
thought, with no discussion of what the phrase meant.281  While the con-
gressional debates around the IRA’s definition of “Indian” reflect legisla-
tors’ uncertainty and disagreement regarding whether particular peo-
ple(s) were Indians to whom the Act would apply, the debates also show 
that lawmakers shared the common understanding that the federal Indian 
affairs jurisdiction applied to people(s) if they were Indians. 
A. The Indian Reorganization Act’s Legislative History 
The legislative history regarding the IRA’s definition of Indian and 
“now under Federal jurisdiction” language is scant.  Early drafts of what 
became the Indian Reorganization Act began circulating in 1932 and in-
cluded among the Indians to whom the law applied persons of Indian de-
scent who were members of “any recognized Indian tribe,” as well as de-
scendants of such members living on reservations and persons of one-
fourth or more “Indian blood.”282  Like the final version, however, they 
did not define what a recognized Indian tribe was.283 
The issue of exactly which people(s) the IRA’s definition of Indian 
covered first appears in the legislative debates in April 1934, when Sena-
tor Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma asked Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
Collier about tribes the Senator described as “lost”—specifically naming 
the Catawbas in South Carolina, the Seminoles in Florida, and the Mi-
amis in Oklahoma—and whether it was “contemplated now to hunt those 
Indians up and give them a status again and try to do something for 
them?”284  Collier responded that the bill (as then drafted, without the 
“now under Federal jurisdiction” language) would make “any Indian 
who is a member of a recognized tribe or band” eligible for government 
aid—including “those rejected Indians” whom Thomas described as not 
under the Department’s “supervision” at the time.285  The discussion then 
moved to another topic. 
Senator Thomas again raised the issue of “lost” Indians in a May 
1934 hearing, stating that in Oklahoma there were “a great many num-
                                                          
 281.   See infra notes 302–07 and accompanying text.  
 282.   RUSCO, supra note 243, at 176, 268 (discussing and quoting draft legislation).  The earlier 
drafts also included “or other native political group or organization” in the definition of “tribe.”  See 
1934 Hearings, supra note 279, at 265 (Chairman Wheeler reading the bill). 
 283.   RUSCO, supra note 243, at 267. 
 284.   1934 Hearings, supra note 279, at 80.  At a hearing on the Catawbas’ status held four years 
earlier, Senator Thomas asked, “[a]t the present rate of decrease, how long will it be before they be-
come extinct?”  Survey of Conditions of Indians in the United States: Hearings Before a Subcomm. 
of the Comm. on Indian Affairs, 71st Cong. 7542 (1930).  
 285.   1934 Hearings, supra note 279, at 80.  
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bers of Indians that are practically lost . . . not registered . . . not en-
rolled . . . not supervised[,]” who were “remnants of a band” and  “could 
not come under th[e] act because they are not under the authority of the 
Indian Office.”286  Thomas’s statement led to an exchange among him, 
Collier, and Senators Wheeler, Lynn Frazier, and Joseph O’Mahoney 
which covers four pages of the Senate record and concludes with Collier 
suggesting that “now under Federal jurisdiction” be inserted after “rec-
ognized Indian tribe.”287  A summary of that exchange follows, and lays 
bare the extent to which the senators’ racial and cultural attitudes—
particularly their fixation on blood quantum and other perceptions of In-
dianness—shaped their ideas about over whom the Department should 
(and should not) be exercising its jurisdiction. 
Senator Wheeler responded to Senator Thomas’s concern about 
“lost” Indians by stating that the IRA was “being passed . . . to take care 
of the Indians that are taken care of at the present time.”288  Senators Fra-
zier and Thomas then brought up the Seminoles in Florida and unspeci-
fied “other Indians” and whether they should “be taken care of” by the 
Interior Department.289  After Thomas said that the Florida Seminoles 
and Catawbas were “just as much Indians as any others,” Wheeler an-
swered that there was “a later provision . . . covering that, and defining 
what an Indian is.”290  Collier then interjected, “[t]his is [the] more than 
one-fourth Indian blood [provision]”291—referring  to the part of the 
bill’s definition of Indian that included individuals of a quarter or more 
Native ancestry, irrespective of whether they were tribal members or 
lived on a reservation. 
Wheeler, who felt that Congress should be “trying to . . . get rid of 
the Indian problem rather than add to it[,]” expressed his opinion that the 
requirement should be one-half Indian blood.292  He “d[id] not think that 
the Government of the United States should go out . . . and take a lot of 
Indians . . .  that are quarter bloods . . . in under the provisions of th[e 
                                                          
 286.   Id. at 263.  Thomas also noted that the previous administration’s policy had been “to not 
recognize Indians except those already under authority.”  Id. 
 287.   Id. at 263–67.  Collier’s suggestion seems to have ended discussion on the issue, as it does 
not appear again in the legislative history. 
 288.   Id. at 263. 
 289.   Id. (statements of Sen. Frazier (“Those other Indians have got to be taken care of, 
though.”) and Sen. Thomas (“I think the Seminoles in Florida should be taken care of.”)). 
 290.   Id. (emphasis added). 
 291.   Id. 
 292.   Id. at 263–64. 
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IRA].”293  Senator Wheeler also argued that it was “perfectly idiotic” for 
the federal government to “continue to manage the property of Indians 
who are of the one-eighth blood” and asked why the government should 
be “managing the property of a lot of Indians who are practically white 
and hold office and do everything else[,]”294 referring to former United 
States Vice President Charles Curtis, who was a citizen of the Kaw Na-
tion and between one-fourth and one-eighth Native (Kaw, Osage, and 
Potawatomi) ancestry.295  But Senators Wheeler and Thomas both 
agreed, along with Commissioner Collier, that the bill did not change ex-
isting law regarding members of recognized tribes (and their descendants 
living on reservations)—and that they were covered by the bill, without 
regard to blood quantum.296 
After more debate on the definition’s blood quantum provision (and 
whether it should be one-half or one-quarter), the senators returned to 
discussing the Catawba and whether they should come under the IRA.297  
According to Senator Thomas, they were living on a 500-acre reserva-
tion, though “[t]he [federal] Government ha[d] not found out they live 
yet, apparently.”298  Some Catawbas “presumably” were half-bloods, but 
most of them were not, and “[s]ome of them [we]re practically white.”299  
Senator Wheeler thought they would not be affected unless they were 
half-bloods, in which case the federal government “would have to take 
them over.”300  Senator O’Mahoney, however, questioned Wheeler’s in-
terpretation, noting that there was “no limitation of blood” for “persons 
of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe” and 
that “the Catawbas certainly are an Indian tribe.”301 
                                                          
 293.   Id. at 263.  That, he said, would lead to “all kinds of people coming in and claiming they 
are quarter-blood Indians and want[ing] to be put upon the Government rolls.”  Id. 
 294.   Id. at 264 (emphasis added). 
 295.   See Scott McKie, Charles Curtis: America’s Indian Vice President, CHEROKEE ONE 
FEATHER (Feb. 4, 2014), http://theonefeather.com/2014/02/charles-curtis-americas-indian-vice-
president/. 
 296.   1934 Hearings, supra note 279, at 264.  Senators Wheeler and Thomas also appeared to 
agree on the need to—eventually, though not in the present bill—end the federal government’s man-
agement of at least some Indians’ property.  Id. 
 297.   Id. at 265–66.  The discussion focuses on the Catawba but was prompted by Senator 
Thomas’s asking whether the bill’s language would “cover into the Department under its jurisdiction 
the Catawbas and Miamis?”  Id. at 265.  Although Senator Thomas mentioned the Miami, there ap-
pears to be some confusion, as Senator Thomas responded “Yes” when Senator Wheeler asked “You 
mean down in Florida?”—even though neither the Catawba nor Miami are from Florida.  Id. 
 298.   Id. at 265–66. 
 299.   Id. at 266 (statements of Sen. Thomas) (emphasis added); id. at 265 (“They are living on a 
reservation and they are descendants of Indians and they are not half-bloods.”).  
 300.   Id. at 266.  
 301.   Id. (emphasis added).  
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Senators Wheeler and O’Mahoney agreed on the need to “have a 
limitation” after the bill’s definition of “tribe” if they wanted to try to ex-
clude the Catawba or other tribes.302  But whereas Senator O’Mahoney 
thought the IRA’s provisions should be extended to the Catawba—”if 
they are living as Catawba Indians”—the same as to Indians living on 
federally-established reservations,303 Wheeler thought they should be 
covered only if they were “half-blood Indians.”304  Wheeler then spoke 
about the need to “eliminate” from federal supervision persons he did not 
consider Indian enough anymore, invoking a specific “instance in North-
ern California, [of] several so-called ‘tribes’ there[,]” whom he told Sen-
ator O’Mahoney were “no more Indians than you or I, perhaps.  I mean 
they are white people essentially.  And yet they are under the supervision 
of the Government of the United States, and there is no reason for it at 
all, in my judgment.”305 
After Senator O’Mahoney suggested “some separate provision ex-
cluding from the benefits of the act certain types” of Indians, Commis-
sioner Collier responded “Would not this meet your thought, Senator: 
After the words ‘recognized Indian tribe’ in line 1 insert ‘now under 
Federal jurisdiction’?  That would limit the act to the Indians now under 
Federal jurisdiction, except that other Indians of more than one-half Indi-
an blood would get help.”306  With the senators still not agreeing on ex-
actly which Indians were then under federal jurisdiction—and to whom 
the Act would apply—the hearings adjourned after Collier made his sug-
gestion.307  There is nothing further in the legislative history regarding 
the act’s definition of Indian. 
The final bill included both Senator Wheeler’s preference for the 
half-blood requirement and Collier’s “now under Federal jurisdiction” 
language,308 despite Felix Cohen’s uncertainty about its meaning—he 
wrote “whatever that may mean” when referring to Collier’s added lan-
guage in a memorandum comparing the Senate and House versions of 
                                                          
 302.   Id. 
 303.   Id. (emphasis added). 
 304.   Id. (“They would not be affected unless they are half-blood Indians.”); id. at 265 (“If they 
are not half-blood Indians, we should not take them in.”).  
 305.   Id. (emphasis added). 
 306.   Id.  
 307.   See id. at 266–67. 
 308.   Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch, 576, § 19, 48 Stat. 984, 988 (codified as 25 U.S.C. 
§ 5129  (formerly 25 U.S.C. § 479)).  See RUSCO, supra note 243, at 269 (noting that Collier favored 
the one-quarter blood criterion but reluctantly accepted the half-blood provision in the final bill).   
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the bill.309  Indeed, the Solicitor’s office recommended that the language 
be removed because it was likely to “provoke interminable questions of 
interpretation.”310  Like the debates about the status of the Catawba (who 
the Interior Department Solicitor’s office determined ten years later were 
indeed an Indian tribe, and always had been)311 and other Indians that 
yielded it, the “now under Federal jurisdiction” language left unre-
solved—and simply reproduced—the question of whether certain peo-
ple(s) were Indians or Indian tribes such that they fell under that jurisdic-
tion. 
B. Post-1934 Congressional Debates and Legislation 
In the years following the IRA, Congress continued to debate wheth-
er the federal government should be exercising its guardianship jurisdic-
tion with respect to people(s) whose Indianness lawmakers questioned.  
Many congressmen, including Senator Wheeler and others involved in 
the IRA debates, still favored assimilation, remained unhappy about the 
federal government’s exercising jurisdiction regarding people they felt 
were becoming more “civilized” and “moving toward an amalgamation 
with the general population,” and wanted to dismantle the Indian affairs 
bureaucracy.312  After barely a decade under the Indian New Deal, feder-
al Indian policy shifted to focus on formally ending—or terminating—
the United States’ relationships with and obligations to Indian people(s), 
“turn[ing] the Indians loose[,]” and transferring the federal government’s 
jurisdiction to the various states.313 
                                                          
 309.   Memorandum from Felix Cohen on Differences Between House Bill and Senate Bill 2 
(undated) (on file with author) (emphasis added). 
 310.   Memorandum Analysis of Difference Between House Bill and Senate Bill 14 (undated) 
(on file with author).  
 311.   See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text. 
 312.   Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Indian Affairs on H. Res. 166, A Bill to Authorize and 
Direct and Conduct an Investigation to Determine Whether the Changed Status of the Indian Re-
quires a Revision of the Laws and Regulations Affecting the American Indian, 78th Cong. 19 (1943) 
[hereinafter 1943 Hearings] (response of John Collier, Comm’r of Indian Affairs); id. at 12 (distin-
guishing between the “more civilized” and “the less civilized” Indians in Idaho) (response of Rep. 
Compton I. White, Idaho); id. at 19 (describing Indians in South and North Dakota, Montana, and 
Oklahoma) (response of John Collier); ALISON R. BERNSTEIN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND WORLD 
WAR II: TOWARD A NEW ERA IN INDIAN AFFAIRS 100–05 (1991) (discussing Congressional opposi-
tion to the Indian New Deal and support for assimilation); Pfouts, supra note 277, at ii (noting that 
“[b]y 1937, [Senator Wheeler] felt that the Act was not promoting his goal of fairly immediate Indi-
an assimilation, and he made an attempt to repeal it.  Though his and several similar repeal efforts 
failed, Wheeler continued to separate himself from the Act in later years.”).  
 313.   See 1943 Hearings, supra note 312, at 12–13 (discussing an earlier “bill . . . introduced to 
wind up the affairs of the Indians and turn the Indians loose” and “provide[] that [their] land shall be 
turned over by the Government to the States”) (statement of Rep. Usher L. Burdick, N.D.); id. at 1, 
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John Collier and other New Deal reformers in the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs had found themselves fighting to defend their policies and pro-
grams, including the IRA, since their adoption.  But Collier was also a 
pragmatist and willing to downsize the BIA in order to preserve it, and 
he apparently shared lawmakers’ concerns about exercising jurisdiction 
over people they felt were no longer Indians.314  In a March 1943 House 
Committee on Indian Affairs hearing on a bill to authorize a study on 
changes to U.S. Indian law and policy, Collier read aloud from a letter he 
received asking how many of the 400,000 Indians mentioned in a recent 
Interior Department news release were “full-blooded Indians, . . . half-
breeds, and . . . blood of lesser degree” and whether the government was 
“just handing out political pap to a great number of persons who are not 
Indians; who do not live as Indians, and should not be subsidized as In-
dians.”315  Collier then suggested that Congress and the Department “find 
out how many of the Indians, here and now, can be relieved of Federal 
supervision[,]” so that the government would not “go on unto eternity 
providing subsidy for Indians who really are Indians no more.”316 
Collier’s other testimony, including his written statement, noted var-
ious obligations—including building schools and hospitals, providing 
economic development, institutional, and technical assistance, and re-
solving Indian land rights and tenure—the United States had to Indian 
peoples and emphasized his belief that it was best to consolidate these 
functions in a single government agency.317  His testimony also shows 
that Collier understood these obligations to arise not just through treaties 
but also the discovery doctrine and colonial fiduciary relationship, and 
that they would continue even if the BIA did not fulfill them or did not 
                                                          
18–22 (debating H. Res. 166, a resolution to “instigate an investigation and study to determine the 
necessity and advisability of revising the Federal laws and regulations relating to Indian affairs”); 
see also CORNTASSEL & WITMER, supra note 5, at 12–14 (discussing shift from Indian New Deal to 
termination policies); DAILY, supra note 273, at 127 (noting “the termination policies that Congress 
instituted in the late forties and fifties, largely in reaction to Collier’s New Deal measures”).  
 314.   See RUSCO, supra note 243, at 175 (noting that “Collier shared an assumption of many 
others acquainted with Indian affairs . . . that most Indians had lost their tribal cultures; particularly, 
their governmental institutions had largely disappeared”); see also supra notes 76–88, 95 and ac-
companying text (discussing correspondence and memoranda from Collier and other Indian affairs 
officials regarding the Shinnecock and other people(s) in the Northeast and Southeast). 
 315.   1943 Hearings, supra note 312, at 15 (emphasis added).  The letter, which Collier said was 
“from a disinterested California lawyer, who knows a great deal about Indians[,]” also asked how 
many of those Indians were “no longer in need of a guardian, Federal or otherwise.”  Id. at 15–16. 
 316.   Id. at 16 (emphasis added).  In subsequent questioning by Committee Chairman James 
O’Connor, Collier agreed that “there [we]re many, there [we]re thousands” of “Indians capable of 
looking after themselves if restored to full citizenship and . . . able to go about like a white man[,]” 
though he was “not prepared to say what percentage.”  Id. at 20.   
 317.   Id. at 23–24.   
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exist.  According to Collier, “[t]hese [we]re obligations and responsibili-
ties which the Nation took upon itself in its announced intention of civi-
lizing and incorporating into its body politic the nations whom it had 
conquered and subjected.”318 
Two months after the House committee hearing, Senator Elmer 
Thomas (who had replaced Senator Burton Wheeler as the Senate Indian 
Affairs Committee Chairman, with Wheeler becoming the ranking mem-
ber) issued a report which condemned Collier’s administration, recom-
mended that the BIA be abolished, and “marked a turning point in Con-
gress’s renunciation of Collier’s policies and an omen of Collier’s forced 
resignation in 1945.”319  Additional Congressional hearings and reports 
that followed resulted in Congress’s officially adopting the termination 
policy on August 1, 1953, when it passed House Concurrent Resolution 
108 with the express goal “to make the Indians within the territorial lim-
its of the United States subject to the same laws . . . as are applicable to 
other citizens of the United States, [and] to end their status as wards of 
the United States.”320  This resolution accompanied Public Law 280, the 
centerpiece legislation of termination policy which transferred criminal 
and certain civil jurisdiction over Indians from the federal government to 
states.321  Legislation specifically “terminating” the federal status of vari-
ous tribes followed, until the United States ended the termination policy 
under President Richard Nixon in the early 1970s.322 
But even as Congress moved to shed the government’s responsibili-
ties to Indian peoples, legislators and other federal officials continued to 
                                                          
 318.   Id. at 24.  
 319.   S. REP. NO. 78-310, at 17–22 (1943); DAILY, supra note 273, at 143.  The House Commit-
tee on Indian Affairs held several hearings on Senator Thomas’s report throughout 1944.  Hearings 
Before the H. Comm. on Indian Affairs on H. Res. 166, A Bill to Authorize and Direct and Conduct 
an Investigation to Determine Whether the Changed Status of the Indian Requires a Revision of the 
Laws and Regulations Affecting the American Indian, pt. 2, 78th Cong. (1944). 
 320.   H.R. CON. RES. 108, 83rd Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).  See Charles F. Wilkson and Eric 
R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 145 (1977) (“Termi-
nation was not to become official policy until 1953.  The clear movement in that direction, however, 
began in the mid-1940’s when reaction against the IRA reform efforts became intense.”); see also 
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON CALIFORNIA INDIAN POLICY, ACCIP TERMINATION REPORT: THE CONTIN-
UING DESTRUCTIVE EFFECTS OF THE TERMINATION POLICY ON CALIFORNIA INDIANS app. 1–5 
(1997) (providing a legislative history of termination in California).  
 321.   See Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation 
Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975).  When enacted in 1953, Public Law 280 applied to all tribes 
in California, Minnesota (except for the Red Lake Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon (except for the 
Warm Springs Reservation), and Wisconsin.  In the decades following, it was extended to include 
exercises of jurisdiction by Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Utah, and Washington.  Id. at 537 n.11, 563, 567–69, 568 n.149.  Similar legislation, 
which predates Public Law 280, applies in New York.  Id. at 577.  
 322.   See ACCIP TERMINATION REPORT, supra note 320, at 3.  
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grapple with figuring out which people(s) were Indians and Indian tribes.  
The 1952 House report that was the basis for House Concurrent Resolu-
tion 108, for example, noted “the danger of relying on what appear to be 
artificial and somewhat unreal social criteria in defining an Indian[,]” 
and that “[t]he trouble in defining an Indian appears in redoubled form in 
the phrase, ‘Indian tribe.’”323  And while Congress remained unsure 
about exactly which people(s) were Indians and tribes subject to the fed-
eral government’s Indian affairs jurisdiction, Congress’s terminating fed-
eral jurisdiction with respect to certain people(s) and transferring it to the 
states is an obvious acknowledgment that those Indians were (thereto-
fore) under federal jurisdiction.  It also raises the questions of when and 
how that jurisdiction came about—and how, if it existed in the 1950s and 
1940s, it could not have existed in 1934.  So does any post-1934 exercise 
of the government’s federal Indian affairs jurisdiction. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The legislative debates, law, and history reviewed above suggest that 
the Indian Reorganization Act’s “any recognized Indian tribe now under 
Federal jurisdiction” language envelops a singular inquiry: whether peo-
ple(s) continued to exist as distinct Indian communities, such that the 
federal Indian affairs jurisdiction attached to them.  However backwards 
the language or standards used, government officials across the branches 
and centuries have asked that same question.  The “now under Federal 
jurisdiction” language and the debates that produced it certainly embody 
a moment of racial essentialism in which many Native people(s) were 
dismissed for failing to conform to stereotypical conceptions of “Indian-
ness.”  They also encapsulate officials’ continual grappling with which 
people(s) the U.S. government should treat as Indian tribes, and on what 
basis it should do so.  The language is, after all, in the statute’s definition 
of “Indian.” 
According to the most basic federal Indian law doctrines, people(s) 
determined to be Indians and Indian tribes were—and had been, since the 
                                                          
 323.   H.R. REP. No. 82-2503, app. II, at 139 (1952); see also id. at 140 (stating a need for “[t]he 
concepts involved in Indian affairs . . . to be listed and defined and the definitions standardized”); 
Quinn, supra note 74, at 360–61 (noting that the report “basically defined Indian ‘tribes and bands’ 
as those ‘[w]hich were reconstructed with the passage of the [IRA] and were set up with formal legal 
existence as tribes recognized by the Government,’ and . . . ‘Indian’ as a ‘[p]erson who is a member 
of an Indian group or tribe which has special relations to the Federal government[,]’” and that these 
“administrative definitions for both ‘Indian’ and ‘Indian tribe’ were set and were to last right up to 
the promulgation of 25 C.F.R. § 83 [in 1978]”) (first and third alterations in original) (quoting H.R. 
REP. No. 82-2503, app. II, at 139 (1953)). 
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United States first asserted jurisdiction over their territories—under fed-
eral jurisdiction.  Some senators, however, were uncomfortable with ex-
ercising jurisdiction over people(s) whose Indianness they questioned, so 
they added “now under Federal jurisdiction” in the IRA’s definition of 
Indian in an attempt to exclude those people.  They clearly understood 
the government to have that jurisdiction; they just did not want to exer-
cise it.  But they could not agree among themselves whether certain peo-
ple(s) were (still) Indians, and the language they added exacerbated the 
very problem it was offered to solve—figuring out which people(s) were 
Indians who came within the federal Indian affairs jurisdiction. 
In the years following the Indian Reorganization Act, Interior De-
partment and other government officials still had to determine on a case-
by-case basis whether certain people(s) were Indian tribes for purposes 
of the IRA and federal law generally—whether to recognize those peo-
ple(s) as Indian tribes who, therefore, were under federal jurisdiction.  
The “indeterminable questions of interpretation” the Interior Department 
Solicitor’s Office warned about when it argued against including the 
“under Federal jurisdiction” language in the IRA are now compounded 
by the Court’s decision in Carcieri.324  It has left judges, government 
lawyers, agency officials, practitioners, and scholars with the task of de-
ciphering the meaning of language that Felix Cohen, who authored much 
of the IRA and developed the criteria for determining whether people(s) 
qualified as Indian tribes under it, himself was at a loss to define.325 
The inquiry regarding whether people(s) fall under the Indian affairs 
jurisdiction has never been, and should not now be, about whether the 
government exercised that jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that Interior Department officials’ decisions not to exer-
cise their jurisdiction with respect to certain people(s) do not negate its 
existence.326  By the same token, what Interior Department officials in 
Washington and elsewhere thought is not determinative of what Con-
gress, or a few of its members, intended when they passed the Indian Re-
organization Act.327  And regardless of one’s philosophy on statutory in-
                                                          
 324.   See supra note 310 and accompanying text.  
 325.   See supra notes 243–51, 309 and accompanying text.   
 326.   United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 653 (1978) (explaining that “the fact that federal su-
pervision over [the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians] has not been continuous” did not “de-
stroy[] the federal power to deal with them”); see also supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.  
 327.   Carcieri reminds us that it is, after all, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of statutory lan-
guage that controls, not what Interior Department officials argue.  See supra notes 31–36.  However, 
administrative law principles suggest some degree of judicial deference is owed to the Interior De-
partment’s interpretation of the statute.  See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 396 (2009) (Breyer, 
J., concurring); Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Cmty. v. Jewell, 830 F.3d 552, 558–59  
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terpretation, it is questionable how much, if at all, statements made by a 
few senators about particular Indigenous people(s) when discussing the 
statute’s definition of Indian (and whether the statute would apply to 
those people) should bear on the meaning of language they did not de-
bate.328 
Assigning meaning to the IRA’s “under Federal jurisdiction” lan-
guage presents normative, interpretive, and political questions in addition 
to doctrinal ones.  Conflating the exercise and existence of federal juris-
diction is not only incorrect as a matter of law; it is also unfair.  Requir-
ing tribes to produce evidence showing the federal government was ac-
tively exercising its jurisdiction with respect to them in and before 1934 
penalizes tribes for whom such evidence might be lacking because feder-
al officials were not doing their jobs and fulfilling the government’s ob-
ligations to those tribes in the years before and around the IRA’s pas-
sage.329  This position is especially troubling given that government 
officials chose not to exercise their jurisdiction regarding certain peo-
ple(s) based on racial and ethnographic standards that are, ostensibly, no 
longer used and have been replaced by criteria under which these same 
people(s) have since been determined to be Indian tribes.330 
                                                          
(D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Citizens Against Reservation Shopping v. Jewell (U.S. 
Oct. 27, 2016) (No. 16-572).  
 328.   See supra notes 302–07 and accompanying text.  In the Carcieri oral argument, Justice 
Scalia seemed rather dismissive of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee debate that yielded the lan-
guage.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379 (2009) (No. 07-526) (“Was it 
even on the floor of Congress? . . . . It was at a hearing, oh.”).  But Justice Breyer retorted that 
“[y]ou learn a lot at hearings, actually.”  Id. 
 329.   The Interior Department’s Office of the Solicitor has taken the position that the phrase 
“under Federal jurisdiction” is ambiguous and that, in order to qualify as having been under federal 
jurisdiction in 1934, a tribe must “show[] . . . that the United States has exercised its jurisdiction at 
some point prior to 1934 and that this jurisdictional status remained intact.”  Memorandum from 
Hilary C. Tompkins, supra note 17, at 18–19 (emphasis added); see also id. at 18 (stating that 
“the . . . Court’s ruling in Carcieri counsels the Department to point to some indication that in 1934 
the tribe in question was under federal jurisdiction.  Having indicia of federal jurisdiction beyond the 
general principle of plenary authority demonstrates the federal government’s exercise of responsibil-
ity for and obligation to an Indian tribe and its members in 1934”) (emphasis added).  This interpre-
tation, by requiring tribes to point to specific examples of the federal government’s exercising its 
jurisdiction in order to show they were under that jurisdiction, appears to be at odds with federal 
Indian law canons of interpretation which require that ambiguous statutes be interpreted in favor of 
Indian tribes—and which the Solicitor’s opinion cites.  See id. at 5 (“[S]tatutory silence or ambiguity 
is not to be interpreted to the detriment of Indians.  Instead, statutes establishing Indian rights and 
privileges are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with any ambiguities to be resolved in 
their favor.”).  
 330.   See supra notes 95–103 and accompanying text. 
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The plain meaning of the word jurisdiction, its usage in the IRA’s 
legislative history and in other contexts,331 and particularly its usage in 
the context of the plenary federal Indian affairs power suggest that all 
federally recognized Indian tribes were under federal jurisdiction before, 
during, and after 1934.  If the phrase is deemed ambiguous, federal Indi-
an law canons of interpretation mandate that statutory ambiguities be re-
solved in favor of tribes.332  That, seemingly, also requires construing ju-
risdiction to mean authority and concluding that if people(s) existed as 
tribes in 1934—whether or not the United States recognized them as 
such at the time—they were under federal jurisdiction then too. 
The questions surrounding the meaning of the “under Federal juris-
diction” language, of course, involve more than just statutory construc-
tion principles.  They cannot be separated from the larger politics around 
tribal land reacquisitions—not only concerning Indian casinos, but more 
generally about state and local governments losing control over, and rev-
enue from, the land.  The extent to which politics and ideologies about 
federalism, as well as attitudes about Indigenous people(s) (including 
perceptions of Indianness and views on tribal sovereignty), shape judicial 
interpretations of the Indian Reorganization Act’s language remains to be 
seen, along with how judges’ explanations will square with federal Indi-
an law’s most fundamental doctrines. 
                                                          
 331.   The phrase “federal jurisdiction” appears nowhere else (besides the definition of “Indian” 
in 25 U.S.C. § 5129) in the statutory text or legislative history of the IRA.  The phrases “federal su-
pervision,” “federal guardianship,” and “federal tutelage,” however, do appear elsewhere in the stat-
ute’s legislative history, indicating that members of Congress understood those phrases to have a 
different meaning than federal jurisdiction and could have used them, instead of “jurisdiction,” had 
they intended to limit the IRA’s application to people(s) over whom the federal government was 
exercising jurisdiction in 1934.  See Memorandum of Hans Walker, Jr., supra note 133, at 4–5 
(comparing the usages of “federal jurisdiction,” “federal supervision,” “federal guardianship,” and 
“federal tutelage” in the IRA’s text and legislative history).  
 332.   See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968).  
